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'What is a chief?' and 'what do chiefs do?' are the two 
questions which begin this study of political authority in rural 
Lesotho. These questions are contained within a broader one, 'why 
do villagers often hold chiefs, individually and generally, in 
contempt but recoil at the suggestion of dissolution of the 
chieftainship?' The latter question arose from the author's 
initial field experiences to become the basis for a study which 
examines the history of the chieftainship in Lesotho. This 
history is seen as a dialectical process involving a struggle 
over, and a struggle for, the chieftainship. The former struggle 
refers to the interventions of elites in society, namely senior 
chiefs, colonial government officials and, in more recent times, 
post-independence governments and foreign aid agencies. The 
latter struggle refers to the interventions of chiefs and the 
rural populace. 
Having outlined different ethnographic descriptions of 
Lesotho's chieftainship, in order to illustrate the different 
criteria of authority which were applied in the making of the 
chieftainship, the study goes on to consider the efforts of 
different agencies to make the chieftainship in the image they 













chieftainship. This analysis takes the discussion from the 
colonial context, during which Basutoland and the chieftainship 
were created, to contemporary regional and local rural contexts, 
in which the chieftainship exists. The discussion illustrates how 
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chiefs have been personifications of family and society, and how 
this representation is being challenged amongst the rural 
populace today. The multiplicity of forces which have shaped the 
chieftainship are then drawn together in a conclusion which 
examines the pivotal role of the chieftainship in the creation 
of a national identity and in the crisis of legitimacy facing 
the contemporary state in Lesotho. 
The study is informed by a marxist theoretical perspective, 
but it is also influenced by the debate on postmodernism in 
Anthropology. This leads the study to acknowledge the current 
context of theoretical uncertainty for ethnographic research, and 
the opportunities this affords for exploration of new 
perspectives. One result is that the study examines tentatively 
the role of bio-physical phenomena in the way Basotho have 
constructed society and nature, and represented this construction 
in their collective understanding of political authority. 
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NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY 
The citizens of Lesotho refer to themselves collectively as 
Basotho. The individual citizen is referred to as Mosotho. 
Sesotho is the language spoken in Lesotho, but it also refers to 
anything pertaining to Lesotho, Basotho and their heritage. 
There are two orthographies of Sesotho. One orthography is 
used in Lesotho and it is derived from the lexicographic works 
of the early French missionaries in the country. The other 
orthography is used in South Africa and it is an anglicised 
version of the former orthography. I use the first orthography 
in this study, except in specific instances where use of the 
second orthography is appropriate. 
The Lesotho orthography contains several idiomatic features 
which appear in this study: 
1) th" is an aspirated "t" and there is no locution in 
Sesotho of "th" as there is in English. 
2 ) "oa" together in a word is pronounced "wa" in English. 
3) "ea" together in a word is pronounced "ya" in English. 
4) An "l" before an "i" or a "u" is pronounced as "d" in 
English. 
5) A "ph" is an aspirated "p", and there is no locution in 





Note on Orthography 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
What is a chief? What do chiefs do? 
Chief and chieftainship 
Origins and Direction of the study 
Summary 









Presentation of structure 25 
What is the chieftainship? 33 
Hierarchies of chiefs 38 
Point of departure 60 
CHAPTER 3: THE MAKING OF THE CHIEFTAINSHIP IN MOKHOTLONG 
Chiefs, the colonial government and subjects 62 
The making of chiefs in Mokhotlong 63 
Conclusion: The dialectic of authority 90 
CHAPTER 4: CHIEFS, SUBJECTS AND SETTLEMENT 
The struggle for the chieftainship 95 
The management of settlement 97 
'Development' committees 107 
Conclusion: Differentiation of authority 113 
CHAPTER 5: CHIEFS, SUBJECTS AND LAND 
The need for land 115 
Indication of need: an ecological crisis in Lesotho 117 
Land as a resource 120 
The struggle for arable land 123 
CHAPTER 6: CHIEFS, SUBJECTS AND LIVESTOCK 
Erosion of chiefs authority? 
Chiefs and the livestock economy 
Collective Interest in Livestock 
Historical roots of current political tensions 
Current tensions over livestock and grassland 
management 
Conclusion: Community of chief and subject 
CHAPTER 7: POLITICAL CULTURE IN RURAL LESOTHO 
The national context of chiefs' authority 
State interventions: an indication of crisis 
The state and national identity 
Creation of concordance between the state and 
national identity 
Disassembling the state and national identity 
Conclusion 















FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTERS 
REFERENCES 
DIAGRAMS 
Map 1: Lesotho- Districts 
Map 2: Grazing Post Research Area and Managed 






Table 1: Size of the National Herd 144 
Table 2: Percentages of households owning livestock in 
four sample surveys of the mountain region 161 
Table 3: Percentages of households which owned sheep and 
goats according to herd size 162 
Table 4: Percentages of households which owned cattle, 
horses and donkeys according to herd size 162 
Table 5: Number of grazing posts in use during summer 
months in five valleys near the 
Maluti/Drakensberg escarpment, 1925-1992 176 
Table 6: Ownership and use of grazing posts 177 
Table 7: Number and ownership of herds at grazing posts 
in five valleys during 1988 178 
Table 8: Livestock numbers and stock density in grazing 
post areas during the summer months of 1988 
and 1992 180 
Table 9: Livestock numbers and stock density in grazing 
post areas during the winter months of 1988 and 
1991 180 
Figure 1: Genealogical relationships between candidates 
for the position of 'acting' chief in 
Mapholaneng sub-ward in 1987 27 
Figure 2: Genealogical relationships in the Tlokoeng 
Ward Chief's Office 31 
Figure 3: The Pyramid description of the chieftainship 39 
Figure 4: The structure of government in Lesotho 96 
Figure 5: Sesotho classification of natural resources 122 
Figure 6: Division of fields amongst the heirs of 
Motisilane Maliehe 130 
Case Study: Maliehe's fields 129 
vii 






-."'-"" Ir.ter.13t!cn'"I boi.,•r.dary fl 
.... /~-\ ....... District tcl!r.dc:<es f 
MAP 2: GRAZING POST RESEARCH AREA AND MANAGED RESOURCE AREA 
(MRA) 
LESOTHO 
..... --. - -
LEGEND 
~ Managed Resource 
~I Area (MRA) , 
· · · · ·· Boundary of MRA 
A: Jareteng valley 
B: Langalabalele valley 
C: Merareng valley 




What is a chief? What do chiefs do? 
On October 5th 1986 I drove into Mapholaneng, a village in the 
Mokhotlong district of Lesotho, to begin field research on the 
chieftainship. I arrived with two practical questions in mind: 
what are chiefs, and what do chiefs do? These questions were to 
be the basis for broader research on the practice of authority 
with a view to understanding the likely future of the 
chieftainship. That future appeared uncertain, for the 
chieftainship seemed to me to be an archaic form of authority. 
The statutory erosion of the chiefs' authority as a result of 
interventions by the colonial government and by the dictatorial, 
post-independence government of the Basotho National Party 
seemed destined to continue, in view of the coup d'etat in 
January 1986 which put the military in power. The ruling military 
council was vacillating on the question of re-establishing 
parliamentary party politics, but it was affirming ministerial 
government staffed by civil servants to the exclusion of chiefs. 
In each district, the District Secretary and the District 
Military Officer presided over a bureaucracy which incorporated 
a number of departments, ranging from an army garrison to a 
vehicle licensing department, and co-ordinated the activities 
of many donor aid organisations. The rise of populist and 
socialist political movements in South Africa with little regard 
for chiefs, as an institution of authority, was another threat, 
albeit it an indirect one, to the chieftainship in Lesotho. Also, 
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the economic welfare of most Basotho depended less on chiefs' 
authority to control local use of natural resources than on 
earnings remitted by the many men and women who migrated to South 
Africa to work, and on access to an ever expanding network of 
traders who import manufactured goods from South Africa. 
My two questions concealed an interest in the cultural 
heritage of the chieftainship. I came to Mapholaneng because it 
lay in Tlokoeng ward, an administrative section of Mokhotlong 
district, and an area of historical significance in the evolution 
of Lesotho's chieftainship. Tlokoeng owes its existence to the 
military support given by a Sotho-speaking refugee group to the 
Basotho paramount chief in the late 19th century. In 1880 many 
Basotho sided with their paramount chief in rebellion against a 
colonial demand to hand in their guns. The tensions were felt in 
the Cape Colony, and they exacerbated a leadership dispute within 
a re-constituted Batlokoa chiefdom in the Mt Fletcher area. The 
dispute was between the deceased chief's heir, Lelingoana 
Sekonyela, and the the regent, Lehana Sekonyela. The outcome was 
that Lelingoana left Mt Fletcher with a following to join forces 
with the Basotho paramount chief in what became known as the 
'Gun War'. Following resolution of this war, the paramount chief 
offered land east of the Malibamatso river and north of its 
junction with the Senqu river to Lelingoana Sekonyela and his 
(see Map 1, page viii). In due course, Lelingoana established his 
own hierachy of chiefs to govern settlements that grew throughout 
eastern Lesotho. The Batlokoa chieftainship became an integral 
part of the national chieftainship, but it acquired a distinct 
statutory identity. 
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It is this political history of endorsement and dissipation 
of political affiliations, spanning the pre-colonial, colonial 
and modern eras, that identified Tlokoeng as an appropriate area 
for field research and for the study of politic al culture. 
Research in Tlokoeng also offered the opportunity for 
comparative research in view of the work conducted in this area 
by the anthropologist, Hugh Ashton. Ashton did fieldwork while 
resident at Malingoaneng during the 1930s, the results of which 
appeared in the monograph The Basuto in 1952. His work reflected 
anthropological concern of the time to record the traditions and 
customs of non-western societies. The Basuto was written on the 
premise that the Batlokoa residents, through their relative 
isolation in the mountains, still led a traditional way of life 
and, therefore, provided the best illustration of Basotho 
culture for documentation in a monograph. 50 years later, much 
has obviously changed in both anthropological discourse and in 
social conditions in the study area. Ashton's premises may be 
discredited today, but their contrast to the principles of this 
study would help me to be reflexive about the anthropological 
enterprise and the inevitable subjectivity of interpreting 
intangible features of political culture. 
While my head was full of ideas about the principles of this 
study, I was hardly aware of the way in which I was being led 
into the research by its 'subjects'. Having carried out research 
previously in Lesotho, I knew the appropriate means to seek 
residence in a village. I arrived in Mapholaneng bearing a letter 
of introduction to the ward chief from the chief in whose area 
I had worked previously. While I was temporarily resident at the 
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high school in Mapholaneng, the headmaster gave me directions to 
the ward chief's village and also influenced me on the 
appropriateness of Mapholaneng for field work. Within the space 
of two days my plans were turned up side down as I re-assessed 
the rationale and scope of my research. I had planned to settle 
in the village of the ward chief because, I thought, I would be 
able to see at close hand the practicalities of ward 
administration, and I would be living in the same locality as 
Ashton and able, therefore, to get a good historical insight into 
changes in the work and authority of chiefs. My interest in 
history and a tacit, albeit simplistic, interest in the ethnic 
heritage of the area were soon outweighed by a training that had 
emphasised the present and the complexities of modernity in 
society which Mapholaneng seemed to display. 
This village was clearly growing rapidly, and fast becoming 
the district's second metropole after Mokhotlong, the district 
capital. It contained 180 homesteads, a high school, a secondary 
school, four large trading stores amongst others, a police 
station, a court, a Red Cross clinic, a post office, and a 
veterinary office. Mapholaneng was also the centre of a division 
of the ward which was under the jurisdiction of a sub-ward chief, 
and which included two further territorial sub-divisions under 
the subordinate authority of two 'headmen' ( ramotse) . Simply put, 
I was taken by the question of how a seemingly archaic authority 
functioned in a context of apparent economic modernisation and 
growth of a nascent town. 
Thus I went to the village of the ward chief with my letter 
of introduction to request permission to live in Mapholaneng. 
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I found that he was senile and that his first wife was acting-
chief, but daily administration was largely in the hands of the 
court secretary and a senior councillor. These men gave me 
permission to settle in the ward and a letter of introduction to 
the sub-ward chief at Mapholaneng. My efforts to see the sub-ward 
chief were unsuccessful, but in the meantime I had been directed 
by the headmaster to a Mr Letlaka Moteetee for assistance in 
obtaining accomodation. I subsequently found out that Mr Moteetee 
was an important political figure in the area. He was the local 
organiser of the Basotho Congress Party (BCP), a Pan Africanist 
organisation which had been a resistance movement to the BNP 
government for many years, and an ex-teacher cum trader who had 
suffered detention and torture for his political activities. Mr 
Moteetee subsequently became my patron, as a result of which many 
particular doors opened for me while I carried out fieldwork. 
My early days in Mapholaneng were certainly coloured by 
undisguised political interest in my presence, resulting both 
from my stated research interests and from my coming from South 
Africa. I was accosted and seemingly screened on different 
occasions by a CID detective and the lieutenant of an army patrol 
while the vistors to my hut were often those who professed BCP 
affiliations. There was some irony in this introduction. My 
sentiments were initially in line with BCP ideology, which had 
nothing but disdain for the chieftainship and espoused its 
dissolution. Subsequently, however, my views changed as I 
encountered popular support for the chieftainship; but Mr 
Moteetee and other BCP sympathisers remained the people upon whom 
I relied to test my interpetations. 
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My main concern at the time, however, was my failure to hold 
with etiquette for strangers newly arrived in a place; namely, 
to meet and introduce myself to the sub-ward chief. I finally 
found him at a local shebeen. Subsequent efforts to meet him 
were no more successful - he was an alcoholic whom I rarely saw 
again, and he died a few months later of his illness. My early 
encounters with the chieftainship were limited to peremptory 
talks with those who carried out business on behalf of this chief 
while my experience drew derogatory comments from villagers about 
chiefs in general, mixed with pride for the institution. It was 
an experience which informed a question that was to become 
central to my fieldwork: why do villagers often hold chiefs, 
individually and generally, in contempt, but recoil at the 
suggestion of dissolution of the chieftainship? 
Chief and chieftainship 
The dissertation addresses this question in the following way: 
Popular disdain for chiefs stems from individuals' personal 
grievances about particular chiefs' actions and demeanour which 
fuel common concern about the ability of chiefs to address their 
subjects' concerns. Diatribes against chiefs often refer directly 
and indirectly to ideals about what chiefs were like in the past, 
and about what chiefs should do now. In other words, disdain for 
chiefs refers to the present, to real and imagined incompetence, 
and to injustices perpetrated by individual chiefs, while 
support for the chieftainship refers to the past and the future. 
One must recognise that this is not a novel condition; the 
chieftainship has always been an important institution in Lesotho 
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and, hence, a subject of intense debate and intervention. 
However, as I begin to discuss in chapter 2, different agencies 
have intervened on the basis of different principles with regard 
to the nature of authority in general, and the role of chiefs in 
particular. 
The history of the chieftainship can be summarised in the 
following fashion. The colonial authorities sought to define the 
chieftainship principally as a territorial authority on the basis 
of imperial demarcation of Basutoland as a geo-poli tic al entity. 
Colonial officials demarcated districts, and sub-di visions within 
them, and chiefs were accorded places within a territorial 
hierarchy. For the chiefs party to colonial ambition, notably the 
immediate heirs of the founding paramount chief, Moshoeshoe I, 
the chieftainship was to be a dynastic structure based on 
kinship. A patrilineal concept of authority was to be the basis 
for placing chiefs in order of seniority according to their 
agnatic links to Moshoeshoe I. Colonial officials and chiefs 
colluded in an effort to create a political structure that was 
consistent with notions of nation and country as dictated by the 
colonial government. These premises were entrenched by the time 
Lesotho gained its indepedence in 1966, but subject to the 
global trend for nations to be governed by elected governments 
supported by civil service bureaucracies. 
A result of this trend has been continued effort by Lesotho 
govenments to demarcate the chieftainship as a separate limb of 
local government to be superceded in time by modern state 
institutions. In contrast, the populace, notably the majority 
resident in rural areas, has not expressed such a unificatory and 
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reductionist perspective on the chieftainship. Their concern has 
been with the question of how chiefs can respond to the many and 
varied demands upon their position and authority, and to the 
needs of rural people in a complex modern world. The populace's 
demand of the chieftainship is that it should be flexible. Their 
interventions have sought to ensure that the chieftainship is 
never clearly definable; that it is always coming into being and 
able to withstand everchanging challenges. 
The chieftainship is caught between very different conceptions '\ 
of what it is and what it should be. Whereas colonial authorities 
sought to graft it onto a European political concept of 
territory, the populace emphasised that which is within 
'territory' - the natural resources and settlements to which 
authority was beholden. Whereas chiefs emphasised patrilineality 
as a root of the chieftainship, the populace emphasised the 
necessity of grounding this heritage in their daily lives and in 
their need for natural resources. A central argument of this 
thesis is, therefore, that despite the efforts of post 
independence governments to sideline the chieftainship, the 
rural populace continues to support the chieftainship as a means 
to withstand interventions which threaten to destroy their 
particular, albeit changing, relationship to the land. The 
history of the chieftainship is not, however, one of simple 
opposition between the rural populace and state functionaries. 
They are caught up in each other's intentions. They have 
collaborated in some instances, and have been in open conflict 
in others. The outcome is that the chieftainship is never 
moulded into the form desired by a particular agency. Chapters 
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3, 4, 5 
which 
and 6 address these dynamics from different perspectives 
are presented in terms of the different, but 
cross-cutting, relationships between chiefs and the colonial 
government, between chiefs themselves, and between chiefs and 
their subjects. 
The transformation of the chieftainship has been qualitatively 
different in the colonial and post-colonial eras. During the 
colonial era, the chieftainship was built up into a clearly 
defined structure, with the populace, chiefs and colonial 
officials supporting this effort though contesting the scope of 
its authority. This was due to the centrality of chiefs in the 
political and social order. To colonial officials, chiefs were 
a relatively effective means of indirect rule. To the chiefs, 
colonial rule confirmed their status in society. For the 
populace, the vast majority of whom still relied in part on 
agricultural livelihoods, chiefs were central to the allocation 
of natural resources. Ironically, the focus on the structure and 
boundaries of the institution led to subordination of chiefs' 
authority to other government institutions as it became one 
political construct amongst others. 
During the post-colonial era the focus of attention has 
shifted to the duties and rights of chiefs, attended by 
opposition between state functionaries and the rural populace 
over the role of the chiefs. This is due to the apparent weakness 
of the chieftainship in the contemporary era. The statutory 
erosion of chiefs' authority has given the impression of an 
institution in decline. For post-colonial governments, this has 
indicated an opportunity to devalue the chieftainship as a 
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government institution. For the rural populace, this apparent 
weakness has clarified the threat of imposition of political 
institutions which satisfy the government and other external 
agencies' norms of politic al and economic order rather than those 
that prevail within the country, and which are based on 
international patterns rather than the realities of life in 
rural Lesotho. Rural residents continue to affirm the 
chieftainship, as part their attempts to create space within 
these norms of geo-political order, in order to accomodate the 
f'-_ 
diversity of social and economic demands on late 20th century 
society. 
Chapter 7 examines the broader implications of political 
organisation and identity in this interaction between local, 
national and international agencies. The contest over the rural 
social order is an engagement over appropriate political means 
to accommodate the diversity of demands upon contemporary 
society. From the perspective of the government and 
international organisations, social order is best based upon a 
notion of nationality that can be integrated into the 
international political and economic framework of nation states. 
From the perspective of the rural populace, this order must 
include institutions which stem from local concerns, and which 
can then promote local needs in the national and international 
arenas. It is in this contest of approach that the chieftainship 
becomes an important symbol of political identity and 
organisation. On the one hand, the chieftainship can be seen to 
perpetuate a parochial outlook amongst the rural populace, and 
to be potentially divisive in terms of promoting regionalism 
10 
and, in extremis, politically organised ethnic groups within the 
nation. On the other hand, the chieftainship can be seen as a 
means to safeguard rural residents' interests as rural 
livelihoods are integrated 
arenas. 
into national and international 
The argument in chapter 7 is that both interpretations co-
exist in political practice in Lesotho (within as well as between 
rural and government circles). Successive governments and 
political parties have threatened at various times to disband the 
chieftainship, regarding it as an impediment to development of 
a modern nation state. The threat has never been carried out, 
however, because the chieftainship is not simply an objective 
impediment but the nexus around which Basotho articulate their 
national identity and the economic circumstances particular to 
Lesotho. To disband it would not solve the immediate problems of 
government. Any such move could, however, destabilise society and 
promote political opposition based on local and regional 
concerns. 
Although the focus of Chapter 7 is on the different demands 
made upon the rural social order, the underlying intent is to 
illustrate the social boundaries which people draw to define this 
order. The boundaries seem apparent from the perspective of an 
observer. Successive governments have reified the chieftainship 
such that the political situation seems to be one of the 
government at odds with the rural populace who are led by chiefs 
to resist modernisation. That perspective, however, is clear 
because it is aligned with the macro-view adopted by the 
government, being urban based and supported by the trend towards 
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uniformity in the general structure of national governments. The 
apparent divisions blur when one observes the ways in which the 
rural populace interacts with chiefs, as is discussed in chapters 
4, 5 and 6. I argue that the rural populace does not adopt such 
a reductionist perspective on the chieftainship. The populace 
uses the institution to assess, and to intervene, in changing 
circumstances of rural life, thereby denying opportunity to 
external agencies to impose demands for change that are perceived 
to threaten their limited means to draw sustenance from the land. 
Chapter 8 discusses the future of the chieftainship on the 
basis of the discussion in the preceeding chapters. Having 
emphasised the problem of perspective with regard to the 
chieftainship, I indicate that the institution has been, and 
continues to be, transformed, but the process has been obscured 
in the ethnographic literature. This literature has legitimately, 
if not always consciously, highlighted the role of successive 
governments and external agencies in this process, but it has 
often ignored the interventions of rural Basotho, and thus has 
simplified the complexity of the interactions between different 
agents that have shaped the chieftainship. In conclusion, I do 
not deny the role of elites, but I suggest that the future of the 
chieftainship really depends more on the commitment of the rural 
populace to residence in Lesotho than on interventions of the 
government and other external agencies. 
The allusion here to the problem of perspective, and to the 
obscuring of social processes in the ethnographic literature, 
refers to my search for a framework in which to present my 
research. By asking, in effect, why the chieftainship in Lesotho 
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continues to exist, my research confronted the problem of how to 
understand cultural particularities amidst the globalisation of 
economy and society. The neo-marxist framework of much South 
African anthropology since the 1970s was inadequate because the 
questions I was asking went beyond the political and economic 
issues it could address. 
For much of the 1970s, South African anthropology sought to 
refute notions of bounded cultural wholes as propagated by 
apartheid ideology. This was done primarily by negation: by 
illustrating the changes in, and overlap between, political and 
economic practice in the supposed ethnic groups as a result of 
their integration into the capitalist political economy of 
Southern Africa, and thus demonstrating both the evolution of, 
and integration into, a cultural context which was more complex 
and diffuse than that described in the ideology of ethnic 
enclaves. 
This perspective emphasised the integration of people into 
a global context of capitalism and socialism rather than the 
diversity of political, economic and social practices in 
localities, and the diverse ways in which people interpreted the 
global political economy according to local circumstances. It did 
not directly address this diversity of expression in view of the 
danger of suggesting bounded cultural wholes - the objects being 
negated in the first place. Instead, this perspective emphasised 
the subordination of locally specific livelihoods and culture to 
national political and economic concerns. This perspective could 
only be politically equivocal, as is attested by the way it 
inspired the populist slogan, 'One nation, one culture', that 
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was current in South Africa during the early 1990s. In 
contrast, the trend today is to confront the issue of diversity, 
in view of events around the world and in South Africa which 
cast doubt on expectations of national and global integration. 
For instance, the recent conference on 'Ethnicity, Identity and 
Nationalism in South Africa', held in Grahamstown during April 
1993, brought critical questions into the open: 
'Why should there be an ever increasing threat of ethnic 
division at the very moment when we are about to cast off the 
shackles of Verwoedian ideology, which took ethnic division and 
separation as its very heart? Are we treading a slow and 
tortuous path towards national unity, or are we heading for 
ethno-regional conflict and partition? Should we be trying to 
foster the one and forestall the other? Can the experience of 
other countries help us?'(McAllister and Sharp, 1993:7). 
The contemporary context for analysis of political processes, 
and for deriving conclusions, is not one of theoretical 
certainty, however, as a result of the influence of postmodernist 
discourse across the spectrum of scholarship. Postmodernism in 
anthropology has undeniably helped the discipline to consider the 
conceptual limitations of the discipline's longstanding focus on 
cultural particularities (e.g. Barnard, 1993; Clifford and 
Marcus, 1986; Marcus and Fischer 1986; Strathern, 1987). One must 
be more circumspect, however, about the value of the intense 
debate on the utility of postmodernist discourse, in which 
outright rejection (Jarvie, 1984; Sangren, 1988) mingles with 
polemic (Friedman, 1991), doubt (Pool, 1991) and qualified 
support (Carithers, 1990). In picking a way through this debate 
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it is easy to lose sight of the object: acknowledgement in 
ethnographic studies that cultural particulars are 
representations of the imagination of many agents ( including 
anthropologists) as much as products of material circumstance 
(see Bourdieu, 1977), and that a reflexive approach in analysis 
is a useful methodological exercise towards construction of 
theory (see Roosens, 1989), even if there is no certainty of the 
outcome at present. 
In the South African context, there are a number of 
ethnographies which have highlighted this object, though not 
always overtly or with the same degree of commitment to 
postmodernist discourse (Crapanzano, 1985; Comaroff, 1985; 
Comarof f s, 1991; Ferguson, 19 90; Gordon, 1993; Murray, 19 92; 
Wilmsen, 198 9) . One must acknowledge in this variation that these 
studies have illuminated, for South African anthroplogists, the 
quest for coherent theoretical and narrative frameworks, rather 
than demonstrated an appropriate framework. This study seeks, 
therefore, its own path through the interstices of theoretical 
uncertainty; examining who have been the 'authors' of the 
chieftainship while working towards an understanding of why the 
chieftainship exists today. 
Origins and Direction of the study 
The analytical premise of this study is that the chieftainship 
in Lesotho is not as concrete as ethnographers and Basotho 
have imagined it to be in the past. Accordingly, popular disdain 
for chiefs and fears about doing away with the chieftainship 
highlight a struggle to understand the institution as a social 
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construct which represents intangible, but changeable, ideas and 
values about social organisation. 
By way of illustration, this study looks at authority, 
political authority to be specific, as it is expressed in the 
form of the chieftainship in rural Lesotho. Stated in these 
terms, the object of the study appears tangible. To state 
'chieftainship' is to suggest something concrete, and this 
perception is endorsed by providing an enclosing background -
rural Lesotho. Yet, like a photograph that appears only after an 
image has been turned around between the camera lens and view 
finder, and then reversed in the process of developing, the 
object is a reflection and a representation of an image. A 
chieftainship is not a concrete thing, but a representation of 
a systematic way in which people organise public facets of their 
lives. Rural Lesotho is not just a background but a social, as 
much as a physical, context that is forever changing as a result 
of the interventions of its inhabitants. Once we try to capture 
what is being represented - authority - the object becomes even 
more intangible. Al though authority is forever affirmed as 
necessary to social organisation, its realisation is rarely 
stable, and its form is forever contested, and such form as may 
appear is barely in place before being re-fashioned. 
The questions which this study asks about the chieftainship 
stem from previous research into political structures in Qwa Qwa, 
the government designated 'South Sotho homeland' (Quinlan, 1986). 
That research looked at the ideology of chieftainship and tribe, 
the 'tribal paradigm', from the perspective of how it was used 
in contests for political authority amongst local leaders. My 
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conclusion was that those who saw in this paradigm a means to 
wealth and authority in government were in fact heading into a 
political cul-de-sac. They would acquire statutory positions as 
chiefs but little authority over the population, and little scope 
to influence government policy. This conclusion arose from the 
argument that the material basis for the tribal paradigm, 
agriculture and residential status defined by membership to a 
tribe, had become irrelevant to this 'homeland's' population. The 
residents of Qwa Qwa were completely dependent on access to 
migrant jobs in the urban centres of South Africa and to the few 
jobs available in the local industrial parks, and on the 
patronage of government bureaucrats to facilitate the legal and 
economic means to secure those jobs. 
The Qwa Qwa study led me to consider whether the same argument 
could be applied in Lesotho. I thought initially that the general 
argument would hold. The Qwa Qwa study echoed the tenor of 
anthropological and historical research of the 1970s and early 
1980s. The dominant refrain was the marginalisation of 
agriculture in rural african settlements as a result of 
development of the capitalist economy and apartheid policies, the 
ensuing poverty and erosion of local politic al and cultural 
heritages as people became subordinate to the demands of first, 
the colonial, and later, the South African government (Gay, 1980; 
Kimble, 1978; Mohapeloa, 1970; Murray, 1981; Quinlan, 1984; 
Spiegel, 1979; Thompson, 1975). 
Nonetheless, although the population of Lesotho was similar 
to Qwa Qwa's in terms of its structural dependence on the South 
African economy, it still had access to land unlike the latter. 
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Moreover, anthropological research indicated considerable 
investment in agricultural livelihoods, and persistent efforts 
by Basotho to retain their cultural idioms of organising these 
livelihoods (Gay, 1980; Murray, 1981; Quinlan, 1984; Spiegel, 
1979). This suggested that the tribal paradigm might still be 
relevant to rural Basotho. For example, Murray's (1977) analysis 
of brideweal th transactions in Lesotho, which emphasised the 
material reasons for perpetuation of this practice, suggested an 
important question: if Basotho still regarded this practice as 
central to their sense of social order, then what of the 
chieftainship which is bound into this and other practices? 
The few publications on the chieftainship were, however, 
highly ambiguous on this question. Breytenbach (1975) suggested 
that the chieftainship was gradually being sidelined as an 
institution of government by modern institutions of the nation-
state. Jingoes (1975) suggested that it remained deeply rooted 
in popular consciousness. Hamnett ( 1975) and Kimble ( 1985) 
suggested that it was an anachronism in view of its internal 
structural contradictions, and historical interventions which had 
led to Lesotho becoming a nation-state. 
Furthermore, despite my conclusions in the Qwa Qwa study, the 
evidence indicated that the chieftainship was still a nexus of 
political contest and, therefore, possibly of more significance 
in the lives of rural populations than I had argued. Recent 
research by myself and two colleagues on civil society in South 
Africa has taken this issue further, to suggest that 
chieftainships are not incompatible with modernisation (McIntosh, 
Quinlan and Vaughan, 19 94) . Agencies such as migrant worker 
18 
organisations, for instance, which have been seen as a civic 
challenge to the tribal paradigm (Delius, 1990; Hirson; 1977; 
Ritchkin, 1990; Terblanche, 1993), often endorse that paradigm 
in their structure, aims and discourse. The theoretical problem 
with this research of the 1970s and 1980s is that it propagated 
a populist agenda in South African historiography, which was 
couched in terms of popular resistance to apartheid, and based 
on the neo-marxist assumption that resistance would take a 
particular form: that it would tend towards class based 
resistance which had a rationality that was opposed to seemingly 
archaic institutions such as chieftainships (e.g Bozolli, 1983; 
Beinart & Bundy, 1987; Callinicos, 1980). This tendency is not 
so obvious today, and this study examines why this is the case 
through reference to the chieftainship in Lesotho. 
The study examines the role of the chieftainship in popular 
resistance, and in attempts by many people to exert some measure 
of control over changing political and economic circumstances in 
their localities and in southern Africa. It takes as read that 
social behaviour is often a form of resistance against imposed 
constraints on livelihoods, but emphasises what it is that people 
strive to defend and how, in the process, they change what is 
being defended. In this case, the object of defence is seen to 
be people's need for land. The focus is on how people use land, 
how they re-fashion available resources and how they re-direct 
their use of these resources. The central argument is that 
rural Basotho have not always struggled against the hegemony of 
colonialism and of capitalism, in defence of their need for land, 
but also against those facets which they 'know' cannot be 
19 
moulded to local conditions. What they 'know' is neither absolute 
nor fixed. The knowledge is accumulated and assessed in relation 
to current conditions and aspirations to shape future conditions. 
Where they reject and where they embrace impositions on local 
society, rural Basotho have created particular expressions of 
market relationships. They continue to di versify their practices, 
as in the past, in ways which both support their heritage and 
which challenge their marginal economic status, but which are 
also dictated partly by the efforts of external agencies to 
impose their own agendas. 
This interpretation stems not only from the various threads 
in South African historiography that point towards respect for 
the diversity of social practices amidst the globalisation of 
the capitalist political economy. It also stems from the choices 
I made during field research. The first choice, which was made 
on the spot rather than with much forethought, was to work in 
Mapholaneng rather than in Tloha Re Bue where the ward chief 
lived. Research in Tloha Re Bue would have oriented the study 
towards analysis of political authority from the perspective of 
the ward chief's office and in terms of how the hierarchy of 
authority worked. As I noted earlier, Mapholaneng suggested 
itself as a better locale for a number of reasons, but 
fundamentally, because it challenged the idealist and parochial 
premises of my research. Given the numerous facilities oriented 
towards consumerism in the village, the role and status of chiefs 
could hardly be presumed in a situation where agricultural 
livelihoods and the cultural heritage were bound to be enmeshed 
in complex ways with these symbols of modern society. The study 
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would have to acknowledge this complexity if it was to arrive at 
any conclusion about what chiefs do, and about the valueof the 
the chieftainship to its subjects. 
The second choice was to do additional research beyond 
villages up at the grazing posts on the alpine grasslands, as a 
result of an opportunity to participate in a large, multi-
disciplinary research project, the Drakensberg/Maluti Catchment 
Conservation Programme (D/MCCP). 1 Whereas the village based 
research highlighted people's dependence on wage incomes and the 
market economy, the research at the grazing posts highlighted 
rural residents' dependence upon livestock and the land. In other 
words, to use a Newtonian analogy, the combined research lead me 
to see the village as a nucleus into which is drawn, from 
different directions, the different forces that shape the 
conditions under which people live. While daily activities in and 
around Mapholaneng revealed the impositions of external agencies 
and the broader regional economy upon people's relationship to 
the land, the work of herders and stock owners revealed the 
impositions of bio-physical phenomena upon people's efforts to 
sustain agricultural livelihoods. 
This analogy should not be read too literally. It illustrates 
schematically the many factors which villagers take into account 
in their efforts to draw sustenance from the land, and from the 
market economy. The significance of doing research in villages 
and at grazing posts was that it led to questioning how people 
fashion resources and how they demarcate sources of sustenance. 
This questioning led to consideration of the data in terms of a 
social process, in which people continually re-fashion their 
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environment through specific practices which support access to 
and use of certain resources. These practices could then be seen 
not only as the content of socially constructed spaces. They 
could also be seen as means by which people demarcate boundaries 
which then allow them to assess the transgressions of external 
agencies and, as changing circumstances and knowledge intimate, 
to perceive opportunities for revision of the way they describe 
and act upon the world. The study could then begin to see how 
people authorise their actions, and in turn, how this is 
expressed in what chiefs do. The study would thus avoid pre-
determining the structure of the chieftainship, but would be on 
a course to see how the institution is continually being re-
fashioned by the way people change their relationship to the land 
and to the market economy. 
Field work at grazing posts led to consideration of how to 
assess bio-physical phenomena like climate, terrain and 
vegetation on rural livelihoods. The village based research 
highlighted how people actively transform the land, given the 
visibility of arable farming and of settlement growth which 
involve direct intervention to change the landscape. The grazing 
post research, in contrast, could not avoid the influence of bio-
physical phenomena on livelihoods. People regularly voiced 
concern about hazards like snow, hail and rainfall, and seasonal 
variation in quality and quantity of forage. Moreover, these 
concerns were supported by evidence of high mortality, and low 
survival, rates for livestock. In other words, the study was 
drawn into considering ecological processes in terms of how 
people's strategies shape bio-physical conditions which, in turn, 
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exert a feed-back influence on social practices as those 
conditions change. That influence is felt in the way this study 
looks at how Basotho construct their environment as a means to 
understand how they authorise their actions through the 
chieftainship. Al though the study is more concerned with how 
people collectively perceive and categorise bio-physical 
phenomena, the point I want to stress here is the focus on the 
'natural environment' and its apparent constraints on people's 
activities. This is a particular emphasis which I explore in 
chapters 5 and 6, and which informs my discussion in chapter 7. 
Summary 
This introduction has intimated that this study puts aside 
certain conventions for doctoral theses. The reason is that the 
study is actually based on research in Lesotho that spans 15 
years rather than on the norm of introduction to anthropological 
methods by way of a couple of years research in a locality and 
synthesis of data within a prescribed theoretical framework. My 
interest in Lesotho began in 1979 with independent research in 
the country for an undergraduate dissertation on reactions within 
a locality to a Taiwanese agricultural project. That experience 
led to six months field work in a village during 1981, and a M.A. 
thesis which attempted to understand at an empirical level, the 
dynamics of household economic interactions and, at a theoretical 
level the dynamics of historical change (Quinlan, 1984). 
Subsequent work in Qwa Qwa informed, as already noted, the 
planning for this study. Field work at grazing posts for the 
D/MCCP which followed initial field research in Mapholaneng 
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extended the anthropological research into the field of ecology. 
That experience accumulated as a result of further research in 
1991 and 1992 when I organised an integrated research project, 
'Conservation and Livestock Management in Lesotho', funded by 
the University of Durban Westville. This research involved 
further consideration of the relationship between localised 
socio-economic processes and broad scale interventions (Quinlan, 
1992; 1993a), experimentation with methodologies (Criticos & 
Quinlan, 1991a; 1991b; Letlema et al, 1993; Quinlan, 1993b), and 
engagement in different arenas with a variety of empirical and 
theoretical issues (Deacon, 1993; Criticos & Quinlan, 1993; 
Petlane & Quinlan, 1993; Quinlan, 1993c; Quinlan, 1994). 
This study is, therefore, one component of that experience. 
It is an attempt to draw together many theoretical and 
methodological questions which have arisen as a result of that 
experience during a period in which theory and methodology in 
anthropology have been the subject of much debate. The result is 
that initial interest in questions of what are chiefs and what 
they do, in a society bordering on the 21st century, culminated 
in an examination of the broader, albeit more intangible, 
phenomenon of political authority and its idiomatic expressions 
over time within a country and in a particular locality. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE STRUCTURE OF CHIEFTAINSHIP IN LESOTHO 
Presentation of structure 
In order to overcome feelings of strangeness, an 
anthropologist's early days of research are often a quest for 
some semblance of order. Locating oneself within a social 
framework of family, homestead and village is a priority. 
Identifying structure in what is to be studied is often the next 
step, both to allay fears about the need to begin to 'do' 
research and to get some sort of grasp on the subject matter. 
In my case, these slight foundations of fieldwork were shaken 
by my inability to meet the chief at Mapholaneng and by the 
derogatory comments from people about the chieftainship. The 
symbolic framework of political authority and social order was 
not presented as expected. This sal utory lesson on naivety 
helped, of course, as I followed the ways in which informants 
presented the chieftainship to me. 
Shortly after my arrival, I was informed about a problem for 
the maintenance of social order in a neighbouring hamlet. The 
matter involved the resident phala (loosely translated as 
'village headman'). The position is the lowest in a hierachy 
which incorporates 'headman' (Ramotse), various ranks of chief 
(Morena; e.g. sub-ward chief, district chief) up to the king 
(Motlotlehi). I discuss this hierarchy more fully later. Phala 
means literally 'trumpet' or 'whistle', and it describes 
symbolically the status and duties of the political office. A 
phala is a minor authority who has two duties: to broadcast 
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messages of the chief to the village residents, and to maintain 
the peace in the village. 
In this instance, the middle aged phala had recently been 
censured by his peers and by the councillors of chief Ramorabane 
Sekonyela at Mapholaneng, all elderly men, for throwing his wife 
out of the home. He was asked to stand down from the office on 
the grounds that he could not be respected now that he was a 
'single man', and in view of the marital discord with his wife. 
Another elderly man was appointed in his place by the 
councillors. Six months later, following interventions by other 
members of the family and by the councillors, husband and wife 
were living together again. The public face of the marriage was 
intact and, as a result, the husband was re-appointed as the 
phala of the hamlet. 
The interventions by the various parties in this case 
emphasised the structure of authority, that is, the normative 
procedures and principles by which rural residents govern their 
settlements. It affirmed publicly-espoused, local values on 
social order, giving me a grasp on how authority was framed by 
patriarchal conceptions of society and differentiated in terms 
of the social status of individuals. The authority of a phala 
depends on ability to command respect, which is based partly on 
the trust placed in him by his superior chief or ramotse, but 
more substantively, on being seen to uphold social norms. This 
presentation of the chieftainship was tacitly confirmed by the 
lack of interest shown generally by villagers in the matter. It 
caused hardly a ripple in Mapholaneng, not only because marital 
strife is common, but also because the interventions of the 
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councillors affirmed public values. 
Such affirmation was repeated in another instance in early 
1987 when, following the death of chief Ramorabane, the issue of 
succession was openly debated and resolved in Mapholaneneg. 
However, as witness to the debates and explanations, I was 
introduced to political undercurrents in the locality which 
hinted at the way the chieftainship was not simply sustained by 
adherence to established norms, but shaped by the contemporary 
concerns of its subjects. 
When chief Ramorabane died, he left a male heir who was only 
three years old. The need to appoint an adult as regent, or 
'acting chief', produced four candidates: Ramorabane's wife; one 
of his uncles, Mamoko Sekonyela, who had been a senior 
councillor; and the two sons of Ramorabane's father, Setempe 
Sekonyela, by the latter's second wife (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Genealogical relationships between candidates for 








Ramorabane's wife was a contender for a practical reason - to 
preserve the principle of succession by legitimate male heirs. 
As a woman she held no primary claim to office. As a woman and 
mother to a male heir she could only be a regent until such time 
as her son could be installed as the chief. If she were appointed 
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as acting chief, her own subsidiary status would ensure that the 
right of succession of the son would be maintained. Her 
appointment, as opposed to a male agnate, would also prevent 
conflict which could possibly arise in the future over her son's 
genealogical right to the office. Another agnate might contest 
his status as regent many years later, having got used to being 
a chief, and seek to usurp the position by casting doubts on the 
legitimacy of either the wife's marriage to the previous chief 
or even the parentage of the son. 
Ramorabane's wife was soon dismissed by the Sekonyela family 
on prejudicial grounds, however, the most overt being that she 
drank liquor too frequently. The accusation was damning, 
irrespective of its merits. The immediate insinuation was that 
people would face the same problems with her as they had 
experienced with both Ramorabane and his father, Setempe, who 
were regarded as alcoholics. The accusation also cast doubt on 
her competence as a role model for the heir, and thus raised 
fears about the latter's future capability. Underlying these 
doubts were patriarchial prejudices about leadership, and the 
status and role of women in society. 
Ramorabane's uncle, Mamoko Sekonyela, was initially a strong 
contender. In principle, he had no genealogical grounds to become 
more than a regent and, in addition, he was an old man who would 
be unlikely to be in a position to contest the office by the time 
the heir came of age. Moreover, he was influential, experienced 
in local affairs and supported by other senior councillors of the 
deceased chief. These positive characteristics were outweighed, 
however, by a publicly known accusation of witchcraft against 
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him, and widespread gossip about his alleged abuse of authority 
for material gain (that gossip continued after the succession 
when it was alleged that he has appropriated relief food aid in 
the wake of heavy snowfalls during October 1987). 
The other contenders were Ramorabane's half brothers, Mosuoe 
and Reselisitsoe. Ramorabane's father, Setempe, had two wives. 
Ramorabane was the only son of the first wife while the second 
wife had born Mosuoe and Reselisitsoe. Mosuoe was eventually seen 
to be the appropriate choice. He was held in high standing as an 
educated man who held a government job as an Agricultural Officer 
in the lowlands. He was a legitimate contender as a man, as a 
close agnate of the deceased chief and, in principle, as an heir 
to the position after Ramorabane's son. Mosuoe turned down the 
offer, however, on the grounds that he did not want to sacrifice 
his career. He would have taken a considerable drop in income to 
become the chief and, in 16-18 years time when Ramorabane's son 
would inherit the position of chief, he would be unemployed. 
Reselisitsoe was, therefore, appointed as 'acting' chief largely 
by default. His subordinate agnatic status endorsed a position 
as 'acting'chief. Compared to some candidates, moreover, 
there were no blemishes on his character. In addition, as one 
informant noted somewhat acidly, the senior councillors happily 
endorsed Reselisitsoe because he was young and illiterate, and 
hence malleable and no threat to their control over the 
management of affairs. 
At the time of these events my main informants were people who 
were antagonistic to the chieftainship, and most of the other 
village residents showed little interest in the succession. Yet, 
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a short while later, there was widespread irritation with 
Reselisitsoe because he had not attended a subject's funeral, and 
had not sent a representative as etiquette demanded. The common 
judgement amongst residents was that he needed to start acting 
like a chief. This event highlighted ambiguities in the normative 
presentation and explanation of political authority by my 
informants, and in my own interpretations of events at that time. 
The succession and people's reactions confirmed a longstanding 
anthropological explanation of succession to chiefly rule in 
southern Africa namely that it is 'heredity modified by 
expediency' ( discussed in more detail later) . But the 
particularities of the events, which I witnessed, cast doubt on 
the fullness of such an explanation. 
To explain the succession in terms of either 'expediency' or, 
more obtusely, patriarchy, would be to devalue the specificity 
of the interactions, and to preclude exploration of the 
possibility that particular practices of an historical moment 
shape the chieftainship in particular ways. On the one hand, it 
would draw attention away from the influence of forces other 
than public norms and values upon the chieftainship. For 
instance, Mosuoe's rejection of the offer to become regent in 
favour of his career in the Department of Agriculture alluded 
to influence of a broader economic and political context in 
which the chieftainship exists and to which it is beholden. On 
the other hand, an explanation couched in terms of expediency 
or patriarchy would be be little more than a description of the 
functions of norms to facilitate action, and ignore questions 
of why and how particular choices were made. 
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Al though events such as the case of the phala and chief 
Ramorabane's succession posed more questions than answers, they 
pointed to the importance of seeing how political authority was 
expressed and shaped in practice. Regular contact with the 
Tlokoeng ward chief's office over a period of two years enabled 
me to observe this process further. During the 1980s, 'Mamphofu, 
the senior wife of Matsohlo Sekonyela, the senile ward chief at 
Tloha Re Bue,, was the acting chief. Her position was that of 
regent in the interregnum between the time when her husband 
became incapable of administering the ward's affairs and his 
death, when their eldest son, Halialoha, a married man in his 
thirties, would formally inherit the position of ward chief (see 
Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Genealogical relationships in the Tlokoeng Ward 
Chief's Office. 
Mosuoe Sekonyela 
Matsohlo 'Mamphofu 0 
j 
Q 
£ Halialoha Morera 
'Mamphofu was more than a figurehead. Through force of 
personality she commanded respect as a chief, while also working 
hard to maintain the integrity and authority of the office. She 
was burdened, however, by lack of support from Halialoha and 
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another son who was often in trouble with the police for various 
alleged offences. During the mid 1980s she was assisted by two 
men. One was an 'Executive Officer', a civil servant who had been 
seconded from the district administration and whose duties were 
to liaise between government departments and chiefs. The other 
was Makalo Sekonyela, a half brother of Matsohlo, a gazetted 
headman and official secretary in the chief's office. 
'Mamphofu's authority began to wane in 1987, possibly with her 
consent. The daily business of the chief's office had been taken 
over by Makalo and by Marero, the eldest son of Matsohlo's second 
wife. Marero had replaced the Executive Officer after the latter 
had been transferred for allegedly misappropriating public funds. 
Marero was effectively Makalo's understudy, and by 1989, they 
were the 'power behind the throne' . 'Mamphofu had become a 
figurehead to Makalo and Morero's administration, and Halialoha 
had been largely excluded from gaining experience in the 
administration of the chief's office. 
During this period, Halialoha began to assert his claim to 
authority and, though this was with some justification, his 
ambiguous status was manipulated on occasion by others. For 
example, one day during 1987, a wealthy trader wrote out his own 
grazing permit in front of Halialoha for the latter to sign. This 
was contrary to regulations and normal practice. Grazing permits 
record the grazing area and specify the number and type of 
livestock which can graze in there, and are supposed to be issued 
in accordance with stipulations on the carrying capacity of the 
different grazing areas in a ward as determined by the district 
Agricultural Officer. Normal practice is for chiefs or their 
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nominated councillors to issue permits according to both official 
and local assessment of the 'carrying capacity' of grazing 
land. In this case, 'Mamphofu or Makalo and Marero were the 
people to whom the trader should have gone for the permit. The 
trader in question was, however, using the ambiguity in 
Halialoha's status and his economic status in the locality to get 
what he wanted from chiefs, when he wanted. 
These events, like those cited earlier, revealed much about 
the practice of authority, but provided little indication of how 
to explain the chieftainship in Lesotho. The shifts in loci of 
authority in the ward chief's office, notably the removal of an 
'outsider', the civil servant, and his replacement by a close 
agnate of the heir, indicated that any explanation would have to 
account for the culturally idiomatic way in which authority is 
expressed. An explanation would also have to account for the 
bureaucratisation of authority which is indicated in the way 
Morera was being groomed to manage the administrative affairs of 
the ward with the precepts and demands of the national government 
in mind. Moreover, the trader's manipulation of Halialoha 
highlights the intervention of market forces, suggesting that a 
chief's authority is subject to modification by many different 
agencies. It is with these questions in mind that the remainder 
of the chapter discusses the problems of explaining the 
chieftainship in Lesotho. 
What is the chieftainship? 
If one were to ask 'what is the chieftainship?' (serena in 
Sesotho) many Basotho would hesitate to answer, for the way in 
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which the question is phrased presumes a perspective that many 
do not share. Few Basotho would adopt such a distanced stance 
as is implied in use of the word serena which is, indeed, 
rarely used in conversation. But if one were to ask 'what is a 
chief?, an answer would be given readily and in a way that 
indicates the structure of this system of authority. 
The chieftainship in Lesotho is described by the people, and 
by the official record, as as Marena a Lesotho, meaning 
literally 'the chiefs of Lesotho'(Mazenod, 1984). There are many 
chiefs in Lesotho, approximately one for every thousand citizens. 
1558 individuals were officially recognised as incumbents of the 
chieftainship in 1984 (Mazenod, 1984), the last time a record was 
published. Al though there are formal distinctions of rank between 
chiefs (e.g. district chief, ward chief), and between them and 
headmen (bo ramotse), all are popularly acknowledged by the title 
morena. Individual chiefs are identified by name for it is the 
name that relates the person genealogically to predecessors and 
indicates that the office is an hereditary one. The structure of 
the chieftainship may be described in turn as a hierarchy of 
genealogically-related individuals whose status stems from the 
founding leader of the Basotho nation, Moshoeshoe I. Chiefs are 
also identifed by the area in which they live, which allows 
description of the chieftainship as a set of of fices with 
jurisdiction over certain settlements, and hence identification 
of who is subject to which chief. Having located chiefs in time 
and space, popular descriptions are often elaborated through 
praise poetry, which is a valued public art, and through stories 
of what chiefs did, when, where, how and to whom. 
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It is the popular description which leads to reflection on 
what one wants to know by asking, 'what is the chieftainship?'. 
First, to ask the question presumes a place and a time. Were it 
possible to identify the chieftainship as something which 
remained unchanged, the question would probably never arise. 
Popular descriptions of the chieftainship, however, use 
historical events to illustrate the specific character of the 
chieftainship at particular times and in particular places, while 
also giving prominence to certain events in order to indicate 
changes in form. Secondly, the descriptions inevitably differ 
because they emphasise 'particular' features at the expense of 
others. How a chieftainship is described thus becomes 
significant, not only to identify characteristics which are real 
and imagined by the record, but also to discern those which are 
subsumed in the record. 
These points simply identify methodological concerns in 
contemporary southern African historiography. Our concerns are 
largely with why particular events happened in the history of 
society, how they influence current developments, and what the 
future holds in the light of this understanding. In short, we are 
interested in the processes that shape society in this region. 
While the past is known to influence the present, how we 
understand that relationship has proved to be as significant for 
identifying processes as is exposition of evident and prominent 
developments. In other words, both the empirical events and what 
issues and themes underpinned and slanted their recording need 
to be considered in order to identify social processes. 
These caveats guide the discussion here. My aim is to describe 
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the chieftainship as a social process which will continue to 
unfold. The chieftainship is not a static entity; it is a social 
institution shaped, consciously and unwittingly, by people in the 
course of interpreting and acting upon the world around them. In 
this case, our focus covers a relatively short span of time and 
a small geographical area. There has been a chieftainship in 
Lesotho since the 1840s, and it has been confined for much of 
this time within the boundaries of the country. Nevertheless, 
agencies within and beyond Lesotho have shaped the chieftainship, 
giving it a heritage which stretches back to African societies 
of pre-colonial times, and across the world to Britain and 
France, and which incorporates political and economic 
developments in South Africa. 
I start with a stereotypical description of the chieftainship. 
This description portrays, as I discuss shortly, a pyramid 
structure with the office of king at the apex under which there 
are ever larger strata of chiefs and headmen down to a broad base 
of councillors. This structure is based on a territorial division 
of authority; small areas administered by headmen are 
encapsulated in larger and larger territories of succeeding 
strata of chiefs to the point where the king is vested with 
authority over the whole country. This is an 'outsider's' view 
and, as such, it is simplistic. This is not to say that this 
description is 'wrong'. It aptly reflects the political influence 
of colonial and post-colonial governments in shaping Lesotho 
society. However, it obscures the interaction between indigenous 
and colonial authorities in creating the chieftainship in 
Lesotho. If we look at this interaction we can see mutual effort 
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by leaders on both sides to create a hierachial structure of 
chiefs, but on the basis of different premises and for different 
purposes. Whereas colonial officials sought to define authority 
on the basis of territories, in order to facilitate 
administration of the country according to their precepts of 
government, the indigenous leaders sought to incorporate this 
basis within a model of kinship, to emphasise their status as 
authorities. Political authority was to be structured according 
to individuals' genealogical position in relation to the founder 
of the Basotho nation, Moshoeshoe I. There is, therefore, another 
description of the chieftainship which proclaims a dynastic 
structure (Hamnett, 1975; Mazenod,1984). 
Both descriptions emphasise the chieftainship as a hierachial 
structure, but there is an anomaly: Subsumed within both models 
there are pre-colonial and novel concepts which emphasise both 
personal relationships between chiefs and subjects, and the 
subordination of chiefs' authority to the material and symbolic 
needs of the populace. In other words, there are concepts by 
which Basotho understand the office of chief as being one aspect 
of the network of social ties which bind people into a group and 
through which social and economic activities are mediated. This 
anomaly suggests description of the chieftainship in terms of a 
wheel: the chieftainship is the hub of the wheel kept in place 
by the spokes, which are the relationships between chiefs and 
subjects. The chieftainship is, in this sense, the focal point 
of society, around which, and through which, Basotho define the 
nation, the country, and their place in it. This dynamic is 
undeniably present today, but it is obscured by other 
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descriptions of the chieftainship. Its significance will become 
evident when I discuss the efforts of post-independence 
governments to integrate the chieftainship with a modern 
politic al bureaucracy. These governments have emphasised the 
chieftainship as a hierarchy of offices in order to align it with 
the hierachial structure of a modern state. As we shall see in 
later chapters, that understanding has hindered these 
governments' ability to govern in the rural areas. 
How then to describe the chieftainship of today in Lesotho? 
Each description reveals significant features and important 
agencies in its development. Yet no single description is 
adequate; nor does a combination seem possible without confusion. 
The descriptions indicate a complex process of political 
organisation. They point to conflicting notions of what the 
chieftainship is and what it should be. There is tension between 
the impetus to define a hierarchy of political authority over 
and abovethe populace, and that which seeks to keep political 
authority grounded in citizens' everday concerns and activities. 
It is this tension which reveals the life and complexity of the 
chieftainship. The chieftainship is always coming into being, for 
it has yet to be drawn entirely in the image of any of its 
makers. This chapter introduces the process by focusing on the 
effort to create a hierarchy of chiefs and the way this hierachy 
has been described in the ethnographic record. 
Hierarchies of chiefs 
The 'outsider's' description of the chieftainship is 
illustrated in Figure 3. The numbers in brackets indicate the 
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approximate number of incumbents in 1984, but they are still 
applicable because the number of posts is now relatively stable. 
There is a supreme authority at the apex of the structure which 
broadens out through different strata of chiefs to a large base 
of village headmen and, beneath them, to an undetermined but 
large number of councillors who are advisors to the various 
chiefs and headmen. 





(Morena oa setereke) 
I 
Ward Chief 















The emphasis is on geographical differentiation of authority. 
The paramount chief or king has dominion over the whole country. 
Territorial sub-divisions demarcate areas of jurisdiction of 
subordinate chiefs, down to a spatially defined unit - the 
village. This description reflects Lesotho's development as a 
geo-political entity. Lesotho is a state which occupies a 
defined area of land. Within the country there are now ten 
administrative districts: Berea, Butha Buthe, Leribe, Maseru, 
Mafeteng, Mohales Hoek, Mokhotlong, Qacha's Nek, Quthing and 
Thaba Tseka ( see Map 1). Within these districts there are 
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smaller demarcated areas known as wards and sub-wards while 
numerous villages dot the landscape. 
A British imperial hand is evident in these developments. 
Following the creation of the Basutoland protectorate in 1870, 
British officials proceeded to establish an administration in 
terms of territorial uni ts. At the time, this territory was 
described in terms of three loosely defined areas under the 
authority of three chiefs, the senior heir to Moshoeshoe I and 
two of his brothers, and one area governed by a magistrate 
(Lagden, 1909:462). All were in the lowland regions while the 
vast mountain interior was simply described as 'very rugged 
ground' (ibid). Later, as colonial services were extended 
throughout the country, towns or their progenitors, police 
'camps', marked core administrative areas which would serve as 
bases to demarcate districts. 
By 1884, when Basutoland became a Crown Protectorate, the 
borders of the country had been clearly demarcated. By 1904 the 
interior had been demarcated into seven districts (Berea, Maseru, 
Leribe, Quthing, Mafeteng, Mohales Hoek and Qacha's Nek). At the 
turn of the century, Butha Buthe and Mokhotlong were simply small 
police 'camps' which would later be administrative nuclei for 
districts that would be demarcated during the 1940s. This 
practice continued after independence. In 1978 the district of 
Thaba Tseka was carved out of existing districts, following the 
growth of a small town, Thaba Tseka, as an adminstrative centre 
in the central mountain region for the government and a host of 
development agencies (Ferguson, 1990:76,80). 
The colonial imperative was reflected in the organisation of 
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indigenous authority. Officials encouraged a form of spatial 
demarcation by which locally acknowledged senior chiefs were 
proclaimed as district chiefs and their subordinates were placed 
in sub-divisions of these areas (wards and sub-wards). Alarmed 
by the proliferation of chiefs, and by conflicts over 
territorial claims, the colonial government rationalised the 
structure during the 1930s (Hamnett, 1975: 35-36). A limited 
number of district, ward, and sub-ward chiefs and headmen were 
recognised in a 
individuals and 
as authorities. 
government gazette and, thereafter, only these 
their heirs were to be accorded official status 
That heritage is evident today. In any locality, 
people can readily point out the areas under the authority of 
particular headmen, how these are encapsulated by chiefs' wards 
and, in turn, the number of wards in the district. 
In this description a chief is an authority over a particular 
territory. Although this is a significant feature of the 
chieftainship, it is obviously not a characteristic peculiar to 
the institution. The description defines observable boundaries 
of political authority but not the authority itself. It 
emphasises the colonial heritage at the expense of indigenous 
conceptions of the chieftainship. A closer look at the 
chieftainship reveals that the colonial description subsumes 
another description which is based on a patrilineal model of 
authority that was elaborated by the chiefs themselves. This 
model originated with Moshoeshoe I who strove to build the 
Basotho nation into a coherent political 
challenge the intrusions of 19th century 
entity which could 
colonial settlers. 
Moshoeshoe appointed sons and brothers as chiefs subordinate 
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to himself, with authority over particular settlements and 
immigrant populations to his polity. The office of chief was an 
hereditary authority. Oldest sons inherited the positions of 
their fathers, and their brothers were appointed as subordinate 
chiefs to govern smaller communities within the broader 
community of the oldest sibling. 
The chieftainship in Lesotho can be described, therefore, in 
terms of kinship. The paramount chief is the oldest son of his 
predecessor in a line which goes back to Moshoeshoe 1. Beneath 
the paramount chief there is a stratum of senior chiefs 
emanating, in like fashion, from the four principal sons of 
Moshoeshoe and some of his brothers. Beneath these chiefs there 
are others whose predecesors were junior sons of senior chiefs. 
A full account of this description has to recognise, however, 
that the hierarchy was as much a response to colonial intrusion 
as a product of indigenous heritage and, therefore, it was a 
novel development. Moreover, a full account must recognise the 
dominance of the colonial authorities in shaping the hierarchy. 
This draws us to recognise the ambiguity in the efforts by 
Basotho to construct an 'indigenous' political structure within 
the context of colonial domination. For example, this ambiguity 
is intimated by the lack of concordance between the English and 
Sesotho terms used to describe the hierarchy ( see Figure 3) . 
Morena emoholo (literally, 'big' chief), Motlotlehi (king) and 
Morena oa setereke (district chief) are close approximations of 
the English terms, but Morena oa sehloho (literally 'head' chief) 
does not refer to ward chiefs specifically; it is an address to 
the senior chief of whatever area is being referred to in a 
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particular social context. It can be used to refer to the 
district chief, a sub-ward chief (for which there is no Sesotho 
term except Morenana [literally, 'little' chief]), or even to a 
Ramotse. The translation of the word Ramotse as 'village headman' 
is also potentially misleading. Ramotse means literally, 'Father 
of a village', but the individuals thus designated are 
authorities of sub-di vi sons of wards and sub-wards. They are 
chiefs in that they have the same responsibilities as their 
superiors to administer the affairs of the villages in their 
areas of jurisidction. The origin and development of these 
particular ambiguities are explained in the course of the 
discussion below. 
The basis for the 'indigenous' hierarchy is a patrilineal 
model of kinship which originated in pre-colonial times. It was 
a model by which people ordered social relationships between 
indi victuals, within groups and between groups. Agna tic 
relationships formed the framework for the transfer of wealth and 
authority, nominally specified by the link between father and 
eldest son. Lineages, interconnected through marriages, provided 
the skeleton for defining individuals as members of a group and 
for their identity vis a vis other groups. Oral genealogical 
records which traced male ancestors back to a single legendary 
ancestor, like branches of a tree to a trunk, provided the 
structure for identifying clans and the relationship between 
members of different groups. 
The significance of this model for Moshoeshoe was its utility 
in drawing people into the Basotho polity. In short, the model 
was people oriented. It defined real and imagined relationships 
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between the many groups on the highveld and, in the context of 
colonial intrusion, it could be used to unite those different 
groups into a corporate entity. Moshoeshoe 's half brother, 
Mopeli Mokhachane, for example, brought his own following into 
the Basotho fold following the numerous conflicts with colonial 
settlers during the 1840s and 1850s. Moshoeshoe allowed Mopeli 
Mokhachane to settle with his people at Mokhetoaneng, where he 
was acknowledged as a chief under the overarching authority of 
Moshoeshoe's third son, Masopha (Damane and Sanders, 1974:96-97; 
J.de Miss.Ev.1866, vol 41:46). 
Moshoeshoe's skill lay in using his agnates as a nucleus for 
the corporate body that was to become the Basotho nation. The 
framework consisted of genealogically-related leaders. The 
corporate body was built up through combination of different 
groups under the overall authority of Moshoeshoe. In view of the 
characterisation of a chief as a father figure, and of his role 
as a personal leader, it can be said that there was a distinctly 
indigenous premise to political authority which was the 
antithesis of the colonial perspective. Humans were the 
fundamental resource rather than territory. However, elaboration 
of authority on this premise alone proved to be short lived in 
the face of persistent colonial pressure. A colonial presence in 
some form, from the earliest days of the Basotho polity in the 
1830s through to the creation of Basutoland and subordination of 
Basotho to Cape Colony rule in 1869, imposed a different logic 
upon the kinship model of authority. 
Although the patrilineal model helped Moshoeshoe I to draw 
people into a corporate body, it had little capacity to keep them 
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there. The model provided a basis for common political identity 
in the context of external threats. Once people were congregated 
together and subject to personal leaders, however, there were few 
constraints to prevent chiefs from leading their followings 
independently of Moshoeshoe I, in order to satisfy personal 
ambitions and the economic demands of followers for subsistence. 
For example, Moshoeshoe I never managed to incorporate Moorosi 
and his Barolong following, though both leaders were allies 
against colonial forces (Murray, 1992:15-16). Similarily, 
Moshoeshoe I often struggled to keep his subordinate chiefs in 
check. The activities of his nephew, Lesoana, and of his son, 
Molapo, are cases in point. They were prone to act independently 
with their own subjects, raiding the Free State and Natal for 
cattle, and attempting to incorporate people in those territories 
into their followings (Thompson, 1975:283). 
The territorial premise for political authority was slowly 
imposed through the military and economic domination of the 
highveld by colonial forces. Between the 1830s and 1869, Basotho 
fought many wars against colonial forces, and agreed to five 
separate treaties. The net effect of this conflict was the 
circumscription of the Basotho polity into a territorial entity 
Basutoland. In turn, chiefs came to realise the potential 
security of territorially defined areas of jurisdiction, while 
colonial governments used this principle to divide the Basotho 
polity. At the second Treaty of Aliwal North in 1869, for 
example, Molapo accepted a status as a 
within the Free State, separate from 
(Thompson, 1975:289-290). Similarily, 
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chief of a 'reserve' 
his father's polity 
Mopeli Mokhachane was 
tempted away from the Basotho fold by the offer of a reserve at 
Witsieshoek (Eybers, 1918:320,325; J.de Mis.Ev, 1868, vol.43:9). 
Throughout this period Basotho were drawn into the market 
economy of the colonial settlements in ways that contributed to 
territorial demarcation of the Basotho polity (Germond, 
1967:156). Following colonial settlement on the highveld, 
Moshoeshoe I's followers rapidly acquired technical expertise to 
increase surplus production of crops for trade with colonial 
settlers (Germond, 1967:439,441,453-454). People were 
consequently drawn towards seeking secure tenure to land, as 
much as affiliation to a group, as a basis for survival. This was 
recognised by Moshoeshoe I and others, who attempted to restrict 
agricultural production and trade amongst their subjects (Kimble, 
1978:151-153). Their efforts, however, were short lived because 
they were counter-productive. Moshoeshoe himself encouraged trade 
as a means to accumulate guns and horses which could be used to 
defend the Basotho polity (Thompson, 1975:194-195). Moreover, the 
principle of personal leadership prevented chiefs from 
obstructing their followers' efforts. If a chief tried to impose 
restrictions there was little that he could do to prevent a 
follower leaving the group to join that of a more amenable chief 
(Eldridge, 1993:148). 
By 1870 Basotho had acquiesced to the territorial imperative. 
Basutoland was clearly demarcated (Molapo's 'reserve' was 
incorporated into the territory) and colonial officials were sent 
to establish a government in the new Protectorate. The import of 
this imperative would, however, take many years to become 
apparent in the structure of the chieftainship. Initially, the 
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encapsulation of a population within territorial borders simply 
created a group for which political organisation had to be 
developed. Within these confines, Moshoeshoe I's agnates 
proceeded to elaborate the kinship model of authority to their 
advantage. An important point here is that they did not have a 
system that was already in place; they had certain principles 
which they modified to accomodate the new circumstances. 
Hamnett ( 1975: 37-40) provides an apt illustration in his 
discussion on the 'Laws of Lerotholi'. These 'laws' were written 
after Lerotholi became paramount chief in 1891, and they are 
ostensibly a 'declaration of Sotho law and custom'. However, as 
Hamnett notes, these 'laws' were a means by senior chiefs to 
codify a system of authority in the image they desired, and to 
overcome the ambiguities in the kinship model. The rules for 
succession, for example, coincidentally justified Lerotholi 's 
position as the paramount chief which had been previously 
contested. The pertinent rule (which is drawn from the 1959 
edition of the 'Laws'; Duncan 1960) states that: 
'The succession to chieftainship shall be by right of birth; 
that is, the first born male of the first wife married; if the 
first wife has no male issue then the first born male child of 
the next wife in succession shall be chief ... Provided that if 
a chief dies leaving no male issue, the chieftainship shall 
devolve upon the male following according to the succession of 
houses. ' 
The significance of this rule lies the fact that Lerotholi was 
the oldest son of Letsie I's second wife, and heir apparent 
because his father's first wife had born no sons. The question 
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of who would succeed Letsie had been raised hypothetically 
before Moshoeshoe died, and the latter had tried to stipulate 
that the heir should be a son born to the daughter of Letsie's 
first wife. Hamnett (op cit:39-43) goes on to describe similar 
instances in later years when succession to the paramountcy was 
open to question by force of circumstance, when different 
principles had to be applied, and on occasion, when attempts 
were made to change the 'Laws' to suit the desires of the 
incumbent paramount chief. 
Hamnett (op cit:38) describes the application of the kinship 
model as 'heredity modified by expediency'. A few principles were 
elaborated but the model always contained ambiguities that could 
never be resolved. Hamnett (op cit:25-35) explains these 
ambiguities by showing that application of the principle of 
agnatic descent contained two different imperatives, which he 
cal ls the 'retrospective' and 'circumspecti ve models'. The former 
refers to the way Moshoeshoe was seen as a founder of a dynasty, 
with his four sons forming the basis of cardinal lineages. Taken 
as fixed points of reference, these lineages determine forever 
the structure of the chieftainship. In each succeeding 
generation, the eldest son of each incumbent would inherit the 
position of chief, and together they would form a closed elite 
group of chiefs. If these chiefs decided to appoint other agnates 
or supporters as subordinate chiefs, inheritance to the positions 
would follow along the same lines as for the principal chiefs. 
This model expressed in ideal terms the origin of the 
chieftainship and prescription of authority on the basis of 
agnatic descent. Having based the chieftainship on a founder, 
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Moshoehsoe, and his sons, however, the model also contained the 
seeds for chiefs to use what Hamnett calls the circumspective 
model. If Moshoeshoe could place his younger sons as chiefs, then 
other chiefs in each succeeding generation could do the same. The 
logic of this model is that in each generation a chief acted as 
a 'new' founder of a lineage. He could place younger sons as 
chiefs over existing chiefs, including his own brothers who had 
been similarily appointed in the past by their father, thereby 
contradicting the retrospective model. 
Hamnett's models provide a useful basis for understanding the 
chieftainship as a structure, and the origins of what is 
commonly called the 'placing system'. I would argue, however, 
that he leads us to see the chieftainship in a way which 
obscures as much as it reveals. To substantiate this point, and 
to expose the social process by which the chieftainship was 
created, we need to consider the way in which Hamnett describes 
the chieftainship. It is my contention that Hamnett, like two 
other commentators on the chieftainship (Ashton, 1952; Jones, 
1951), describes the institution in a way that displaces it from 
the social context in which it functions. By displacement, I 
mean that these authors imply that the chieftainship had become 
fixed into a particular form by the 1950s, and stood above the 
political economy of the country. This is not to deny that these 
authors were aware of the interventions of different agents to 
create the chieftainship, and of the circumstances of the times 
to which these agents were responding. Their sensi ti vi ty to 
history was subordinated, however, to explanations which limited 
the agents who were taken into consideration, and which 
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compacted the social process, in order to present the 
chieftainship as a finished product of history. In taking issue 
with the analytical orientation of these authors, I want 
nonetheless to show that their work raises questions about 
understanding the chieftainship which can be used to cast a 
different light on how the chieftainship was created. 
There are two features of Hamnett's analysis which concern us 
here. The first is his focus on the elite of Basutoland society, 
notably senior chiefs and the colonial government, as the agents 
who created the chieftainship. The second is that he compresses 
political events to illustrate the contemporary form of the 
chieftainship. For example, he moves rapidly from the tensions 
in the early days of the chieftainship to insert the 
interventions of the colonial government in 1930s and '40s which 
openly imposed the territorial component of chiefs' authority. 
This leads him to take for granted the territorial component of 
chiefs' authority. The result is an illuminating view of the 
chieftainship, but there are a number of discrepancies. 
In 1938 the colonial government formally began to rationalise 
the chieftainship through statutory proclamations. The number of 
chiefs was reduced, and the statutory authority of chiefs was 
subsequently curtailed and made subordinate to the colonial 
government (Ashton, 1952:186; Hamnett, 1975:35). The placing 
system had previously led to a proliferation of chiefs as 
incumbents attempted to place succeeding generations of heirs 
into positions of authority. The proclamations were a means for 
the colonial government to clarify territorial areas of 
jurisdiction, to specify the number of these chiefs in these 
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areas, and to subordinate the authority of chiefs to colonial 
institutions. However, as Hamnett (1975:35-36) has argued, 
colonial consultation with senior chiefs meant that: 
'At its worst, the 1938 legislation had the unanticipated and 
unintended effect of giving the major chiefs carte blanche to 
reconstruct the political system to their own liking.' 
Through the advice of the 'major chiefs', individuals whose 
genealogical ties were closer than others to Moshoeshoe I and his 
immediate heirs were confirmed as authorities, thereby re-
affirming their status as senior chiefs. Other chiefs and headmen 
whose genealogical status did not dovetail with this rendition 
of the patrilineal model generally lost their legal status as 
authorities. Intwined with his insights into the placing system 
and the colonial interventions, Hamnett infers ( rather than 
substantiates) the introduction of the territorial model of 
authority. For example, he describes the placing system as: 
' ... the system whereby Moshoeshoe and his successors and 
senior subordinates appointed members of their own agnatic kin 
to chieftainship positions over local groups within their 
territorial control' (1975:25). Likewise, he asserts that 'Now, 
political authority in Lesotho is, in principle, territorial' 
(1975:30). 
Hamnett's analysis presents the chieftainship as a history of 
the elite in which the kinship and territorial models were 
ultimately synchronised. The effect is affirmation of the 
'outsider's description of the chieftainship, but this is an 
image of its form and not really of its content and, therefore, 
one must begin to question what Hamnett's analysis really 
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reveals. The thrust of his analysis is to show that the 
chieftainship was shaped into a more coherent form than it had 
in the past as a result of the combined actions of senior chiefs 
and colonial officials. The possibility of a neat 
synchronisation of the kinship and territorial models seems 
unlikely, however, in view of the different premises of their 
creators, and the ambiguities in the kinship model. In addition, 
Hamnett's own argument that the political system was 
re-constructed points to a 
which suggestsnew tensions 
re-creation of political authority, 
and contradictions as much as 
resolution of old ones. Finally, as much as institutions may 
be shaped by elites in society, it is improbable that something 
so central as the chieftainship in Lesotho could be constructed 
without significant interventions by its subjects. 
Having cast some doubts on the scope of Hamnett's analysis 
rather than its general validity, one must begin to assess the 
source of these limitations. Hamnett elaborates a trend set by 
Ashton ( 1952) and Jones ( 1951) who focused on the judicial 
process behind the creation of the chieftainship. The bias in 
this approach is its propensity to focus on elites because they 
are the agency which stands out in the judicial documents. 
Furthermore, the role of elites had been a particular concern, 
indeed, a fear of the colonial government which Ashton (1952:309) 
alluded to, at a time when Jones had been employed by the 
government to analyse particular political developments that 
followed the rationalisation of the chieftainship. 
For example, Jones (1951) made detailed examinations of the 
infamous episode of liretlo the 'medicine murders' which 
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followed the interventions of the late 1930s and 1940s. Ashton 
(1952: 307-314) reiterated much of Jones' analysis and included 
data from what appears to have been Jones' initial report (Jones, 
n. d.). 1 Both authors highlighted the judicial process and the 
social context in terms of the concerns and actions of senior 
chiefs. They argued that that these murders were linked to the 
rationalisation of the chieftainship, which undoubtedly created 
tensions amongst the chiefs. The murderers included senior 
chiefs. Thus their arguments were plausible. Their analyses also 
suggested a fratricidal conflict, a re-organisation of the 
pecking order within the hierarchy which occurred when the 
colonial authorities brought into the open their territorial 
demands of the chieftainship. By suggesting that the murders were 
really expressions of an internal dispute over ranking of the 
incumbents within the chieftainship, as opposed to conflict over 
the form of the institution, Ashton and Jones implied that the 
murders were a dramatic finale to re-construction of the 
chieftainship. Accordingly, both authors laid the basis for 
Hamnett's later study; guiding it to presume the form of the 
chieftainship, but towards more detailed analysis of the internal 
structural tensions. 
Ashton's and Jones' analyses play down, however, the fact that 
the murders were carried out in a culturally idiomatic way and 
involved ordinary people who were often victims. If these factors 
are taken into account, the episode suggests not only a re-
organisation of the pecking order vis a vis the dominance of 
colonial authority, but also a re-assessment and re-assertion of 
indigenous notions of authority, albeit in a violent way. The 
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fact that they continued for nearly a decade, and that disputes 
over chiefs' territorial boundaries and over inheritance to 
office are still common, suggest that the colonial interventions 
did not resolve the contradictions between the kinship and 
territorial models, let alone the ambiguities in the former 
model. 
These doubts about the presentation of the chieftainship as 
a completed product of history demand re-assessment of the 
theoretical perspective which informs it. Hamnett's (ibid) 
characterisation of the reproduction of the chieftainship as 
'heredity modified by expediency' coincides with the perspective 
of Comaroff (1978) on Tswana chieftainships, the principles of 
which were seen as applicable to other African social 
institutions by Kuper ( 1982). This perspective explains the 
reproduction of social institutions as a dialectical process 
between the rules for social order and the circumstances in which 
they are applied. Hamnett, Comaroff and Kuper espouse a common 
argument, which is that this process indicates a struggle over 
social institutions, that is over their form, to maintain the 
integrity of the rules irrespective of the political and economic 
circumstances of African society which have changed markedly. 
This kind of explanation is synchronic. The emphasis is on why 
a social institution such as the chieftainship in Lesotho retains 
a coherent form through time, despite occasional and marked 
change in the circumstances which the institutions were 
originally designed to address. The explanation views the process 
as akin to the arc of a pendulum. Modifications to the 
institution are indicated by distinguishing different points 
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through which the pendulum passes. The continued existence of the 
institution, in a form broadly recognisable as similar across 
time, is governed by the limited arc of the pendulum's movement 
that is of consistent nature. 
Thus Hamnett 's explanation of Lesotho's chieftainship, in 
terms of retrospective and circumspective models, is really 
description of the opposite ends of a pendulum within which the 
chieftainship moves, sometimes 
sometimes the other. Comaroff 
emphasising one orientation, 
adopts a slightly different 
approach in his illustration of how conflicts over succession to 
office are ultimately resolved. In his view, choice of a 
particular individual to be a chief is legitimated after the 
event by changing the status of the new incumbent if necessary, 
so that it accords with the principles of hereditary used by 
society, and by showing as a result the illegitimacy of the other 
contenders' status. The argument that the politics of succession 
is a question of correspondence between the status and ambitions 
of interested parties and society's rules is really description 
of how an institution is moved from one point to another in a 
fixed arc. 
The assumption in this type of explanation is that an 
institution has definite limits within which modifications are 
tolerated. Kuper's (1982) essay, which focused on bridewealth to 
illustrate the dialectic between rules and circumstance, 
stretched the limits of this assumption even further. His 
argument was that there are ambiguities within the rules which 
people exploit. The way they are exploited, to emphasise one or 
other interpretation of the rules, indicates the changes that 
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occur. The thrust of his argument was that institutions change 
in a series logical shifts to keep them consistent with, and 
useful for people to respond to, changing circumstances. Kuper' s 
analysis suggests a break with the pendulum analogy; it suggests 
that there is subtle change in the nature of an institution such 
that, eventually, it may share little more than name to earlier 
forms. What Kuper does is to draw attention to that part of the 
political process wherein people refer as much to the 
circumstances as to the rules for social order in their effort 
to maintain the structural integrity of an institution. His 
argument begins to illustrate the limitations of others' 
arguments, but falls short of making a break with them. 
If we pursue Kuper' s understanding of the process, 
argument which can be made with equal validity is that 
the 
the 
process implies not only change within prescribed limits but also 
a fundamental shift, however subtle, from one state to another. 
However much people may believe and act in ways to suggest that 
the chieftainship is as it always was, the placement of a new 
person and realignment of politic al affiliations produces an 
order and political dynamics that are different to those which 
existed previously. The implication is that in every situation 
where the rules for social order have to be publicly re-affirmed, 
people recognise the lack of correspondence between the rules and 
circumstance. Consequently there is overt and latent concern that 
there will be ever greater discrepancies in the future. 
Therefore, I argue that Hamnett ( 197 5), his predecessors 
(Ashton, 1952; Jones, 1951), and Comaroff (1978) have all 
emphasised one aspect of the dialectic, namely the struggle over 
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social institutions which emphasises their history and people's 
efforts to sustain that heritage. They have downplayed the other 
aspect of the dialectic, namely the struggle for social 
institutions which emphasises present circumstances and people's 
concern to shape the institution so that it will be relevant into 
the future. Furthermore, Hamnett's and Comaroff's renditions of 
authority emphasise the way in which it is invested in the chief 
through reference to history and principle, and downplay the way 
authority is also determined in the interactions between chief 
and subject. The point here is that they privilege principle over 
circumstance, and as a result do not explore fully the complexity 
of circumstance. 
With regard to the chieftainship in Lesotho, I argue that 
'expediency' in the implementation of principles should be seen 
as a struggle for the chieftainship in terms of finding a person 
and re-aligning political affiliations that are appropriate for 
society to address the future. Simply put, the demand is 'the 
best man for the job'. There is of course no inherent requirement 
that people will be explicit about this concern, or that the 
'best' decision is ever taken, or that 'the best man' will be 
chosen. Social and economic inequalities in society may result 
in a choice of someone suitable only to the interests of a 
minority. Contingent factors are significant, moreover, in that 
they express the 'interests' of people concerned, that is, their 
perspectives and actions to ensure personal and society's 
capacity to address the future. The critical points, however, are 
that this aspect of the dialectic demands recognition that a 
social institution is never a finished product of history, and 
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that ordinary people are as much agents in the shaping of the 
chieftainship as are the elites of society. 
The dialectic, let alone the points above, cannot be 
demonstrated easily, in view of the multitude of issues which lie 
behind 'principle' and 'circumstance'. This dialectic was 
intimated in the three illustrations, cited at the beginning of 
the chapter, of the practice of political authority in Tlokoeng 
ward during the late 1980s. Nonetheless, these cases provide no 
more than clues for an appropriate direction for subsequent 
analysis which is pursued in the following chapters. 
To summarise, these cases highlighted the situational and 
temporal specificity of chiefs' authority, intimating that the 
chieftainship is a dynamic institution whose form and content is 
still being shaped even though its form has become more coherent 
since the late 19th century, as Ashton (1952) and Hamnett (1975) 
have demonstrated. In making the obvious point that the analysis 
needs to consider the contemporary as well as the historical 
context, I emphasise the dialectic in the construction of the 
chieftainship, and this precludes any understanding of the 
chieftainship as an institution which has been produced and re-
produced according to a pattern determined in the past. While 
there is a pattern in terms of persistent expression of certain 
criteria of authority, the attempted integration of the 
territorial and kinship models points to contradictions rather 
than resolutions in the form and content of the chieftainship. 
In addition, the cases cited at the beginning of the chapter 
indicate that the chieftainship is not only a creation of the 
elites in Lesotho but also of ordinary people. In other words, 
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there is a need to question what has happened, and what is 
happening, at the interface of intent to create a particular 
political order and the multitude of conflicting interventions 
to achieve this aim. 
I have set out the argument in the manner above in order to 
get beyond the rather dated literature on the chieftainship in 
Lesotho, and to place this study in the realm of contemporary, 
political and theoretical concerns of anthropology in South 
Africa noted in chapter 1. In particular, there are strong 
parrallels between this study and a recent historical work by the 
Comaroffs (1991) on the interactions between pre-colonial Tswana 
chiefdoms and the vanguard of the colonial settlers, notably, 
missionaries. Their study was an exploration of how political 
and economic institutions were not only re-constructed as a 
result of colonial domination, but also how they were re-
fashioned over time as a result of the interaction between 
coloniser and colonised. Included in their study was analysis 
of the interplay between kinship and territorial constructs of 
authority amongst Tswana chiefdoms (op cit:136, 146, 151, 161-
162, 166). It also suggested that the upheavals of the Lifaqane 
at the beginning of the 19th century caused both disruption of 
established political discourse, and efforts to reconstruct 
earlier arrangements (op cit:168). Furthermore, it outlined how 
local territorial constructs were contested and ultimately re-
fashioned following the intervention of colonial agencies (QQ 
cit:203, 290-292). Their study was, however, part of a broader 
project by them on colonialism: in short, 'a study of the 
colonization of consciousness and the consciousness of 
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colonization' (op cit:xi). This study has a narrower focus than 
the Comaroffs' work, but like the latter, it seeks to understand 
the role of the colonised as agents, as much as subjects, of the 
history of southern Africa. 
Point of departure 
Ethnographic description of Lesotho's chieftainship has 
alluded to, but obscured a dialectic which can be broadly defined 
as a struggle over, and a struggle for, the institution. The 
former struggle has been well documented in the ethnographic 
literature, for it is a reflection of the interventions of 
colonial officials and senior chiefs which have been most visible 
for observation. The struggle for the chieftainship is less 
visible, however, for it is to be found in the interactions 
between the rural populace and chiefs, notably those in the lower 
echelons of the hierarchy. The important corollary is that while 
the struggle over the chieftainship focuses on maintenance of the 
formal structure of the hierarchy by reference to history, the 
struggle for the institution focuses on its re-creation by 
reference to the present and the future. 
Acknowledgement of the struggle for the chieftainship requires 
analysis of the broader economic and social context in which the 
chieftainship exists. This is an obvious point, but analysis 
cannot simply account for this context in terms of general forces 
such as the market economy and the state, when the rural populace 
clearly intervenes as well on the basis of their understanding 
of these forces. The implication of this point is that the 
chieftainship is subject to the contemporary concerns of the 
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rural populace. I argue that the rural populace continually 
re-assesses what chiefs do, and acts to keep the chieftainship 
relevant to its needs, as the circumstances of rural life change. 
The rural populace's continuing struggle to ensure that the 
exercise of authority reflects their changing needs means that 
the chieftainship is never fixed, but always coming into being. 
The following chapters illustrate this point. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE MAKING OF CHIEFS IN MOKHOTLONG 
Chiefs, the colonial government and subjects 
Ethnographic descriptions of the chieftainship have 
highlighted the actions of elites to create and to sustain the 
institution. This bias hides a complex history of interventions 
by different agencies. Al though the interventions of elites, 
notably colonial officials and senior chiefs, cannot be ignored, 
they must be be seen in relation to the interventions of their 
subjects, if analysis is to avoid the mistake of presenting the 
chieftainship as an institution whose existence has been 
determined only by elites. 
In order to correlate the interventions of different agencies, 
I analyse the relationship between chiefs and the colonial 
government, between chiefs, and between chiefs and subjects. This 
chapter focuses on the first two sets of relationships. By 
looking at how criteria of authority were expressed in different 
ways and at different times in these relationships, I draw out 
the key elements of the relationship between chief and subject 
with which these agents were grappling. My aim is to examine the 
history of the attempts to combine the kinship and territorial 
models of authority, in order to reveal general features of the 
relationship between chief and subject for further examination 
in subsequent chapters. This analysis is based on the history 
of the chieftainship in Mokhotlong. 
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The making of chiefs in Mokhotlong 
The 'placing system' aptly describes Lelingoana Sekonyela's 
appointment as a chief in what was later to become Mokhotlong 
district. As I noted in chapter 1, Letsie I granted Lelingoana 
the right to occupy land east of the Malibamatso river and north 
of its junction with the Senqu river. In the 1890s, Letsie's 
successor, Lerotholi, despatched a brother, Rafolatsane, to 
settle on land south of the Senqu river but near to Lelingoana. 
Both appointments marked the initial steps towards extension and 
consolidation of political authority by Moshoeshoe's heirs. By 
placing Lelingoana, they honoured an ally and extended the 
paramount chief's influence into the interior of the country, at 
a time when Basotho were beginning to occupy this land. 
Rafolatsane's placement highlights their efforts to consolidate 
their presence in the mountains. However, one must acknowledge 
that these steps were informed by political uncertainties of the 
time. 
Those uncertainties are recorded in the oral history of 
Tlokoeng ward. My discussions with elderly residents in the ward, 
on the history of Batlokoa settlement in the region, produced a 
common explanation about the placement of Lelingoana and 
Rafolatsane. Ironically, the explanation of why Rafolatsane was 
placed near to Lelingoana inverts that of Lelingoana's placement 
in the first place. 
On the one hand, it was said that Lelingoana was placed as as 
a barrier against possible encroachment by Zulus into Lesotho. 
There is some justification for this reasoning. Although the 
internal constitution of Basutoland took place in a time of 
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relative peace, there was still turmoil in the Cape colony and 
Zulu rebellions against colonial rule in Natal were only just 
coming to an end (Beinart & Bundy, 1987). On the other hand, it 
was said that Rafolatsane was placed to prevent collaboration by 
the Batlokoa with the Zulus. This explanation is also plausible 
if one recognises that in use of the word 'Zulu' the oral history 
refers to Nguni-speaking people from which the Zulu nation 
evolved, and more broadly, to Nguni people whom Basotho 
distinguish as a different ethnic group. The eastern mountain 
region borders on Natal, from where refugees fled during the 
course of the rise of the Zulu state and subsequent colonial 
interventions (Thompson, 1975; Lye & Murray, 1980; Heard, 1976). 
There were also scattered settlements of Bathepu, an Nguni-
speaking people, in the area during the late 19th century, 
according to chief Thabo Matete and other residents of Mateanong, 
a village in the eastern part of Mokhotlong district near the 
junction of the Mokhotlong and Sanqebethu rivers. 1 Moreover, the 
Batlokoa group originated amongst Nguni-speaking people, and that 
heritage was espoused, after Lelingoana' s placement, by his 
followers through association of particular clan affiliations of 
Nguni origin with particular settlements (Ashton, 1952:200). 
The explanations allude to important political considerations 
at the time, from which we can discern the initial criteria by 
which political authority was established. On the one hand, the 
placement of Lelingoana and Rafolatsane established the presence 
of the Basotho paramountcy in the eastern mountain region through 
which a hierarchal pattern of authority was introduced. The 
authority of Lelingoana and Rafolatsane stemmed from being 
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accredited senior chiefs supported directly by the paramount 
chief. This gave them access to 
attracted followers over whom 
large 
they 
areas of land, which 
needed to establish 
subordinate authorities. On the other hand, the sequential 
placement of Lelingoana and Rafolatsane reveals the process by 
which political boundaries were drawn in reference to followers 
and their leaders. Having incorporated the mountain region within 
the ambit of a Basotho geo-political entity, there was a moment 
of contradiction in allowing the re-birth of a Batlokoa political 
grouping, but this was offset by the placing of Rafolatsane and 
his followers. A similar scenario occurred earlier and further 
south when Letsie 1 despatched the son of a councillor, 
Thlakanelo, to control settlement and reportedly to prevent 
'Baputhing immigrants from establishing themselves independently' 
(Germond, 1967:429). 
In summary, three criteria of authority guided the 
establishment of the chieftainship in the Mokhotlong area; the 
colonial circumscription of Basutoland, the notion of hierarchy 
in terms of patrilineality, and the political organisation of 
people by reference to their particular leaders. The interplay 
of these criteria marks the process by which political authority 
was constructed. How people expressed these criteria, 
re-defining them and re-moulding them as circumstances changed, 
marks the attendant process by which particular attributes of 
the chieftainship came into being. However, we must recognise 
that the criteria outlined above were not uniformily present 
during the early days of settlement in the mountains. 
For instance, the early demarcations of loci of authority 
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cannot be read simply as territorial demarcations. Although the 
Senqu river distinguished the settlements under the authority of 
Lelingoana and Rafolatsane, the oral record of Rafolatsane' s 
placement suggest that the notion of territory was subordinate 
to personal allegiance to chiefs. Similarily, given that 
territorial areas of jurisdiction had yet to be defined within 
Lesotho at the time of Lelingoana's placement, then clearly, 
other criteria informed use of the Malibamatso river as a marker 
of Lelingoana's authority. The criteria which were most 
significant can be discerned from the conditions under which 
Lelingoana was placed in the mountain region. While Lelingoana' s 
placement as a subordinate authority to the paramount chief 
introduced the criterion of hierarchy, it also affirmed 
pre-colonial criteria of what it was to be a chief. A chief was 
the pivot on which people identified themselves politically as 
members of a group. Accordingly, political authority was based 
on the personal relationships which a chief established with his 
followers. This meant that when Lelingoana arrived in the 
mountains his authority 
allegiance from people 
depended more on his capacity to command 
than on proclamation of his right to 
administer a particular area. 
This basis of authority is illustrated in an episode which 
occurred shortly after Lelingoana settled in the mountains. 
According to Mapholaneng residents, the environs of this village 
used to be occupied by a Makholokoe group prior to Lelingoana's 
arrival. These people were under the patronage of chief Joel, 
a brother of the paramount chief, Letsie I. They rejected 
Lelingoana's authority, which led to conflict and, eventually, 
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to their expulsion from the area. Reportedly, Joel later led a 
force to challenge Lelingoana but turned back before engaging 
with Lelingoana's forces. 2 
In this case, Lelingoana's formal status as a delegate of the 
paramount chief carried little weight in his dealings with these 
people. The central issue was whether they would identify 
themselves with Lelingoana, and thus affirm his status as a 
chief. By choosing to resist Lelingoana, they distinguished 
themselves as a separate group (which is perhaps, the reason why 
they are identified as 'Makholokoe' by present day residents of 
Mapholaneng). Once the political boundary had been drawn, 
Lelingoana faced a critical challenge to his future as a chief. 
If he acquiesced to the resistance, he would establish a 
precedent for others, including ambitious followers, to deny him 
his status. There was also the possibility that he would become 
simply a leader of one of a number of independent groups under 
different chiefs. Such action would have been tantamount to 
giving up the opportunity which the paramount chief had given him 
to become the senior authority in the region. 
In choosing to use military force against the group, 
Lelingoana resolved that crisis, but he also drew a clear 
politic al boundary by indicating that settlers in the region 
would have to express allegiance to him if they wanted to settle 
there. Joel's response, irrespective of its failure, confirms the 
nature of the political context at the time. By choosing a 
military option, he sought to contest Lelinogana's ability to be 
the patron of settlers in the mountains. 
While these events highlight the means used to create 
67 
political organisation within the Basotho polity, its corrolary 
should not be forgotten; namely, rejection of people who would 
not identify with the political and economic aspirations of 
chiefs and settlers. For example, Lelingoana allegedly revelled 
in decimating the Bushmen population in the Maluti mountains 
(Wilson, n.d.:5). A missionary report (Germond, 1967:418) notes: 
'Until recently, the mountains were uninhabited. The Bushmen, 
whom the Basuto on their arrival from the northward found in 
possession, were gradually driven to the most difficult country, 
till in 18 71, the last remnant were, in retaliation for 
repeated cattle thefts, destroyed by Jonathan and Joel Molapo, 
grandsons of Moshoeshoe, who 
Basutoland. ' 
then as now, lived in Northern 
Lelingoana only arrived in the mountains in the 1880s. 
Therefore, it is probable that he simply continued the genocide 
of those Bushmen who, having survived the depredations of Joel 
and Jonathan, had retreated into the far reaches of the area he 
had come to occupy. 
various developments following Lelingoana's arrival 
illustrate the centrality of patronage, and its expression in 
terms of kinship. The central variable was command over people 
rather than territory, as is illustrated in village names, for 
it was through settlement that chiefs established control over 
use of the land and its constituent resources. For example, 
Lelingoana's village, Malingoaneng, means literally 'where 
Lelingoana' s people are'. Similarily, the names of many villages 
throughout Lesotho have a prefix, 'Ha', followed by a personal 
name, indicating how the kinship model was applied in practice. 
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The nucleus of a village would be an original homestead 
established by a man and his wife/wives. In time, sons would 
establish their own homesteads in that place and, with 
immigration of friends and affines, the 
a village. Authority in the hamlet was 
the founder who would be regarded by the 
'Father' ( Ramotse) of the settlement, 
identify it. 
hamlet would grow into 
defined in relation to 
other residents as the 
and whose name would 
Elevation to status as a chief depended on popular 
acknowledgement of the person's capabilities as a leader, and on 
the support of established chiefs such as Lelingoana. Again, a 
paternalistic ethos prevailed as Rafolatsane and Lelingoana 
established their authority by the standards of the day. For 
instance, as people came to settle in the mountains, Lelingoana 
appointed his sons as chiefs and sent them with small followings 
to establish villages in the main river valleys. Similarily, he 
allowed a re-constituted Batloung group to settle in the lower 
part of the Khubelu valley and acknowledged its leader as a chief 
under his overall authority (that area is known as Khatleli, the 
name of the original leader of the immigrant group). As each 
community grew and new hamlets were established, these chiefs 
would appoint their own kin and councillors, or acknowledge 
village founders, as subordinate authorities. In each case, the 
subordinate authorities were 'fathers' to their own subjects, and 
Lelingoana was the paternal figure to all who acknowledged his 
authority. 
The personal character of authority is also reflected in 
changes in village names. For example, there is a village which 
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used to be known as Ha Thakatsilo but which is commonly known as 
Likomeng (literally: 'where klipspringer are') today. Thakatsilo 
was a son of Lelingoana who was appointed chief of this community 
after Lelingoana moved from there to establish Malingoaneng. The 
lineage of Thakatsilo subsequently died out and authority over 
the settlement was transferred to another descendant of 
Lelingoana, Qaqailana, who lived in the area. Once he became 
chief over this village along with others in the locality, the 
area became known as Qaqailana, and it is still known by this 
name today. 
The criterion of territory was a latent factor in this pattern 
of settlement and authority. Its emergence was a slow process, 
as is illustrated in an agreement by Lelingoana, at the behest 
of the paramount chief, Lerotholi, to grant the area between the 
Malibamatso and Matsoku rivers to chief Joseph Molapo at Leribe, 
for use as grazing land by the latter's subjects (JC, 1946:2-3, 
14). The critical issue in this case was the source and purpose 
of the request. Following the circumscription of Basutoland, 
Basotho were compelled to move into the interior as their 
population grew. When Joseph requested grazing land from 
Lelingoana, he was reacting to a common problem. As the 
population grew in the lowlands, so more land was turned over to 
settlement and cultivation with a consequent decrease in grazing 
land. The request for grazing land in the mountains was, 
therefore, symptomatic of the pressures of population growth. 
It is also probable that Joseph's formal status influenced the 
agreement. Joseph was the senior descendant of the cardinal 
lineage established through Moshoeshoe's son, Molapo. In a 
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context where Moshoeshoe's heirs were elaborating the kinship 
model of authority, this meant that Joseph was nominally the most 
senior chief in the country after the paramount chief. Taking 
into account the system of patronage which governed the practice 
of authority at that time, Lelingoana would have courted 
political disaster by refusing Joseph's request, but would have 
helped his own career by acknowledging his position as a client 
of the Basotho paramountcy. 
Furthermore there would have been little reason for Lelingoana 
to reject the request. He had a large area to the east of his own 
settlements, which could be used as grazing land as the need 
arose. Moreover, the matter did not involve any question of 
jurisdiction over settlement and followers. Like other unsettled 
valleys, the Malibamatso/Matsoku area was simply a place for 
building of grazing posts to be used by herders during the summer 
months. The land could be used by any person, but they had to get 
permission from the relevant chief, whose duties included 
management of grazing resources. Lelingoana's followers were not 
prohibited from using the land but, in the future, they would 
have to get permission from Joseph. This did not mean that they 
had to change allegiance to Joseph, for their status as subjects 
was determined by their residence in a village and not by the 
location of their grazing posts. Equally, there would have been 
little reason for Joseph to deny use of this land to Lelingoana's 
subjects, for it covered a large area for what would have been, 
at the time, relatively few people and livestock. Yet, when the 
district of Mokhotlong was created in the 1940s, after 
longstanding recognition that the Leribe chief controlled use of 
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this grazing land, the Matsoku river was used by colonial 
officials to demarcate a district boundary. 
The territorial model of authority became apparent as the 
colonial government established a visible presence in the 
mountain region. This occured with the establishment of a police 
camp on the site of present day Mokhotlong town in the early 
1900s (Jones n.d.:l). The police force was placed under the 
authority of the District Commissioner at Qacha' s Nek. This meant 
that this region became part of Qacha's Nek district, but at the 
time the categorisation was nominal rather than substantial. The 
district had no clear boundaries, and there does not seem to have 
been any attempt by colonial officials to interfere with local 
efforts to construct a chieftainship. 
The chiefs, however, recognised the tacit change in the 
formal relationship between them. At the time, one of a chief's 
duties was to send stray stock to his superior. Lelingoana would 
have been the chief to whom his subordinates sent the stray 
stock, and as a senior and relatively independent chief he would 
have retained them. There is evidence (JC, 1946:2), however, that 
Lelingoana began to send stray stock to chief Makhaola, the 
principal chief at Qacha's Nek. The evidence is admittedly very 
scant, but it seems probable that Lelingoana's nominal inclusion 
into Qacha's Nek district was used by the paramountcy to begin 
delineating the relative status of the chiefs in the region. 
Lelingoana and Rafolatsane stood on a par with Makhaola, in terms 
of being subordinate only to the paramount chief. Makhaola was 
senior to the other two chiefs, however, by virtue of being a son 
of the deceased paramount chief, Lerotholi. As a client of the 
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paramount chief in a context where the kinship model of authority 
was commonly accepted, Lelinogana would have been susceptible to 
claims that he show his allegiance by paying tribute. 
The next shift in loci of authority occurred in 1925 when the 
paramount chief, Griffith, decided to place his heir, Seeiso, as 
a chief in Mokhotlong, and as a superior to Lelingoana and 
Rafolatsane. At first glance, this decision illustrates the 
process by which the kinship model was used to construct the 
chieftainship. The consequences, however, reveal the ambiguities 
of, and constraints on, the process. The placing was couched in 
the familiar phrase, bokhina pere. This means literally 'to 
knee-halter a horse', and referred to common political practice 
for appointing new chiefs amongst others. 
The phrase encapsulates metaphorically different dimensions 
of the practice. It refers to the new chief (the horse) who, if 
he is to be a chief, must be tied to a particular locality (a 
knee-halter prevents a horse from straying). It also indicates 
that those people who appoint the new chief, and those people 
amongst whom he is to be placed, determine the scope of the 
appointee's authority (one puts a knee halter on a horse to limit 
its scope of movement but, at the same time, to allow it to 
graze). The phrase also indicates that the chiefs who accept the 
placement are providing for the welfare of the new chief. 
Accordingly, the allusion is that the new chief exists on their 
sufferance and, therefore, is not necessarily senior to them. 
Likewise it refers to the possibility that the new chief is not 
necessarily a permanent appointment (a knee halter is a temporary 
constraint). Finally it also refers to the need to provide a 
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space in which the new chief can draw sustenance (a horse needs 
an area to graze). 
The ambiguities in bokhina pere virtually ensured that 
Seeiso 's placing would be contested. The contest would be a 
muddled affair, spanning many years and incorporating new 
developments and re-interpretations of past events. The contest 
was to hinge on the status of the chiefs relative to each other. 
The different criteria of authority would be re-fashioned and 
elaborated in different ways. 
The formalities of Seeiso's placement projected an image of 
a hierarchy defined according to the principle of agnatic 
descent. The paramount chief legitimately placed his heir as 
a chief over two other chiefs. In addition, chief Makhaola 
presided over the ceremonies as might be expected given that he 
was the incumbent senior chief in the region. However, the 
formalities obscured deep divisions between the chiefs. On the 
one hand, neither Lelingoana nor Rafolatsane was prepared to 
accept Seeiso's placement. On the other hand, Jones (n.d.:1) 
reported that the paramount chief deliberately placed Seeiso in 
this unfriendly environment with a view to promoting another 
son, Bereng, as his heir to the paramountcy. 3 
After Seeiso had settled near the police camp, neither of the 
two chiefs relinquished villages under their control. By refusing 
to fulfil the requirements of bokhina pere, the two chiefs 
virtually prevented Seeiso from being a chief except in name. 
Seeiso controlled only the village he established. Without a 
broad base of subjects, he could not mediate their need for land. 
Without such access to people and land, he could not control land 
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use and settlement. Without a basis for exercising patronage, he 
could not earn an income and affirm his status as a chief. 
Seeiso was caught in an impossible situation. He was a 
proclaimed chief and heir to the paramountcy. He had to live up 
to that status which meant distribution of largesse to the 
followers who supported him. However, Lelingoana and Rafolatsane 
actively prevented him from building up a basis upon which he 
could exercise patronage. In 1928, for example, the paramount 
chief ordered Rafolatsane and Lelinogana to remit stray stock to 
Seeiso rather than to Makhaola ( JC 1946: 2). It subsequently 
transpired that neither of the two chiefs obeyed the order. In 
face of these problems, Seeiso fell into debt and became an 
irritant to the colonial officials. In 1931, indeed, the colonial 
authorities had to intervene in Seeiso's personal affairs, and 
instruct him to sell some of his livestock (Jones, n.d.:3). 
In the meantime the colonial government was beginning to 
translate the kinship model into their terms. The initial step 
was to categorise chiefs like Lelingoana and Rafolatsane as 'sub-
chiefs' (JC, 1946:2), on the grounds that 'chiefs' were the 
senior living agnates drawn from the four cardinal lineages of 
Moshoeshoe's heirs (Ashton, 1952:187). Lelingoana objected to 
this categorisation. The paramount chief sought a compromise by 
stating that Lelingoana would continue to be categorised as a 
chief, out of respect for his old age (he was reportedly born in 
the 1840s, Wilson, n.d. :1), but his successor would be regarded 
only as a sub-chief (JC, 1946:4). This was a compromise of the 
moment, but it also illustrates the collaboration between the 
senior chiefs and the colonial government in creating the 
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chieftainship. The intervention had little immediate effect, 
however, for it addressed the colonial government's perception 
of the chieftainship rather than the reality of the structure 
in the area. Although the re-categorisation of Rafolatsane and 
Lelingoana bolstered Seeiso's formal status relative to them, it 
did not affect their ability to deny him the means to consolidate 
his position. 
Distinctions in status amongst these authorities were 
confused, at this time, by the application of different criteria 
of authority. Seeiso was regarded as the most senior chief by the 
paramountcy and the colonial government. That status would also 
have been nominally acknowledged by the local populace, given 
common recognition of the principle of agnatic descent as a 
determinant of status. However, the inclusion of the category 
sub-chief complicated the distinctions. From the perspective of 
the colonial government and paramountcy, Seeiso was the chief 
(morena), Rafolatsane and Lelingoana were sub-chiefs (marenana) 
and their subordinates were headmen ( ramotse) . In local parlance, 
however, every authority would be called morena out of respect 
for their position, and terminological distinctions would be made 
by reference to the history of settlement in the region. For 
example, a person who controlled several settlements within 
Lelingoana's sphere of patronage would be identified as ramotse 
in relation to Lelingoana. But this person would be identified 
as morena in relation to his own subordinates who would be 
regarded either as ramotse if they were empowered to act like 
a chief, or as phala if they were simply village headmen 
empowered to keep the peace in a village. 
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The contestants in this struggle were well aware that the 
central issue was their status relative to each other. Seeiso 
would have to wait until the 1930s, after Lelingoana and 
Rafolatsane died, before he could secure any advantage from the 
colonial intervention. Rafolatsane died in 1932 and Lelingoana 
in 1934. The demise of these chiefs initiated a period of 
further shifts in loci of authority. On the one hand, Seeiso 
pursued with some success the general strategy that his 
forebears had followed since the death of Moshoeshoe. On the 
other hand, Mosuoe Sekonyela, Lelingoana's heir, adopted 
different tactics to his father, and eventually succeeded in 
curtailing the interventions of Seeiso. A critical factor in the 
contest was the continued intervention of the colonial 
government. 
Following the death of Rafolatsane, the colonial government 
recommended that Seeiso's area of jurisdiction be enlarged, and 
this was supported by the paramount chief (Jones, n.d.: 3). The 
decree probably would have been difficult to implement had 
Rafolatsane not died without an immediate heir. The lack of an 
evident heir led to a succession dispute amongst Rafolatsane's 
agnates and followers which indirectly served Seeiso 's interests. 
Rafolatsane's senior wife, 'Makori had no sons. His second 
wife, had born two sons, but both had predeceased Rafolatsane. 
The third wife had born a son, but he was reportedly crippled 
and unambitious (Ashton, 1952: 198). The dispute began over 
inheritance claims to Rafolatsane 's property which required 
resolution of who would inherit the latter's position. 
Eventually, 'Mankata, the widow of Rafolatsane's eldest son, was 
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chosen to be the chief. The rationale for this choice is not 
recorded and any explanation is, therefore, speculative. It 
seems, however, that the principle of agnatic descent was 
applied, but in a convoluted and contradictory manner. This can 
be surmised from the post facto statement of the paramount 
chief's court, which authorised 'Manka ta' s appointment, and which 
stated: 'Mankata you are a Rafolatsane and therefore the stock 
are yours and being Rafolatsane, you must feed, clothe and 
plough for his widow, 'Makori" (Jones, n. d. : 4) . 
Once Rafolatsane' surviving son by his third wife had recused 
himself, there being no binding reason why an heir had to become 
a chief, attention would have turned to Rafolatsane's oldest, but 
deceased son, as the married agnate through whom the line of 
succession should proceed. At this point, the lack of any progeny 
from that son and 'Mankata would have meant that 'Makori could 
have been appointed as the chief, if there were grounds to 
believe that she might bear a son, irrespective of the genitor, 
on the grounds that any child conceived by her would still be 
regarded legally as a child of her deceased husband. We can only 
surmise that 'Makori was beyond child bearing age and, 
therefore, 'Mankata, as a younger woman and potential bearer of 
an heir, was a legitimate choice as chief according to the 
principle of agnatic descent. 
Although the succession dispute had been formally resolved, 
the decision was ambiguous in that it did not really justify why 
'Mankata was more appropriate than 'Makori as choice of chief. 
As a result the conflict continued in the locality. 'Mankata 
moved to establish her village close to Rafolatsane 's old 
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village which led to fighting between her supporters and those 
of 'Makori (.:::o~p'--_c=i-=t: 44). The episode is popularly known as 
11 'Mankata 's rebellion 11 , during which several people were killed. 
This led to 'Mankata being tried and sentenced to prison. Her 
place was taken by a nominee of the paramount chief who acceded 
to apportionment of a bokhina pere area for Seeiso, thereby 
giving him a basis on which to become a chief in practice. 
Following the death of Lelingoana, Seeiso attempted to 
substantiate his superior status to Mosuoe by using both 
customary principles and colonial institutions. He demanded that 
Mosuoe provide firewood and arrange for his fields to be ploughed 
(Jones, n. d. : 6; JC, 1946: 20) . Seeiso also seems to have got 
Mosuoe's name deleted from some of the tax receipts (JC, 
1946: 19) . By demanding tribute from Mosuoe, Seeiso sought to 
demonstrate his senior status relative to Mosuoe, as well as to 
improve his material status by acquiring goods and labour. By 
changing names on tax receipts Seeiso secured more income for 
himself and reduced Mosuoe's, because at the time, five per cent 
of all tax collected in an area was set aside for distribution 
amongst the tax collectors, and the chiefs to whom the tax payers 
were subjects. According to Ashton (1952:208), the monies 
collected would be apportioned out to all the authorities 
according to their status relative to each other. In other words, 
Seeiso was using a colonial institution to redefine residents 
as his subjects rather than Mosuoe's. 
Mosuoe responded by refusing to comply with Seeiso's demands 
and then by taking the matter, along with a complaint about being 
regarded as a 'sub-chief', to the Resident Commisioner (JC, 
79 
1946). The outcome was ambiguous. Mosuoe was assured that no 
rights had been taken away from him, and that 'he was looked upon 
by the Government as being of the same status as his father and 
that the only change that there was was merely verbal' (QQ 
cit: 58). The principal concern of the Resident Commissioner 
appears to have been to assure himself that Mosuoe acknowledged 
Seeiso as his superior, and once assured, he did not seek to 
intervene further. 
The dispute was subsequently complicated by the efforts of the 
colonial government to re-constitute the chieftainship along 
territorial lines, and to extend its presence throughout the 
country. In 1938 the colonial government published its New Native 
Administration Proclamation and appointed an Assistant District 
Commissioner to Mokhotlong camp (Jones, n.d.: 1) In addition, the 
colonial government recommended that Seeiso be granted a larger 
area in which to be a chief (op cit:3). In 1939 government 
representatives met with Seeiso to work out who should be 
gazetted as authorities. Although the Proclamation included a 
demand that the authorities be recognised by the people, the 
government did not consult with residents (op cit:14). As a 
result the chieftainship in the area was re-constructed. Both 
Seeiso and Mosuoe benefited from this re-construction, but in 
different ways. 
In 19 3 6, Seeiso, Lera to Rafolatsane ( the deceased chief's 
third wife who had become nominally acting chief of the area 
following the demise of 'Mankata) and Mosuoe governed the 
population of the Mokhotlong area. They had 19, 1 7 and 8 9 
subordinate authorities, respectively, under them (op cit:12). 
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Following implementation of the 1938 proclamations, these three 
chiefs had under them respectively 31, 12, and 26 subordinate 
authorities (Ashton, 1952:191; Jones, n.d.:15). The statistics 
have to be treated with some caution. They show that Seeiso used 
the proclamations, and the Rafolatsane dispute, to consolidate 
his position by expanding his base of subordinate authorities. 
He appointed followers to subordinate positions of authority and 
allowed them to do likewise. 
For example, by 1939 Seeiso had placed fourteen followers as 
headmen over existing headmen. One of these appointees, his 
kinsman, Matlere, subsequently appointed younger brothers (born 
of different wives of their common father) to positions as 
subordinate headmen. In addition, Seeiso acquired a large number 
of settlements to the east of Rafolatsane 's domain, whose headmen 
came under his authority (Jones, n.d.:15). The decline in the 
number of authorities under Rafolatsane rule indicates the way 
in which this bastion of opposition to Seeiso diminished as 
Seeiso's influence increased. 
one cannot, however, assess the drastic reduction in Mosuoe's 
area in the same fashion. The large number of authorities in the 
Batlokoa area are testimony to the colonial government's concern 
to rationalise the chieftainship. Seen in these terms the 
proclamations achieved the desired effect in the Batlokoa area, 
but they did not weaken Mosuoe's position in relation to Seeiso. 
Two factors are relevant in this case. 
First, Mosuoe, unlike Seeiso, stood at the apex of an 
established hierarchy which had been built by his father along 
the lines set by Moshoeshoe 's heirs. Therefore, he was in a 
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strong position to use the proclamations to modify the hierarchy 
along these lines, and he did so by appointing sons to gazetted 
positions of authority. While this no doubt created some tensions 
in the Batlokoa area, Mosuoe's actions accorded both with 
established political tradition and the formal conditions set by 
the colonial government. In contrast, Seeiso was a relative new 
comer who was imposed on an existing political order and whose 
presence and actions had stirred opposition. Unlike Mosuoe, 
Seeiso was struggling to build up a broad subject base, and this 
was only possible at the expense of many existing authorities. 
The second factor was the difference in the size of the tax 
paying populations subject to the authority of these two chiefs. 
There appears to have been roughly equal numbers of tax payers 
(approx 9,000) in the Batlokoa area and south of the Senqu river 
(Ashton, 1952:191; JC, 1946:40). With the reduction in the 
number of officially recognised authorities, the income capacity 
of those who were retained in the Batlokoa area improved 
markedly. In effect, the reduction in the number of authorities 
increased Mosuoe's own income and that of his selected 
subordinates, thereby creating conditions for support from the 
latter. If one recognises that Mosuoe was re-organising his 
hierarchy of subordinates in a context where he had established 
command over the entire population, the net effect would have 
been consolidation of the hierarchy as a whole. In contrast, 
Seeiso did not have an equivalent tax payer base. When he took 
over control of many of Rafolatsane's former subjects, he 
acquired 2,809 of the 4,285 tax payers (JC, 1946:29). While this 
gave him a sound financial basis, it was comparatively small, and 
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made smaller still as he increased the number of subordinates in 
his quest to establish a political base. 
In summary, the re-construction of the chieftainship in 1939 
highlights the re-alignment of the different criteria of 
authority. Seeiso established his own hierarchy along the lines 
that Lelinogana had done many years before, but this was only 
possible with the support of the colonial government. In 
contrast, the colonial interventions enabled Mosuoe to 
consolidate his hierarchy and to present it as dynastic structure 
in the image of Moshoeshoe's model. In the process, he drew a 
very clear boundary to distinguish his following from those of 
his neighbours. In ef feet, he endorsed a separate politic al 
identity for his subjects as a Batlokoa constituency and for 
himself as their leader. Coupled with the fact that he had a 
stronger financial base than Seeiso, in terms of the proportion 
of tax payers to chiefs and headmen, Mosuoe's subordinate status 
to Seeiso was nominal rather than substantial. 
Late in 1939 the paramount chief died and Seeiso inherited the 
position. Then Seeiso died suddenly in 1940, and his subjects in 
Mokhotlong came under the control of the regent, 'Mantsebo, who 
appointed Matlere as her representative in the area (Jones, 
n.d.:9). The contest appears to have subsided following these 
developments and the distractions of the Second World War, though 
at some stage during the war Mokhotlong was demarcated as a 
district. 4 The dispute surfaced again in 1944 when the regent 
revived the bokhina pere claim (JC, 1946:4). Despite Mosuoe's 
objections to her delegates who came to negotiate the matter, she 
unilaterally instructed the latter to demarcate an area. Mosuoe 
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took the matter to court along with all the other issues which 
had been a bone of contention since Seeiso's arrival in 
Mokhotlong in 1925. He appealed against what he saw as the 
dissolution of the agreement between Lelingoana and Letsie I, 
whereby Lelingoana had been made a senior chief. The point of 
this argument was to show that the regent had no right to 
interfere with Lelingoana' s legacy. Mosuoe argued that Lelingoana 
had been a chief accountable directly to the paramount chief and, 
therefore, that he had held the same status as the principal sons 
of Moshoeshoe, whose authority was never impaired by attempts by 
the paramountcy to place other chiefs in their areas. He also 
appealed against his official status as a sub-chief and against 
the demarcation of a bokhina pere in his area. In addition, he 
challenged the authority of the Seeiso chieftaincy to demand 
tribute from the Batlokoa chieftaincy (JC, 1946). 
Having lost his appeal in both the paramount chief's court and 
in the Judicial Commissioner's court, Mosuoe finally won the case 
in the Basutoland High Court at the end of 1946 (CC, 1946). The 
criteria of authority were again articulated in a novel fashion 
during these proceedings. There were three main threads in this 
process. First, Mosuoe's three arguments clearly rested on, and 
sought to promote, his political status as leader of a particular 
politic al grouping within the Basotho nation. Secondly, the 
territorial model was an overt factor in court deliberations, 
given that it had become the basis for colonial description of 
the political order in the country. Mokhotlong was a district. 
Topographical features, such as rivers, demarcated boundaries of 
each chief's domain. The categories of paramount chief, chief, 
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sub-chief and headman could be readily described in terms of 
district, ward, sub-ward and village to explain the structure of 
the chieftainship. Thirdly, Mosuoe's case was heard in a context 
of deliberate intent by the colonial government to subordinate 
chiefs to its rule by means of establishing British precepts of 
government, notably the separation between the executive, 
legislature and judiciary. 
The basis of colonial government influence lay in the 
proclamations which differentiated the administrative authority 
of chiefs on the basis of territory from their judicial authority 
on the basis of distinctions in rank. The former basis 
subordinated chiefs to the District Commissioners while the 
latter enabled the government to subordinate customary law to the 
British judicial system. These changes were introduced through 
the establishment of a national treasury in 1946, amidst revision 
of chiefs' judicial authoritiy and reduction of the number of 
chiefs who were entitled to adjudicate cases. Previously, as 
Ashton (1952:224) described, chiefs and headmen presided over 
their own courts ( makhotla) . They arbitrated petty disputes, 
heard civil transgressions of customary law, and could punish 
offenders by meting out fines which formed part of their income. 
There was a structure for appeals which was defined by the 
hierarchy of chiefs, at the apex of which was the paramount 
chief's court. This structure was separate to the colonial 
judiciary, but was linked to the latter by the District 
Commissioners who exercised both administrative and judicial 
authority, and adjudicated criminal cases. 




number of officially recognised courts from 
1300 to 121. In Mokhotlong, the number of 
recognised courts was reduced from 72 to 10 (Jones, n.d.:19). The 
reforms did not prohibit chiefs and headmen from continuing to 
hold their own courts, but they distinguished the few chiefs who 
would be entitled to punish offences and mete out fines, which 
would be remitted henceforth to the treasury, from the many 
chiefs and headmen who would be able only to arbitrate disputes. 
In principle, the informally recognised courts formed the lowest 
stratum from which cases could be sent on appeal to the 
officially recognised courts. The chiefs' courts were divided 
into two tiers, with those of district chiefs standing above the 
others. Cases could then go on appeal through these courts to the 
paramount chief's court. This structure was integrated into the 
colonial judiciary through establishment of a Judicial 
Commissioner's court above the paramount chief's court. Colonial 
legal officers presided over the Judicial Commissioner's court, 
which took over the judicial functions of District Commissioners. 
Thereafter cases could go to the High Court and ultimately, in 
principle, to the House of Lords in England. 
The re-structuring of authority was not so coherent in 
practice. On the one hand, the reforms created a ponderous 
judicial procedure. Cases had to be heard at the informally 
recognised courts before they could be heard at the formally 
recognised courts. This procedure proved to be unsatisfactory 
because it implied that the lowest courts could still exercise 
judicial authority, when in fact they could only mediate 
disputes. Given that these courts could not impose any sanctions, 
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litigants inevitably took their cases to the formally recognised 
courts (Ashton, 1952:229-230; Jones, n.d.:20). On the other 
hand, the two tier structure for the formally recognised courts 
effectively placed chiefs and headmen on the same level as 
judicial authorities. This meant that cases could come before the 
court of one of Mosuoe's subordinate chiefs, for example, and 
then go on appeal direct to the district chief's court, even 
though they should go via Mosuoe according to local norms. 
The reforms diminished the authority of the chieftainship in 
relation to the colonial government, but they also promoted two 
subtle distinctions in that relationship which would be 
significant in Mosuoe 's case. First, the reforms emphasised 
government as the exercise of administrative authority. Secondly, 
they refined the colonial government's description of rank 
amongst the chiefs. The old distinction between chief, sub-chief 
and headman was superceded by categorisation in terms of 
paramount chief, district chief, chief and headman. Although the 
reforms confirmed Mosuoe as a subordinate to the position of 
district chief, they did not specifically define the authority 
of the one relative to the other, and thus left room for 
manipulation of the definition of the category 'chief'. 
The paramount chief's court decision ignored these 
undercurrents and, not surprisingly, affirmed the authority of 
the regent to demand a bokhina pere area. The Judicial 
Commissioner's court took Mosuoe's arguments at face value in an 
attempt to reconcile proclaimed indigenous concepts of authority 
and the constitutional reforms of the colonial government (JC, 
1946). This court's decision against Mosuoe was clearly based on 
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the colonial demand to distinguish forms of authority. The court 
rejected the argument about Lelingoana's and Letsie's agreement 
because there was no written record. The court rejected Mosuoe's 
appeal against his categorisation as a 'sub-chief' on the grounds 
that it had been only for 'administrative purposes and that as 
far as his rights over the people of the Batlokoa tribe was 
concerned, these rights were untouched' (op cit:6). The court 
also rejected the appeal against payment of tribute to Seeiso on 
the grounds that it was an administrative issue which was beyond 
the ambit of the court, and re-iterated this rationale in 
rejecting the appeal against the bokhina pere demarcation: 
' ... this Court comes to the conclusion ... that (the bokhina pere 
area) having been taken by the Paramount Chief in his 
administrative capacity in accordance with custom, again this 
Court is not prepared to interfere. It is not the function of 
Courts to interfere with matters that have been dealt with by 
executive or administrative authority provided that such action 
is in accordance with the law itself' (op cit:9). 
This particular emphasis in the court's judgement, 
irrespective of its elision of 'administrative' authority and 
'custom', inadvertently established grounds for the High Court 
to find in Mosuoe's favour. First, the judge found legal grounds 
to admit the circumstantial evidence of the agreement between 
Lelingoana and Letsie. Secondly, and more importantly, the judge 
dispensed with the sub-chief and bokhina pere issues by outlining 
the limits of adminstrative authority: 
'We are dealing here with powers vested in the Paramount 
Chief which involves the exercise of a personal discretion: the 
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Paramount Chief must decide where and how much to take, when 
powers involving the exercise of such a discretion vests in any 
person or body of persons ... then the exercise of such powers can 
never be delegated Halsbury's Law (vol. 25, p.526). If 
therefore the Paramount Chief did have a right in the present 
case of demanding a knee-haltering area - of which I have grave 
doubts in view of the agreement - even then it was absolutely 
irregular and illegal to attempt or pretend to delegate these 
powers as was the case here purported to be done according to 
the evidence of those witnesses who were present at the taking. 
on this ground alone the appeal was bound to succeed for no 
evidence of any custom suggesting that such powers can be 
delegated would ever be substantiated in view of the very 
definite principle of law' (CC 1946:7-8). 
Although the High Court judgement was based on a technical 
point (Ashton, 1952:202), it reflects the ambiguities of the 
constitutional context at the time. 
subordination of the chieftainship 
Even as it expressed the 
to colonial precepts of 
government and officials' efforts to entrench objective criteria 
of authority, it also endorsed particular, intangible, values 
about the relationship between chief and subject. Subsequently, 
Mosuoe was recognised as 'Chief of the Batlokoa, Malingoaneng, 
in the Mokhotlong district subordinate to the Chief of 
Mokhotlong' (ibid) . He retained the contested bokhina pere area, 
and confirmed his position 
constituency in a defined 
as an authority of a particular 
area. As if to confirm the 
consolidation of his authority, amidst the tensions which the 
colonial interventions of the previous decade had fuelled, there 
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were no reported 'medicine murders' in the Batlokoa area, 
although there were many south of the Senqu river in which a 
number of chiefs and headmen were implicated (Jones, n.d.:31). 
In other words, Mosuoe's fortunes in and beyond the courts 
highlight the dialectic of authority as outlined in chapter 2. 
If we were to continue discussion of the history of the 
chieftainship in Mokhotlong, it would confirm this process. The 
theme of re-constitution and change would be apparent. For 
example, in the 1950s there was no clarity as to whether Seeiso's 
area belonged to the district chief or the paramount chief 
(Jones, n.d.:9). The contest over the relative status of the 
district chief and the ward chief continued, though in a 
different arena. Matlere attempted to use his authority as de 
facto district chief to influence the appointment of district 
court presidents as a means to challenge Mosuoe's authority (QQ 
cit:24). In a different vein, the events of the 1940s included 
the appointment of women to positions of authority more 
frequently than in the past, amidst concern among some chiefs 
such as Mosuoe (op cit:29-30). This development would be a study 
in itself; even though one can discern in it attempts to sustain 
principles of agnatic descent on occasions where no heir to a 
position was immediately apparent, the development highlights a 
modification to the patriarchal basis of the kinship model which, 
in relation to the status of women, is a process which can be 
traced back to pre-colonial times (Eldridge, 1993: 126-139). 
Conclusion: The dialectic of authority 
The history of the chieftainship in Mokhotlong shows that the 
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territorial and kinship models of authority have only been 
superficially integrated. Despite efforts to make them correspond 
with each other, their re-interpretation over time has drawn out 
new dimensions of, and possibilities to define, authority. As 
circumstances have changed, the constituent features of these 
models have also been re-interpreted in a new light. Inevitably, 
the models remain in tension with each other. Nonetheless, the 
efforts to integrate these models reveal the key elements of the 
process. 
The key element of the territorial model is settlement as a 
physical construct. The colonial government demarcated chiefs' 
authority on the basis of the location of villages and people. 
In contrast, for chiefs, settlement was a social construct that 
expressed the identity of a group over which a chief had 
authority. While the colonial government's perspective was 
designed to define the relationship it wanted between itself and 
the chiefs, the perspective of the chiefs was rooted in a concern 
to define the relationship between themselves and their subjects. 
These perspectives were inevitably in conflict; the colonial 
imperative was to demarcate boundaries of authority while the 
chiefs' imperative was to define the locus standi of authority 
from which it could be elaborated. The key element of the 
kinship model is distinction in social status. Although the 
principle of agnatic descent was commonly acknowledged as the 
means to distinguish status, it was interpreted in different 
ways. The colonial imperative was to differentiate authority 
through hierarchal divisions, with the effect of placing the 
colonial representative of the British monarchy at the apex. In 
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contrast, the chiefs' imperative was to confirm their positions 
at the centre of their subject groups. Even though the placement 
of agnates in subordinate positions established a hierarchy, it 
also expanded the social boundaries of the group in a way that 
always indicated the centre whence the group originated, namely 
the senior chief. 
These divergent imperatives inevitably inspired the continual 
contests amongst chiefs in Mokhotlong, and confused the grounds 
on which they were fought. On the one hand, the contests were 
attempts to clarify the relationship between chiefs and the 
colonial government, and here the emphasis was on differentiation 
of authority into di visible forms. On the other hand, the 
contests were attempts to clarify the relationship between chief 
and subject, and here the emphasis was on coalescence of 
authority around the personage of a chief. The result was that 
the relationship between chiefs became the focus of conflict, for 
it was the nexus of these opposing dynamics. 
The ethnographic and legal record deals primarily with this 
relationship, given its prominence in historical events. The 
problem with this record lies in its propensity to emphasise one 
part of the dialectic over the other. In other words, the record 
focuses on the relationship between chiefs and the relationship 
between chiefs and the colonial government, at the expense of 
looking at the relationship between chief and subject. Downplayed 
in the analyses of commentators, and by the protagonists 
themselves, are chiefs' subjects as agents in the history of the 
chieftainship. The foregoing discussion has indicated their 
significance, though not in any detail, given the preliminary 
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need to draw out their presence from the shadows of the written 
record. All that has been shown, thus far, are indicators of that 
significance. 
First, a longstanding thread in the history of the 
chieftainship is that the office of chief was defined as much by 
the personal ties established between chief and subject as by 
birthright. This is a function of the kinship model which 
obviously expresses personal relationships as well as putting 
them into an order. The written record emphasises birthright in 
order to illustrate the contests between chiefs as conflict about 
status relative to each other. However, the underlying imperative 
in these contests, to locate the chief at the centre of a group, 
shows that there was equal concern with the question of how a 
chief acquired status in relation to his followers. The means was 
a familial one; the chief had to be seen to be a patriarch and 
to act in a paternal way towards his subjects. 
Secondly, one can discern in the contests between chiefs in 
Mokhotlong ambivalent attitudes to what a chieftainship should 
be. While there were obvious efforts to define the chieftainship 
on the basis of historical precedents, there were also efforts 
to define the chieftainship on the basis of contemporary needs 
and economic circumstances in the rural areas. On the one hand, 
the accumulation of precedents over time enabled chiefs and the 
colonial government to refine their conception of the 
chieftainship, as an institution with permanent features that 
would be endorsed in each generation and so enable it to exist 
throughout time. On the other hand, the way in which chiefs 
sought to define politic al boundaries through their subjects 
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indicates a conception of the chieftainship as an organic entity, 
whose survival depended on its ability to adjust to the changing 
needs of its subjects. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CHIEFS, SUBJECTS AND SETTLEMENT 
The struggle for the chieftainship 
The struggle over the chieftainship is, as we have seen, 
largely about creating an appropriate political order for 
administration of the territory of Lesotho as a whole. We have 
also seen that the chieftainship cannot be understood without 
taking into account the struggle for the institution. The 
previous chapter examined historical dimensions of this 
dialectic. This chapter introduces its contemporary dynamics by 
exploring the two concluding points of the last chapter in more 
detail - the expression of kinship in the construction of chiefs' 
authority, and the capacity of the chieftainship to adapt to 
changing circumstances of rural life. As we have seen in the 
preceding chapter, 'settlement' and 'land' have figured 
prominently in the construction and re-construction of the 
chieftainship. This chapter examines the issue of 'settlement' 
in the contest over how the population should be identified in 
relation to chiefs. Chapters 5 and 6 pursue the issue of 'land', 
notably the people's need for agricultural land, given that this 
is the material basis of chiefs' authority. 'Settlement' and 
'land' are closely related, but they are discussed in separate 
chapters for the sake of clarity. 
Having indicated that the chieftainship is not a finished 
product of history, I argue that common descriptions of the 
chieftainship need to be assessed. The point is that there is 
clearly a dialectical process in the exercise of authority in 
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rural Lesotho which is not captured in the common descriptions. 
Any analysis of contemporary Lesotho must acknowledge the 
political tensions which still exist in the rural areas. This 
tension is indicated in the schematic presentation of the 
structure of government in Figure 4. It includes local government 
structures which will be discussed shortly. 
Figure 4: The .structure of government in Lesotho 
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(e.g. school, church) 
Although Figure 4 retains the colonial image of the 
chieftainship, it points to the ambiguities which still exist in 
the exercise of political authority in the country. In the first 
instance, Figure 4 poses an obvious question; is the structure 
of government a single integrated structure or a dual structure? 
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The Figure shows that the chieftainship still exists as a 
distinct institution, but it can be interpreted in two 
different ways. On the one hand, the chieftainship appears to 
have been sidelined by modern institutions of government, giving 
the impression that it is an archaic form of authority. On the 
other hand, the chieftainship appears to pervade all levels of 
society, suggesting that it is still politically significant 
particularly at local levels of society. However one interprets 
Figure 4, the presence of a dialectic cannot be ignored. The 
question to be 
and continues 
answered is how this dialectic reflects the past, 
to stimulate further modifications to the 
construction and exercise of authority in the rural areas. 
The management of settlement 
Villages are the most common form of settlement in Lesotho. 
There are a few towns, notably the eight district centres and 
the capital, Maseru. The majority of the population maintains de 
jure residence in villages although many people, particularly 
men, spend most of their lives working in South Africa and in the 
urban centres of Lesotho. In 1986, for example, Mokhotlong 
district had a de jure population of 80,343 people, of whom only 
3,983 lived in Mokhotlong town while the remainder were spread 
throughout the approximately 688 villages and hamlets in the 
district (Bureau of Statistics, 1988). 1 
The social and physical nuclei of a village are homesteads. 
Homesteads often consist of two or more buildings, a kraal for 
livestock and a small vegetable garden/orchard ( jarete). The 
buildings are either thatched, stone rondavels or stone/brick, 
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and corrugated iron-roofed rectangular houses of which one is 
used as a 'kitchen', and the other ( s) as sleeping quarters. 
Homesteads are often the residences of nuclear families but in 
many villages, kin, affines and neighbours share food and co-
operate with daily chores. This pattern of residence arose from 
the general trend, noted in the previous chapter, for sons to 
build their own homesteads close to those of their parents. For 
example, one of the villages on a hill near Mapholaneng consists 
primarily of agnate descendants of its founder, Kalia Alotsi, a 
renowned follower of Lelingoana, and his sons who built their 
homesteads on that site. 
This heritage is still evident in many villages. Where chiefs 
and headmen have settled with followers in the past, their living 
descendants are often to be found in the same village or in 
neighbouring villages. It is this proximity of kin to each other 
which substantiates the patriarchal framework of authority. A 
married man is nominally the head of his homestead which is 
identified by his name. Although wives are usually the homestead 
managers, given the absence of many husbands on migrant work 
contracts, few have the freedom to make decisions with regard to 
trade in livestock, purchases of expensive commodities, and 
choice of crops to cultivate. Agreement from husbands is 
necessary or, as is often the case, approval from the kinsman in 
whom the husband vests authority over his affairs during his 
absence from home (e.g. father, paternal uncle, brother). 
Likewise, in cases where a married son stays on at the homestead 
to support a widowed mother, the latter is nominally the head of 
the homestead in her husband's name. When she dies, the son 
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becomes the homestead head which will then be identified, in 
time, by his name. 
Many villages are substantially larger than they were in the 
past such that kinship is less visible as a framework for the 
social order. Mapholaneng, for example, is a conglomeration of 
several hamlets which have merged as a result of their expansion, 
but which are still identifiable as distinct localities on the 
basis of concentrations of descendants of their founders, and 
according to the names of those founders. Old residents of the 
village still use these names to identify the homes of other 
residents, but many residents simply use the name Mapholaneng. 
Moreover, the village is expanding rapidly through the influx of 
many young couples who have no close kin ties to established 
residents. 
The superimposition of other forms of social and economic 
networks upon that of kinship is evident through Mokhotlong 
district. There are many schools and churches, for example, as 
a result of intensive missionary work by the Paris Evangelical 
Missionary Society, now constituted as the Lesotho Evangelical 
Church, and by various orders of the Roman Catholic church. 
Church and school are often closely linked (Ellenberger, 1938). 
The primary schools in many villages were established by 
evangelists with the support of villagers. According to oral 
reports, there was occasional resistance from the chiefs. Mosuoe 
Sekonyela, for example, reportedly resisted villagers' efforts 
to build a school in Malingoaneng. 
There are many secondary schools in the districts. 
Mokhotlong has six, three of which are in the Tlokoeng ward; one 
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in Mapholaneng, one in Mabuleng and the third at Ha Makhoaba. 
Some of these schools, such as the one in Mapholaneng, provide 
boarding facilities, but many students find accomodation in the 
surrounding villages, either with kin or in rented huts leased 
by villagers. Qualified Basotho teachers, paid by the 
government, and volunteers paid by agencies such as the American 
Peace Corps and the International Voluntary Service, work at 
these schools. The government and Aid agencies provide financial 
assistance, but the schools are administered by Boards of 
Governors which usually consist of locally respected and 
influential individuals such as priests and traders. 
There is also a network of institutions to address civil 
order, health and the agricultural economy, which are based in 
the district administration of the national government. In 
Mokhotlong town, there are various departments under the 
authority of the District Secretary, municipal offices under a 
Town Clerk as well as facilities which include an airport, a 
hospital, a police station, an army garrison, a prison and a 
government woolshed. Beyond Mokhotlong the infrastructure is 
relatively lean. Mapholaneng is the only other place in the 
district where there is a concentration of equivalent facilities: 
a police station, a post office, a Food Management Unit warehouse 
from which food aid to schools is distributed, a Livestock 
Improvement Centre (LIC) which offers stock marketing and 
veterinary services, a court and a red Cross clinic. Beyond 
Mapholaneng, within Tlokoeng ward, there is one other police 
station at Letseng La Terrai, two clinics (at Linotsing and St 
Martins, respectively), and a LIC at Lehlala. In addition, there 
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are Postal Agencies which are located in the villages of chiefs 
and headmen. 
Agriculture is a principal emphasis of the government's 
activities. Police work is concentrated on controlling livestock 
theft, though there are detectives and traffic police in 
Mokhotlong town. For a brief period in 1988 Mapholaneng boasted 
a traffic policeman but the absurdity of this appointment was 
soon realised and the officer in question was transferred back 
to Mokhotlong. LICs are being promoted in order to improve the 
livestock economy. The centre at Mapholaneng, for instance, is 
run by two technical assitants who provide veterinary services, 
arrange for farmers to purchase breeding livestock through the 
Ministry of Agriculture, and hold stock auctions for local buyers 
and for the national abbatoir. In addition, there are 21 dip 
tanks and 10 government shearing sheds located throughout the 
district. These facilities are supervised by officials of the 
Ministry of Agriculture. Individuals who live near dip tanks are 
hired on a permanent basis to manage their use, and casual labour 
(shearers, sorters, packers) is hired between the months of 
November and February when shearing sheds are in full use. There 
is also, in principle, an arable farming extension programme. 
However, between 1986 and 1989, there was only one extension 
officer in Tlokoeng ward. In 1988, a 'home economics assistant' 
was based in Mapholaneng to provide advice to women on how to 
improve household diets. There 
institutions in Mokhotlong 
is also a network of commercial 
district, which reflects the 
population's dependence on the wage incomes of migrant workers. 
Again, they are concentrated in Mokhotlong town which has a 
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number of franchised outlets for South African chain stores in 
addition to locally owned shops, a South African trader's store, 
a wholesale warehouse, an agricultural co-operative store, two 
hotels, an agricultural bank, a commercial bank and two petrol 
stations. Beyond Mokhotlong there are numerous traders' stores. 
There is only one Fraser's store, at Tlokoeng village, which 
is an outlet of a well known trading company in Lesotho which 
was originally established by Scottish traders, but is now owned 
by a South African company (Danziger, 1979). The majority of the 
stores are owned by Basotho entrepreneurs, but some, such as two 
large stores in Mapholaneng, are supported by South African 
partners. These enterprises sell manufactured goods which are 
trucked in from South Africa. There are also many formal and 
informal enterprises ranging from tailors' shops, furniture 
workshops and saddleries, which conduct business daily, to 
butcheries and shebeens which operate intermittently. 
It is not, therefore, surprising that kinship is not always 
visible as an organising framework of rural social order, and 
that it is irrelevant in many instances. Villagers are materially 
integrated into a market economy and politically subject to 
agencies of the modern nation state. However, neither the state 
nor the market predominate in the rural social order. They are 
undeniably important forces of change to the social order, but 
they have yet to dictate the dynamics of settlement in villages. 
The means by which residential and commercial sites are acquired 
in the villages reflect the challenge of the state and the market 
to the authority of chiefs. 
Basotho have an inalienable right to residential sites and, 
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prior to the 1960s, individuals would simply approach the 
relevant chief or headman in whose area he/she wished to stay for 
permission to build a home. Since the late 1960s, however, site 
allocation has been in the hands of Land Committees. Today, these 
committees also deal with arable land allocations as a result of 
the 1979 Land Act (Land Act, 1979) and the 1980 Land Regulations 
(Legal Notice, 1980a). The Land Committees are a means for the 
state to exercise its authority in villages. They are based on 
the territorial areas of jurisidiction of chiefs and headmen, 
but, in each area the residents may elect individuals to serve 
on the committee for a term of three years, and the 
chief/headman need not necessarily be a member. Individuals who 
wish to build a homestead must approach the relevant committee, 
fill in the appropriate forms and, following confirmation of 
title to the land by the Ministry of Interior, they may build 
dwellings. Built into this protocol is an attempt by the state 
to restrict the authority of chiefs over site allocation. The 
bureaucratic process nominally places site allocation under the 
authority of government departments. The election of Land 
Committees provides a platform for rural residents to 
participate in the management of settlements and, if necessary, 
to contest the decisions of chiefs and headmen. 
In practice, however, the Land Committees are no more than a 
minor modification to established procedures. They are elected 
bodies, but they are invariably chaired by chiefs and headmen, 
while the other members are usually men rather than women. 
Furthermore, the functioning of the committees depends largely 
on the incumbent chief or headman. During the late 1980s few of 
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the committees in the environs of Mapholaneng gave any 
impression of functioning as formally required. Although 
meetings were scheduled on a regular basis, chiefs and headmen 
in the area acknowledged that members often did not attend. 2 As 
a result, they usually made the decisions in consultation with 
their councillors irrespective of committee membership. The 
committees simply ratified the decisions when they did meet. 
Site and field allocations are complicated by the 1979 Land 
Act. Although this Act governs all land transactions, its 
ramifications are only beginning to be realised and acted upon 
in the rural areas. The Act is ignored by many who establish 
their homes in small, remote villages because it is largely 
irrelevant to their needs. Usufruct principles of land tenure 
guarantee 
expect the 
right to a residential site, and most individuals 
homestead which they build to be their home for life. 
In larger villages like Mapholaneng, where facilities encourage 
settlement growth and attract entrepreneurs, people are 
beginning to recognise the Act as a statutory mechanism which 
introduces private property rights to land and, as importantly, 
potential market opportunities. Accordingly, more people in 
these centres are beginning to refer to the Act in their land 
claims. 
Site purchases are common in Mokhotlong town and in 
Mapholaneng. The common factor is growth of these settlements as 
commercial centres for the district. In Mapholaneng, for example, 
a number of professionally qualified people such as the District 
Military Officer and teachers, who do not live in the village and 
who do not expect to live there, have built houses as a form of 
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financial investment. They have recognised that Mapholaneng is 
likely to become a town and, therefore, that their properties 
will increase in value. In the meantime they let out their houses 
whenever there is an opportunitiy to do so. In short, the Act is 
used with discretion by rural residents. 
Lost in current practice is the intention of the Act to 
facilitate settlement planning. There is no formal planning 
procedure in Mapholaneng even though the village has been 
designated as a 'rural centre' by the government ( Agrar- und 
Hydrotechnik, 1988). Individuals can build homes and establish 
businesses virtually wherever they wish. The Land Committee does 
not think in terms of 'town planning'; it simply fulfils the 
bureaucratic functions demanded of it. It intervenes only if a 
site application involves the appropriation of fields or use of 
natural resources, such as river sand and water in the case of 
brick-making works. In other words, the committee defines 
settlement management in 'traditional' terms, 
upholding chiefs' authority to mediate 
in the sense of 
their subjects' 
usufructory rights to land and its constituent resources. 
There is potential for dispute in these circumstances but 
little to impede any person, particularly an entrepreneur, from 
acquiring a site. Purchase of commercial sites effectively 
overrides principles of usufruct and the local norms of 
authority. The Land Act is an opportunity for entrepreneurs to 
act independently and according to their own interests. For 
example, in 1990, there was some dispute in Mapholaneng when 
Sehloho, one of the two richest traders in the village, obtained 
a site on the main road through the village at a point opposite 
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the store/bar complex of his main rival, and in front of the 
local court and a number of other shops. His rival's business 
attracts most of the passing traffic to the extent that all buses 
that go through the village stop next to this complex. By 
acquiring a strip of land between the road and the court, Sehloho 
sought to tap into the concentration of trade in that locality. 
There was a year's delay before he built a restaurant because of 
objections from neighbouring shop owners. The dispute revolved 
primarily around the boundaries between the different sites which 
meant that the objections of Sehloho's competitors had little 
chance of success. The land was vacant and, therefore, available 
to anyone who wished to acquire it. Furthermore, site boundaries 
are often not well defined and when they are, they are recorded 
in the original application forms which are not kept in the 
village. In addition, there is no formal 'town planning' policy 
which could be used to regulate site acquisitions. 
These circumstance suggest that the state is only the nominal 
authority in managing rural settlement, but that it establishes 
the conditions for market forces to challenge the authority of 
the chiefs. A closer look at settlement issues confirms this 
impression. The state addresses settlement as a 'development' 
issue to be managed largely by the rural residents themselves. 
To this end, the state encourages the establishment of a 
hierarchy of 'Development Committees' which are based on the 
territorial jurisdictions of chiefs and headmen, and constituted 
by rural residents. 
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Development' Committees 
In each area governed by a sub-ward chief or headman, there 
is a 'Village Development Committee' (VDC). This committee 
consists of elected residents from the area, but it does not 
necessairly need to include the local chief or headman. A VDC 
is formally responsible for improving services in its area by 
initiating projects through funds raised by villagers, by 
identifying needs for submission to the district administration, 
and by co- operating with government officials who come to the 
area to assist with projects. Project proposals are submitted 
to the relevant 'Ward Development Committee' (WDC) which, in 
principle, consists of elected ward residents. In turn, the WDC 
submits proposals to the 'District Development Committee' (DDC) 
which, in principle, includes elected members as well as the 
District Secretary, the district chief and, as observers, the 
district heads of government departments. The DDC is responsible 
for assessing project proposals and for authorising the relevant 
government departments to carry them out. 
The formal structure outlines a democratic process, similar 
to that of the Land Committees, in which rural residents are 
identified as citizens with rights of representation and access 
to government services. The chieftainship is ostensibly sidelined 
in favour of elected bodies and professional personnel. Moreover, 
the problem of lack of infrastructure in many districts is 
seemingly mediated by the participation of rural residents in 
'development'. The system works in Mokhotlong to the extent that 
there are many VDCs which meet regularly and initiate projects. 
However, the structure of authority is no challenge to that of 
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the chiefs, for three overlapping reasons. First, the de facto 
situation whereby the state has neither the infrastructure nor 
the personnel to provide more than a general presence means that 
settlement issues remain largely in the hands of the rural 
populace, as they have been in the past. Secondly, the 
constitution of the VDCs and the WDCs are manipulated by chiefs 
and villagers. Thirdly, the state's approach to settlement as a 
'development' issue actually distances state agencies from rural 
residents. 
In the first instance, the government's reliance on VDCs 
reflects a lack of infrastructure and finance which minimises the 
potential of VDCs to shape the rural social order as intended. 
Coupled with the proclaimed emphasis on 'development', the 
committees are reduced to proposing and carrying out small 
projects. The VDCs in Mokhotlong work primarily to encourage 
building of hygenic toilets ( 'Ventilated Improved Pit Latrines'), 
and to improve village water supplies through the assistance of 
the aid-funded Village Water Supply Unit. This unit provides 
technical expertise, pipes and equipment, subject to the VDCs' 
organisation of villagers to dig trenches between springs and tap 
outlets. In short, financial restrictions dictate a limited 
functional role for the VDCs. 
Secondly, this role is endorsed by villagers. 'Development' 
is something which is seen as extraneous to the rural social 
order; as a councillor of the chief at Mapholaneng exclaimed: 
'my father 
with it'. 
did not have this development, so what do we need 
To most villagers, VDCs are a means to extract 
material benefits from a parsimonious government which exists 
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beyond the world of village life. They support VDCs, and where 
possible, they elect people who, they believe, know how to deal 
with the government. During the 1980s, for example, the 
residents of Mofulaneng, an area of Tlokoeng ward which is 
governed by a headman, regularly elected a retired police 
detective who had worked in Mokhotlong. In 1986, after the 
military coup, they elected a man who had been a cabinet 
minister in the defunct BNP government. Although the BNP was 
never popular in Mokhotlong, particularly in Tlokoeng ward, the 
man's political affiliations were regarded as irrelevant; his 
legal training and his knowledge of 'government' were regarded 
as useful attributes. 
In contrast, few 'village headmen' ( liphala; sing. phala) 
serve on the VDCs, even though this would seem appropriate given 
that the system is manifestly directed at improving material 
conditions in villages. A phala is, however, primarily a 
messenger for a chief or headman who is formally responsible for 
the welfare of his subjects. The lack of representation of 
liphala on the VD Cs reflects the way these committees are 
constituted according to local norms of authority. It is a rare 
VDC that does not include the chief or headman of the area, as 
the chairman, and some of his councillors. The Mofulaneng VDC 
of 1986 included both the acting headman (a cousin of the 
gazetted headman who worked in Maseru) and his babeise/bewys 
writer (an appointee who records livestock transactions: see 
chapter 6). At Mapholaneng, the elected VDC included the chief 
as chairman, one of his two main councillors who was also the 
stock pound master, and six other men who were regarded as his 
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councillors. 
Patrilineality and patriarchal expression of kinship are also 
evident in the constitution of VDCs. It is explicit in the 
Mofulaneng VDC where, prior to the election of a new committee 
in 1986, a cousin and senior agnate of the acting headman had 
been on the committee and, thereafter, having resigned because 
of work pressure as a school inspector, continued to be an 
informal advisor to the acting headman and to the committee. 
Similarily, patriarchal values are expressed during elections. 
Chiefs and headmen are regularly elected. Men and women attend 
the elections, but men are elected. The only woman in Tlokoeng 
ward who was on a Development Committee during the late 1980s 
was 'Mamphofu Sekonyela, the acting ward chief, and it was her 
political status which enabled her to be elected to the chair of 
the WDC (there were two women on one of the three Land Comittees 
in the Mapholaneng sub-ward). 
The way the VDCs are constituted is repeated with the WDCs. 
In principle, a WDC consists of elected persons and is an 
intermediary body in the system. Accordingly, one would expect 
it to be a platform for democratic representation in the 
district administration, and to mesh partisan interests in VDC 
project proposals with broader plans for the ward as a whole. 
However, given the system's technicist focus on 'development', 
WDCs reflect the way rural residents have manipulated the intent 
and functions of the VDCs. During the late 1980s the Tlokoeng 
WDC members were all men with the exception of 'Mamphofu 
Sekonyela. The members were 'elected', but in terms of being 
nominees of various VDCs, Land Committees and chiefs and 
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headmen. On this basis, the WDC fulfils its limited 
'development' role of passing on project proposals to the DDC. 
The DDC in Mokhotlong also consists of 'elected' individuals, 
including members of the Tlokoeng WDC, but few villagers know who 
they are or how they were elected. It has a rotating chair which 
alternates between the Tlokoeng ward chief and the district 
chief. It is managed by the District Secretary. The fate of 
project proposals depend on his assessment, and those of the 
various government department heads, of the administration's 
capabilities to carry them out. In other words, the DDC is far 
removed from the world of village life. The DDC nominally 
integrates principles of political democracy with practical 
demands of bureaucracy but, in practice, public accountability 
is minimal. Instead, the DDC concentrates authority in the hands 
of civil servants who are not formally accountable to the 
populace in terms of the structure of the various 'development 
committees'. Moreover, due to its particular focus on 
'development', the DDC emphasises a top-down and restricted 
approach. 
This system of authority serves commercial interests. This 
became apparent in Mokhotlong district during 1986-87 when a 
small hydro-electric project was started in Tlokoeng ward. The 
WDC and the DDC played no part in local interaction with the 
contractor, Spie Batignolle, a French multi-national company. 
Negotiations on numerous issues, ranging from compensation for 
use of fields for the work site to labour recruitment and pay, 
were restricted to the site engineer, the Tlokoeng ward chief and 
Ministry of Labour officials in Mokhotlong. For instance, Spie 
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Batignolle originally conceded to a demand by 'Mamphofu Sekonyela 
for labour to be recruited at her office in Tloha Re Bue. Her 
concern was to promote employment of ward residents and to 
demonstrate the authority of the chieftainship. Subsequently, a 
compromise was reached following communication difficulties 
between the work site and the chief's office, an hour's drive 
apart, and irritation in Tloha Re Bue over having large numbers 
of men hanging around the chief's office in the hope of work 
contracts. Thereafter, permanent labour was recruited on the 
work site at the discretion of the contractor, and casual labour 
was recruited at the chief's office. This compromise enabled the 
site engineer to minimise involvement of the chief's office in 
the management of labour. In addition, the site engineer 
negotiated directly with the Ministry of Labour on various labour 
problems that arose (e.g. strikes over pay and working hours), 
and he was able to circumvent bureaucratic intrusions once he was 
familiar with Lesotho's laws on labour rights which offer little 
protection to workers. 
In other words, the government's technicist perspective on 
development played into the hands of Spie Batignolle. There was 
little that the government, the chiefs and residents could do to 
broaden the contractor's specific short term interests given the 
structure of local government. Only after the project had been 
completed did the WDC and the DDC act, and then, not 
surprisingly, in a manner consistent with the logic of these 
institutions. Having been told repeatedly that development 
signified products, local residents questioned the project's 
provision of electricity only to Mokhotlong town. The Tlokoeng 
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WDC and the DDC subsequently negotiated the laying of a 
transmission line to Mapholaneng, but it serves only the police 
station and the Post Office. Ironically, the local resident who 
benefited perhaps the most from the project was a local 
entrepreneur. He obtained permission from the ward chief to start 
a brick-making business, using river sand, on a site just above 
the weir for the hydro-electricity plant. The weir traps alot of 
sand. This sand is exposed above the water for much of the year, 
allowing easy access to the raw material. 3 
Conclusion: Differentiation of authority 
Current management of settlement in rural Lesotho highlights 
a process of differentiation of authority. On the one hand, the 
government intervenes to exercise its authority and to 
subordinate the chieftainship, but in a way which actually 
minimises its presence in rural settlements and leads to 
affirmation of chiefs' authority to manage settlement. On the 
other hand, however ineffective the government's interventions, 
they create opportunities for consolidation of the market economy 
in rural settlements which does challenge the authority of 
chiefs. With regard to the first point, there are similarities 
with the colonial interventions to subordinate the chieftainship 
as I discussed in the previous chapter. The colonial government's 
efforts to categorise different facets of chiefs' authority is 
replicated in the post-independence governments' efforts to 
impose objective criteria for 'development' and democratic 
representation in rural local government. This is a theme which 
recurs in other aspects of the interaction between the government 
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and the rural populace, and it is taken up again in chapter 7. 
The immediate issue in question is the challenge to chiefs' 
authority from the consolidation of the market economy in rural 
Lesotho. Not only does it involve chiefs' subjects directly as 
agents, but it also reduces the scope for chiefs to control 
settlement in the future. Therefore, not only are there 
indications that the authority of chiefs is being re-fashioned 
by their subjects but also, that the people's need for land is 
being expressed in novel ways. Having indicated that the 
relationship between chief and subject is being re-moulded in 
concert with the changing circumstances of rural life, I address 
the details of this relationship in the following two chapters. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CHIEFS, SUBJECTS AND LAND 
The need for land 
People's need for land is an important aspect of the 
relationship between chief and subject, because that need and the 
land has been the material basis of the chieftainship. The focus 
of this chapter, however, is not simply on how chiefs and 
villagers negotiate access to and use of land. Although land is 
a physical prerequisite of this relationship, it is not an 
immutable variable. Land is defined as a resource in particular 
ways by its users at any one point in time, and it is re-defined 
over a period of time. Moreover, land is divided into numerous 
different resources according to its constituent features and the 
perceived utility of those features for sustenance. The potential 
of land to be a source of sustenance changes as people use it in 
relation to the constraints and opportunities of changing 
economic, demographic and political conditions. Furthermore, the 
significance of land to rural Basotho is always changing as they 
assess and act upon the world around them. 
There are, accordingly, two processes which analysis must take 
into account. First, the definition and re-definition of land as 
a resource indicates how the relationship between chief and 
subject is both defined and modified. Secondly, as Basotho re-
define land, as a resource in relation to regional and global 
economic forces, they create new conditions for use of the land. 
In other words, they transform both nature, as they understand 
it, and the political relationship between chief and subject. 
115 
This is the struggle for the chieftainship, and within in it is 
a struggle to find appropriate ways of securing access to land, 
and of using it. 
The discussion in this chapter is limited to residential and 
arable land and does not include grazing land, which is covered 
in the following chapter. The division is artificial for, as we 
shall see, the logic of usufructory land tenure specifically 
rejects rigid distinctions between land categories. I leave 
discussion on grazing land until later primarily because it is 
impractical to present the analysis in a single chapter. This 
separation is also necessary to emphasise the different political 
and economic dynamics with regard to arable and residential land, 
on the one hand, and grazing land, on the other. Generally 
speaking, there is a process towards private tenure with regard 
to arable and residential land, as opposed to maintenance of 
communal tenure for grazing land. Nonetheless the one process is 
not divorced from the other. Moreover, these general trends 
af feet not only the availability of the land's constituent 
resources, but also the way people categorise these resources 
and, in turn, how they define the relationship between chief and 
subject. 
I do not address arable and residential land in as much detail 
as grazing land. The aim of this chapter is to highlight critical 
issues and to provide a basis for a more comprehensive analysis 
in the following chapter. I have taken this decision partly in 
view of the direction of my argument in this thesis and partly 
in view of the empirical evidence on society in Lesotho. In 
particular, there is a large corpus of ethnographic literature 
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on arable farming and village life in Lesotho, as is indicated 
shortly, but very little on the pastoralist heritage and the 
livestock economy. The arguments in this chapter are based on 
that literature as well as on my own field research, and this has 
enabled me to present it in a shorter form than might otherwise 
have been necessary. Moreover, rather than re-iterate an area 
that has been well documented, I propose only to indicate current 
trends for purposes of documentation and to outline the 
foundations of my argument in this chapter. In the following 
chapter, I illustrate the argument more fully through a detailed 
analysis of the livestock economy. 
Indication of need: An ecological crisis in Lesotho 
Heavy snowfalls blanketed eastern Lesotho during October 1987. 
Villages were isolated for several weeks. Subsequent food and 
fuel shortages lead to deaths, mainly amongst the aged and 
amongst herdboys stranded at grazing-posts. Many livestock also 
died, possibly 20-30% of the district herd. 1 The government 
responded with aid, initially in the form of helicopter transport 
to retrieve corpses and to bring food to schools, and later by 
co-ordinating a campaign to prevent famine. Food, bales of 
fodder, and paraffin were distributed. This was followed, as the 
time for maize planting passed, by distribution of seeds (wheat, 
barley, beans and potatoes) and provision of government tractors 
and ploughs. 
The campaign was successful in that a large tonnage of goods 
was distributed throughout the district, but there were also many 
disputes. Government officials were extremely distrustful of the 
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chiefs, who were given the task of distributing aid goods 
delivered to their areas of jurisdiction. This suspicion led to 
many delays in the provision of relief. Both government officials 
and chiefs incurred the ire of villagers on account of incidents 
such as officials selling paraffin meant for free distribution, 
and chiefs appropriating aid goods for themselves. Donors also 
attacked the national government for inefficient management of 
transport needs. They pointed out, for example, that army 
helicopters were withdrawn at critical times. 
This crisis was followed by floods in January and February 
1988, which damaged crops and destroyed fields in river 
floodplains. The government stated that it would assist farmers, 
and this generated high expectations in view of the assistance 
given the previous year. Chiefs were required to submit reports 
to district officials in order to obtain compensation for 
affected villagers. In some cases chiefs took the initiative to 
compile reports; in others they were lobbied by villagers. The 
lack of response from district officials led to disenchantment, 
however, followed by antagonism against chiefs and government 
officials. 
Although organisational and welfare concerns were overt 
reasons for disputes during these crises, they reveal the 
dichotomy between chiefs and the government. The military 
government illustrated its lack of authority in the rural areas 
by relying on chiefs to distribute aid goods, whilst the lack 
of co-operation between chiefs and district officials indicated 
a contest for authority. In drawing this tension to the surface 
the crises also indicated their material causes. In the first 
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instance, the crises demonstrate the importance of agriculture 
to rural residents as well as their limited capacity to recover 
from such crises. By highlighting this dependence on the land 
the crises indicated the terrain of the contest between chiefs 
and the government. 
The fundamental social dynamic is that the rural population 
depends primarily upon the remitted earnings of migrant workers 
for its material survival. Agriculture is supported by investment 
of this income and, though secondary to the latter, is a vital 
component of individuals' survival strategies. In other words, 
agriculture has the potential, varying in degree from place to 
place as well as inter-seasonally within any one locality, to 
provide some security to rural residents. The ways in which 
people express this material concern and attempt to harness this 
potential have been the subject of much analysis, because it is 
a common feature throughout much of rural southern Africa (Gay, 
1980; Keegan, 1986; Murray, 1981; 1992; Spiegel, 1979; Sharp & 
Spiegel, 1990). The aspect of this dependence in focus here is 
the way in which the relationship between chief and subject is 
expressed as one dimension of individuals' efforts to attain some 
security through agricultural livelihoods. 
Events such as the 1987 snowfalls were a dramatic illustration 
of the need for land. The subsequent conflicts point to the 
political significance of land to Lesotho's citizens and to the 
government, thereby indicating that land is not an immutable 
variable in the relationship between chief and subject. In other 
words, the ecological crises highlighted a struggle over the 
significance of land, which demands, in turn, analytical 
119 
sensitivity to how people construct 'land' as a resource. 
Furthermore, the ecological crises indicated that this struggle 
is both an agent of, and subject to, the transformation of nature 
in Lesotho. 
The point here is that land is neither simply a physical 
variable nor simply a social construct. There are natural forces 
such as snowfalls and floods which highlight the fact that 
Basotho must take account of environmental conditions in the way 
they construct land as a resource, but the social relationships 
which arise from, and express this consideration reflect a 
process of transforming nature. In short, analysis demands 
sensi ti vi ty both to the way people collectively define the 
environment and to the influence of natural forces on their 
definitions (Benton, 1989; Grundmann, 1991). The ecological 
crises outlined above highlight this dual feature of ecological 
processes, which has been described as a question of how people 
both 'work in the environment' (because humanity is dependent on 
its constituent phenomena to survive), and how they 'work the 
environment', (that is, they transform it by means of progress 
in technology to harness resources) (Crompton & Erwin, 1991). 
These crises are, however, extreme illustrations. In the 
following discussion, I focus on the more subtle and less 
visible dynamics in the everyday life of Basotho villagers and 
chiefs. 
Land as a resource 
The pre-colonial ethos of land as a common resource is the 
basis of land tenure in Lesotho, and of chiefs' authority. In 
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principle, indi victuals hold usufruct rights to land and its 
constituent resources, and chiefs authorise these rights. These 
rights have been modifed and elaborated over time (Kimble, 1978; 
Quinlan, 1984), but the principle is still very evident in the 
relationship between chief and subject. Figure 5 illustrates the 
rudiments of this principle and the relationship. It should be 
noted that Figure 5 presents the current model of resource 
classification, and it should not be read, therefore, as if the 
model has existed unchanged for many years. 
All natural resources are, in principle, for the use of all. 
The practice of usufruct entails functional gradations between 
communal and indi victual rights of access to these resources. 
These gradations have been accentuated during the last 150 years 
by the integration of arable farming and of sedentary settlement 
into the pre-colonial pastoralist heritage. The integration of 
arable farming and pastoralism has involved re-evaluation of 
resource categories and refinement of the usufruct principle. 
Trees, for example, are now private property in specific 
circumstances. Likewise, fields have become virtually the private 
property of individuals, but as I discuss shortly, their use is 
still governed by collective need for livestock forage and the 
occasional utility of fields to provide it. Within this 
framework, chiefs occupy a central position. As is illustrated 
in Figure 5, the role of chiefs as trustees of all natural 
resources is overtly expressed in the way some resources are 
categorised directly in reference to chiefs. 
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Figure 5: Sesotho classification of natural resources 
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Source: Field data and modification of Shoup (1987:26-27, 
Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3). 
NB: There are various categories of fields, tenure of which 
also varies, though many categories are no longer 
substantive features of the land tenure system in practice 
today (see Quinlan, 1984). 
However one represents the Sesotho model of society's 
ecological relationship to land, one cannot ignore the fact that 
it is continuing to evolve in relation to changing material 
circumstances of rural residents. There is a process of multi-
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layered differentiation of the resource categories themselves, 
of rights of access and use of resources, and of chiefs' 
authority over resources (Sheddick, 1954; Quinlan, 1984; Shoup, 
1987). This differentiation may be described as an artefact of 
circumscription, the antecedents of which can be traced to the 
mid-19th century when the Basotho polity was transformed into a 
territorially demarcated nation. Basotho were free, however, to 
occupy the interior of the country given that land was readily 
available. Yet, by the early 20th century, Basotho were no longer 
masters of that environment, able to spread out and to shape the 
countryside as desired, but subject to the consequences of their 
containment. Since that time Basotho have had to contend with a 
history of population growth and expansion of settlements which 
has reduced acreages available for cultivation, and has led to 
encroachment onto available grazing land. The material 
constraints on land and individuals' efforts to derive security 
from land continue to change the practice of authority over land. 
In particular, current circumstances show a growing distinction 
between two facets of chiefs' authority: the authority to 
arbitrate access to land and the authority to control its use. 
The struggle for arable land 
Put boldly, individuals' right of access to arable land is now 
of little value to many young adults. There is such a shortage 
of land for cultivation that many do not expect to acquire more 
than their residential sites. Such pessimism stems from evident 
and increasing landlessness throughout Lesotho, even though 
there is no uniform pattern because of local and regional 
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variations in ecological and demographic conditions (Gattinara, 
n.d.; Gay, 1980; Hamnett, 1973; Murray, 1981; Quinlan, 1984; 
Spiegel, 1979). 
Landlessness is acute in the eastern mountain region partly 
because there is less land on which it is feasible to grow crops 
than in the lowlands. The need for land is visible; the many 
abandoned and deeply eroded fields on steep slopes are testimony 
to the consequences of challenging ecological constraints, whilst 
the apparently successful cultivation of hybrid wheat at 2700 
metres above sea level ( masl), though admittedly on gentler 
slopes, is evidence of the effort to transcend perceived 
ecological limits. In a different vein, demographic trends 
highlight the social consequences of this need. Mapholaneng, for 
example, is growing rapidly through influx of young couples who 
have no intention of acquiring fields. Their stated interests are 
uniformly similar; Mapholaneng has the facilities to support 
lives governed by dependence on migrant wage incomes. Relatively 
good transport to, and from, Mapholaneng is a common reason for 
residence in the village. There is direct access to Mokhotlong 
town and the airport, and to the lowlands and South Africa, on 
a road which was regularly maintained in the 1980s, and which 
was being tarred in 1994, such that it is used by an increasing 
number of buses and taxis. Mapholaneng is also a rare place in 
the mountain region with its relative abundance of retail and 
service amenities. 
Today's young adults have good reason to turn their backs on 
crop farming. They are the generation which bears the brunt of 
their parents' and grandparents' futile efforts to stem 
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landlessness. Apart from the gross shortage of arable land in 
relation to the size of the population, gradual imposition of 
private property rights to arable land has begun to negate 
individuals' usufruct rights. Fields can be inherited and leased 
but, as yet, they cannot be sold. This is a marked departure from 
the embattled days of the 19th century when Basotho unequivocally 
rejected private property rights to land in favour of a system 
of usufructory tenure. Mobu hase lefa (land is not paid [for]) 
(Asthon, 1952: 149) is an old maxim which lost its original 
significance during the 20th century as the migrant labour system 
began to dominate rural livelihoods (Quinlan, 1984:76-84, 133-
146). For much of this century young migrant workers have 
supported their landholding elders through wage remittances on 
the basis of vested interest in the land (Murray, 1981; Spiegel, 
1979). In expectation of returning to rural life, and in a 
context of increasing land shortage, the migrant workers 
established legitimate material grounds to take over these 
landholdings. The informal practice of inheritance grew from this 
material interdependency and is aptly expressed in the Sesotho 
phrase ho ja lefa (to inherit - literally: 'to eat the debt'). 
Inheritance of fields was eventually recognised by the Basutoland 
National Council, a government assembly, in 1947-48 (Sheddick, 
1954:60,168). Subsequently, the practice was legally sanctioned 
through revision of the Laws of Lerotholi (ibid; Laws of 
Lerotholi, 1959, sections 6,11-13 [in Duncan 1960:116). 
Official acceptance of field inheritance set a precedent for 
the privatisation of arable land, the ramifications of which are 
still unfolding. The changes within society were set in motion 
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not only by acceptance of inheritance per se, but also by a 
seemingly innocuous stipulation in the laws. Field inheritance 
is nominally governed by the stipulation that the heir(s) live 
in or near to the homestead of the deceased. This stipulation 
would have been appropriate when it was made, for it reflected 
the material and cultural heritage of rural life. As we saw 
earlier, sons generally settled near to their parents' 
homesteads, while patriarchal attitudes readily accommodated the 
material interdependency between young and old. Although the 
stipulation affirmed Sesotho values of kinship, it also laid the 
basis for change in their expression. 
First, the stipulation elevated the institution of the 'family 
council'(lekhotla la lelapa) above that of chief in the matter 
of distributing fields. 'Council' is a bit of a misnomer, for 
in the course of daily life it refers simply to a loose network 
of elder agnates (men and women) who maintain the social bonds 
between kin, and who may be called upon occasionally to manage 
rituals that express these bonds (Sheddick, 1954:20-21). The 
name refers primarily to the group formed by these individuals 
when they meet to distribute the estate of a deceased agnate 
(Hamnett, 1975:45- 52; Poulter, 1981:107). Prior to legitimation 
of field inheritance, the 'council' informally mediated transfer 
of homesteads and fields to heirs through discussion with, but 
subordinate to the decision of, the relevant chief. Subsequently, 
the chiefs' authority was superceded by the 'council's' authority 
over individual estates. Access to land became subject to 
individual interests amongst a network of co-residential kin 
rather than to chiefs' assessment of these interests in relation 
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to those of other village residents. 
The basis for this 'council's' new found authority was the 
stipulation which linked a deceased' s fields to his or her 
homestead. The homestead was part of a person's private estate 
and so, by extension, the fields fell within the ambit of the 
'council's' ability to authorise distribution of that estate. The 
stipulation itself, however, compounded another process by which 
private property rights had been extended to the land on which 
homesteads stood. In principle, the residential site was only 
held on a usufruct basis while the buildings upon it were private 
property. In the context of pressure on land, however, property 
rights to homesteads became a means for Basotho to extend those 
rights to the sites and to enlarge those sites. The results are 
visible today in the way residential sites are often demarcated 
by their occupants as bounded areas, sometimes as much as quarter 
of a hectare around the homestead proper, rather than as space 
occupied by dwellings. 
This development was stimulated by the efforts of colonial 
officials to encourage horticulture along the lines of the 
European cultural heritage of 'gardens' (Sheddick, 1954:78-79). 
Today, the demarcation of residential sites is justified on the 
basis of the 'right' of an individual to have a jarete. The term 
is derived from the Afrikaans word jaart, which means 'yard' as 
in the yard outside a house, and refers to land set aside near 
the homestead to grow vegetables or fruit trees. Jarete became 
a land category during the 1930s when the horticultural campaign 
was started (Agric. Dept., 1934:10; 1936:8). Individuals were 
encouraged to grow fruit and vegetables on residential sites with 
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remarkable success, stimulated by collapse of the agricultural 
economy during the world recession and the drought of 1932 and 
1933 (Agric. Dept., 1937; 1945; Murray, 1981:14-15; Stutley, 
1960:99; Sheddick, 1954:78-79). Subsequently, a common practice 
was to construct protective fences around these 'gardens' and, 
in many instances, around the entire homestead. 
When the Laws of Lerotholi were revised to allow inheritance 
of fields, 'gardens' were also included as attachments to 
homesteads. Although the Laws maintained the fiction of usufruct 
rights to this land - '(the individual) shall be entitled to use 
of such land as long as he or they continue to dwell thereon', 
and deprived only if 'land [is] required in the public interest' 
(quoted in Hamnett, 1975:139) - private property rights had been 
extended beyond the dwellings to the land. Today, these de facto 
rights have been entrenched by the 1979 Land Act through which 
title deeds confirm individual tenure of residential sites and 
fields. 
There is, therefore, an historical process leading towards de 
facto privatisation of land in a way which reduces both the 
probability of young adults acquiring fields and the acreages 
that they might conceivably acquire. This process is still being 
contested as villagers assess its ramifications. The case study 
below illustrates these dynamics. It refers to a network of kin 
who have been fortunate to be heirs of a relatively large 
landholding. Nonetheless, it is patently clear that the current 
heirs will have little to pass on to the next generation. 
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Case Study: Maliehe's fields 
In 1977 Motisilane Maliehe died at his home in Ha Meta, 
leaving a landed estate of eight fields. His heirs were his 
three surviving sons; Makhetha, the oldest son, who lived in 
Mapholaneng six kilometres distant, and Kikine and Khosi, both 
of whom lived in Ha Meta. As the eldest living agnate, Maketha 
became the 'father' of Maliehe's kin in the area, with implicit 
authority to preside over distribution of his father's fields. 
He duly exercised his authority and laid claim to the fields for 
subsequent division amongst kin. At the time, Makhetha already 
had a field in Mapholaneng while his two brothers had fields in 
Ha Meta. 
Khosi disputed Makhetha's claim and, with the backing of the 
phala of Ha Meta (who was also chairman of the local Land 
Committee), he took the matter to court. The case was heard in 
Mapholaneng, where the court president ruled against Makhetha 
on the grounds that none of the parties had the government forms 
which indicated title to fields. No party had substantial 
evidence to support their claim, but Khosi had a better claim 
to be the heir in terms of the Laws of Lerotholi. Khosi had 
argued that he lived in Ha Meta close to his father's homestead 
and, therefore, that he was a more legitimate heir than Makhetha 
who lived in Mapholaneng, which was not even in the sub-ward of 
the chief who had jurisdiction over Ha Meta. 
Mokhoabe, Makhetha's eldest son, then took over the matter 
as he felt that his father lacked the strength and knowledge to 
proceed with litigation. He arranged for his father to call a 
meeting of the 'family council', as was his right as 'father' 
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of the family, to discuss allocation of Motisilane's fields. 
Khosi and Kikine refused in writing to attend this meeting, but 
this did not deter Mokhoabe. He had written proof that his 
father had attempted to carry out his moral obligations to kin. 
At the meeting, Makheta divided the fields amongst himself, his 
brothers and his three married sons (his fourth son was still 
a boy) [see Figure 6]. 



























Mokhoabe then lodged a claim for the necessary forms in order 
to register title to the fields. Once he had completed this 
administrative procedure, he took the matter to court on his 
father's behalf. This time Makhetha won the case on legal and 
moral grounds. He had the necessary title deeds and he had given 
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a proportion of the inheritance to 
the president noted that Khosi 
proportion commensurate with his 
several children. 
his brothers. In particular, 
had been given a generous 
needs as a married man with 
In 1980, Khosi appealed to the Central court in Mokhotlong, 
supported in principle by his brother Kikine. This court wasted 
no time, however, in rejecting the appeal in view of the local 
court transcripts and the title deeds. Khosi then appealed to 
his sub-ward chief who reportedly claimed not to be familiar 
with the details of the case (but who would have authorized the 
title deeds), and so passed the matter to the Tlokoeng ward 
chief, Matsohlo Sekonyela. Again, Khosi was unsuccessful 
because, as both Makhetha and Mokhoabe commented, the chiefs 
could do nothing against a civil court ruling and obliged, 
therefore, to ignore Khosi's appeal. 
The Land Act had been passed by this time and new forms were 
issued for registering title to fields. By August 1980, Makhetha 
and his sons had obtained most of the necessary forms under the 
1979 Land Act to certify their title to most of the fields. 
Kikine tried in the meantime to take Makhoabe's field which led 
the latter to take him to court. Although Makhoabe did not have 
all the necessary documentation required by the Land Act, the 
court president found in his favour. Subsequently, title to all 
fields amongst the respective heirs, with the exception of 
Motisilane(jun), was confirmed after Mokhoabe had persuaded 
the chairman of the Land Committee at Ha Meta to stamp and sign 
the title deeds. Motisilane (jun.) was still awaiting 
confirmation in 1988 after having re-submitted new forms for 
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approval, following a fire at the local court which had 
destroyed records of his previous application. 
The family feud continued throughout the 1980s. In 1982, 
Kikine died and his wife subsequently brought the title deeds 
for his fields to Makhetha, reportedly on the basis of a wish 
by her late husband to get rid of the fields as a means of 
getting out of the feud. Since then, Makhetha has kept the 
fields, giving a share of the harvests to his sister in law. He 
has not attempted to re-register the fields in his name for fear 
that this would provide Khosi an opportunity to contest the 
claim. 
In 1986, Khosi reportedly came to Makhetha to resolve the 
dispute, and as a gesture of goodwill, said that he would help 
cultivate Makhetha's fields. At harvest time, however, Khosi 
reaped the entire crop without the knowledge of Makhetha, and 
kept it on the grounds that he had carried all the costs of 
ploughing, sowing and harvesting. Makhetha and Mokhoabe might 
have pursued the matter had it not been for the fact that the 
harvest of that year was particularly poor and, therefore, not 
worth the effort. Instead, the feud continued to simmer. In the 
meantime, Mokhoabe and his younger brother Teboho, who were the 
wage earners of the family, established material grounds to 
inherit from their father by paying the costs of cultivating 
their father's fields and those of Kikine, in addition to their 
own. 
The way Makheta and Mokhoabe pursued their claim to fields 
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and, in particular, their comment about the inability of chiefs 
to intervene, suggest a general decline in the authority and 
status of chiefs. However, such a perspective is presumptuous 
even if the evidence indicates reasons for popular disdain of 
chiefs. Chiefs and villagers are caught in a process in which 
authority over land is very much contested, and the relationship 
between chief and subject is being re-constructed as 
circumstances change. The critical position in this argument is 
that it makes no sense to isolate chiefs' authority in relation 
to arable land, when the historical evidence indicates that this 
authority must be located within a broader cultural and economic 
context. The privatisation of land, for instance, may be a 
material process which subverts cultural constructs of usufruct, 
but it is linked to the latter, such that it is an integral part 
of the evolution and expression of land tenure in Lesotho. 
Likewise, as much as the foregoing discussion demonstrates 
empirical changes in the character of land categories, each is 
linked to the other. There are subtle gradations, rather than 
absolute distinctions, between the land categories as people 
assess the consequences for relationships amongst themselves. 
Change to these relationships is not simply determined by 
material imperatives which would imply distinct transformations 
of the relationships. Rather, the change is dependent upon 
culturally mediated recognition of these imperatives as well as 
indi victual efforts to dictate limits. These efforts are only 
partially successful because, in the process, the imperatives 
become part of the cultural idiom and the limits are inevitably 
modified in response. In short, while the authority of chiefs 
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over access to arable land is diminishing, it is also being re-
assessed and re-constructed in relation to chiefs' authority over 
other resources. This dynamic cannot be illustrated fully here, 
for to do so requires detailed discussion of other resource 
categories, particularly grazing land, and the uses to which they 
are put, and this task entails detailed description of the 
pastoralist dimension of rural livelihoods. 
The dynamic can be introduced, however, in anticipation of 
further discussion of it in the following chapter. I outline 
below recent developments in the use of crop stover, which is 
commonly used as winter forage for livestock. The point in 
question is that while this illustration suggests erosion of 
chiefs' authority, like the Maliehe case study above, it also 
highlights the importance of broadening one's perspective before 
judging the matter. Livestock are often seen as antithetical to 
crop farming in market-based farming enterprises, but this is not 
the case in Lesotho. Basotho have integrated not only these two 
facets of farming, but also market production of livestock with 
a pre-capitalist rationale for rearing livestock. Generally, 
livestock are kept, during the summer, at grazing posts in the 
remote alpine valleys away from villages in order to protect the 
crops. The village is the basis on which the divisions between 
arable land and grazing land and remote grazing post, are built. 
Moreover, the village continues to be the reference point for 
modifications to the transhumance system, which will be discussed 
in the following chapter. The dynamics of this process are 
indicated in recent changes in the use of crop stover from 
harvested fields. 
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Communal access to crop stover for use as winter forage for 
livestock is one of the longstanding principles of usufruct in 
Lesotho. Throughout Mokhotlong district, however, farmers often 
reap the crop stover from their fields and store it at their 
homesteads to feed their own animals. Farmers in the district 
informed me that this has been a common practice since the mid-
1970s, and that chiefs have not tried to stop it. They 
rationalise the practice on the grounds that the welfare of 
their animals is threatened during winter by decline in the 
quantity of grazing in village environs as a result of extensive 
use of village grazing lands by the increasing number of animals 
kept in villages during the summer months. They defend the 
practice on the grounds that the crop is legitimately the private 
property of the farmer and so, by extension, the stover also 
belongs to the farmer. 
This practice is, on the one hand, a practical response to 
changing ecological conditions. As settlements expand, the 
establishment of bounded residential sites and cultivation of 
more land in village environs leads to encroachment upon the 
grassland that can be used for grazing livestock. Faced with the 
conflict of choice between growing subsistence or fodder crops 
on limited landholdings in a context of human poverty, 
appropriation of crop stover is a functional compromise. The 
practice is, on the other hand, a logical corrolary of the 
privatisation of arable land. As individual property rights to 
crops are extended to the land on which they are produced, so 
communal tenure of one part of the crop becomes less tenable. 
There are, clearly, ecological and economic determinants of 
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change in agricultural practices which challenge the established 
order, but the functional compromise of farmers with regard to 
crop stover, and the collective acquiescence by chiefs and 
villagers, suggest that there is an internal logic to the land 
tenure system which can accomodate apparent contradictions. That 
logic is revealed in the way the removal of crop stover (and the 
practice of land inheritance) accentuates people's need to use 
resources in particular ways. By removing crop stover from 
fields, individuals are making direct reference to their 
collective interest in livestock as a foundation of social 
relationships in rural areas. Not only are livestock central to 
ritual exchanges but, as we have seen, they are also the medium 
by which the status of chiefs relative to each other is 
expressed. 
This is not to deny the usurption of communal interests in 
crop stover, but it is a warning against seeing this practice in 
isolation,and only on the basis of individual material interest. 
The empirical situation is one of contest for land which has 
resulted in various resolutions that are governed by specific 
circumstances. Individual appropriation of crop stover suggests 
that a resolution to the problem of finding forage for livestock 
has been found quite quickly, but there is no guarantee that it 
will become a permanent solution. In other instances, resolutions 
are still being tested. This is evident in the variety of 
'gardens' to be seen in the mountain region. In some villages, 
there are communal 'gardens', that is, a fenced area which has 
been set aside for collective use by village residents, while 
residential sites are demarcated only by the occupants' 
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dwellings. These 'gardens' are often inspired by Aid agency 
projects to establish horticultural co-operatives but, in view 
of the contest for land, they can also be seen as an attempt to 
preserve principles of usufruct. In other villages, like 
Mapholaneng, there are both 'traditional' type homesteads, which 
have no demarcated boundaries and whose occupants cultivate 
separate 'gardens' granted by the chief, and other homesteads 
which are bounded by fences and contain large 'gardens' that 
affirm the occupants' claim to the total area. 
These visible conditions obscure a history of contest, as is 
illustrated in the case study of 'Maliehe's fields', in which 
resolutions are forever being tested. For example, the board of 
the primary school in Mapholaneng has been involved in a long 
dispute over the fields which had been allocated by chief Kariki 
Sekonyela to help feed the children. Throughout the 1980s 
Kariki's successor, Setempe Sekonyela, and the latter's 
successor, Reselisitsoe, attempted on various occasions to re-
allocate the fields, on the grounds that there were individuals 
in Mapholaneng who had no fields with which to support their 
families. To date, the school board has managed to prevent loss 
of its fields largely on the grounds of 'public interest' and use 
of the fields as 'gardens' for horticulture. 
In contrast, Hamnett (1975:82-84) records a case in which a 
woman claimed rights of inheritance to two residential sites and 
gardens but was disposessed of one garden by the chief. The 
courts initially rejected the woman's claim. Later, the courts 
of appeal first upheld the claim on the grounds that a 'garden' 
could not be categorised as arable land and hence, was not 
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subject to norms of usufruct. The third court finally rejected 
the woman's claim on the grounds that the chief was acting in 
'public interest' and also, that since the woman could not live 
at both sites, she could not by rights lay claim to both 
'gardens'. 
There are no doubt many other cases which would highlight the 
apparent ambiguities of land tenure in Lesotho. But they are only 
ambiguities to the outsider. Basotho are clearly aware that these 
'ambiguities' reflect variable human categorisations of 
resources which can be manipulated. And they are manipulated, but 
always in relation to each other. Categories such as residential 
sites, gardens and fields are modified as a result of individuals 
re-assessing their material interests and proclaimed cultural 
guidelines for expression of these interests. These dynamics are 
apparent. What is not so apparent, and possibly what many Basotho 
are not so conscious of, is the change in the form of the 
relationship between chiefs and villagers. 
one cannot deny that chiefs no longer have the authority they 
used to have with regard to access to arable land. One must also 
recognise, however, that the general trend towards privatisation 
of arable land and its products is being expressed on the basis 
of patriarchal precepts, as is illustrated in the Maliehe case, 
and in reference to a heritage of usufruct land tenure and 
collective interest in livestock, which are foundations of 
chiefs' authority. Therefore, despite the fact that chiefs are 
being displaced from centre stage with regard to the allocation 
and use of arable land, this does not necessarily mean that their 
status and authority is in decline. The potential for this to be 
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the case is evident in view of increasing landlessness amongst 
the young adults of today. As the possibility of acquiring fields 
diminishes, and as transport and consumer facilities improve in 
rural areas, there is potential for decline in the relevance of 
chiefs to people whose lives are increasingly oriented to jobs 
and the consumer market economy of the late 20th century. There 
is, therefore, a substantive basis for popular disdain and 
criticism of individual chiefs, but such judgement rests on 
viewing in isolation specific developments in land tenure in 
Lesotho. As I have noted, the apparent erosion of chiefs' 
authority with regard to arable land cannot be seen in isolation 
from people's interest in, and need for, livestock and their 
concommi tant demand for communal access to resources that sustain 
those livestock. Accordingly, the following chapter continues the 




CHIEFS, SUBJECTS AND LIVESTOCK 
Erosion of chiefs' authority? 
Chapter 5 indicated the importance of exploring the 
relationship between society and nature in Lesotho in order to 
understand political authority in the rural areas. That chapter 
left us with two issues which still require elaboration. First, 
there are indications of erosion of chiefs' authority in relation 
to their subjects in matters pertaining to access to, and use of, 
land for arable farming and for homesteads. Secondly, the 
discussion intimated that this apparent erosion of chiefs' 
authority must be assessed in relation to people's need for 
livestock, and the concommitant need for communal access to 
resources that sustain livestock. The argument in this chapter 
is that the apparent decline in chief's authority with regard 
to arable land is compensated by people's reliance on chiefs to 
uphold collective access to, and need for, natural resources in 
general, and for those that sustain livestock in particular. 
People's pre-occupation with livestock is central to the way land 
categories are defined in relation to each other and to broader 
economic circumstances of life in rural Lesotho. Chiefs are the 
pivot on which villagers assess possibilities for, and 
constraints on, meeting their need for livestock. 
What is in question here is the interaction of rural residents 
with a changing political and physical world, and its effects 
upon chiefs' authority in Lesotho. Chapter 5 revealed shifts in 
the relationship between chief and subject, which could be seen 
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as responses to external factors such as population growth and 
dependence upon migrant wage incomes. The discussion touched on 
the way these factors are mediated in a culturally specific way 
by Basotho, but nagging questions remain about this explanation? 
Are the practices only adaptive responses to imposed conditions? 
Are Basotho driven by cultural prescriptions alone in their 
efforts to mediate imposed conditions? The underlying theme of 
the argument is that Basotho certainly do adapt, and they often 
use cultural prescriptions to adapt, but they also initiate 
change. Livestock, like land, are a material resource, but 
Basotho pre-occupation with them is a particular imperative which 
originated in pre-colonial times and which has been sustained 
to the present day (Ashton, 1952; Ferguson, 1990; Kuper, 1982; 
Murray, 1981). Chiefs are central to Basotho efforts to retain 
established practices, to modify them, and to develop new 
practices that enable them to derive sustenance from the land and 
livestock. 
Chiefs and the livestock economy 
The central role of chiefs in the livestock economy is 
palpable. Access to summer grazing areas beyond village environs 
is governed by district chiefs, from whom stock owners obtain 
permission to build grazing posts. Subordinate chiefs authorise 
the transhumance system by controlling use of grassland within 
their areas of jurisdiction. Throughout the summer months chiefs 
are responsible for ensuring that stock graze neither on 
cultivated fields nor on grassland which they have reserved for 
winter grazing. Chiefs may also prohibit grazing in areas that 
141 
are badly degraded for as long as they feel is necessary. Chiefs 
are also responsible for controlling the number of livestock in 
the villages during the summer, and they can demand their removal 
to grazing posts. Their responsibilities are reduced during the 
winter months, for then the emphasis is on protecting only 
specified areas from further degradation by livestock. With the 
onset of spring chiefs must decide when to restrict grazing in 
village environs, and when to order the removal of the majority 
of livestock to grazing posts. 
Generally speaking, chiefs carry out their duties assiduously 
and with the co-operation of villagers. Their authority is 
visibly demonstrated at the twice weekly gatherings of stock 
owners, usually men, at chiefs' homesteads to conduct the 
business of livestock management. Trade in livestock, 
registration of brands, impounding of livestock, their retrieval, 
and care of stray animals, are all carried out under the auspices 
of the chief. This business is usually supervised by men who 
occupy positions that represent the chiefs' duties (chief's 
secretary, pound master, 'babeisi'/'bewys' [stock transfer 
certificate] writer, grazing land supervisors [batsoari ba 
maboella]). There are standard procedures with which all are 
familiar such that the interactions are often relaxed, though 
contained within norms of social etiquette of respect to the 
chief. The chief's secretary records the various transactions, 
assisted by the babeisi writer, and collects trespass fines, 
while the pound master arranges for release of impounded animals. 
In addition, the secretary arranges for distribution of the 
fines, 70% of which are paid out to the grazing land supervisors, 
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who are men appointed by the chief to enforce grazing 
restrictions, and the remaining 30% is sent to the national 
treasury. 
Likewise, the legitimacy of chiefs is clearly expressed in the 
way decisions are made to restrict winter grazing. Chiefs make 
the decision, usually in October, on the basis of debates amongst 
stock owners at public meetings which are held at chiefs' 
homesteads. The debates revolve primarily around the welfare of 
livestock in relation to prevailing ecological conditions such 
that many factors are voiced and considered: the condition of 
village grassland in relation to the alpine grassland used during 
summer; spring growth of grasses relative to current and 
forecasted spring rainfall; the strength of new born lambs and 
kids in relation to the quality of forage for ewes and (goat) 
does, and prevailing climatic conditions (angora kids, in 
particular, are very susceptible to changes in temperature, to 
hail and to cold rain); villagers' need of cattle to plough the 
fields in relation to rainfall which determines the start of the 
ploughing season ( often early November) . Al though there are 
government regulations on use of grazing land, these are usually 
regarded as just one factor amongst the many others to be 
considered (Legal Notice, 1980b; 1982; 1986). 
These indicators of authority highlight a community of purpose 
and understanding amongst stock owners and chiefs. This 
'community' is so apparent that it begs questions about its 
dynamics. There are, however, two characteristics which demand 
attention. On the one hand, this 'community' is characterised by 
defensiveness amongst chiefs and villagers. There is collective 
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concern about deterioration of grazing land, and about the 
difficulties of rearing a variety of livestock with different 
survival and regenerative capabilities in a harsh environment. 
On the other hand, there is evident tension between the 
relatively rich and poor stock owners over government 
interventions which are seen generally to favour the former. The 
discussion below traces out these dynamics for elaboration in 
later sections of the chapter. 
Collective interest in Livestock 
Basotho have integrated market-oriented rearing of livestock 
with their pre-colonial pastoralist heritage. The outcome is a 
remarkable diversity of livestock, to which are attached a range 
of economic and cultural values, and from which Basotho derive 
a variety of uses. Cattle are the basis of the pastoralist 
heritage, but today, as is indicated in Table 1, the national 
herd is dominated by merino sheep and angora goats. 
Table 1: Size of the National Herd 
Year: 1955 1970 1975 1980 1985 
No of 
animals 
Sheep 1,339,019 1,655,128 1,519,700 1,043,561 1,391,625 
Goats 654,800 973,767 834,600 784,346 978,013 
Cattle 408,144 551,520 502,400 593,929 524,675 
Horses 102,001 109,703 100,300 101,123 110,438 
Donkeys 48,855 89,711 92,700 85,238 111,726 
Mules 4829 4092 ? ? ? 
Sources: Colonial Report, 195 7: 46; Bureau of Statistics, 1970: 
Tables: 4.1111, 4.2121, 4.2432, 4.4111, 4.6111, 4.7111, 
4.8111; Bureau of Statistics, 1982, Tables: 1.1.1, 2.1.1, 
3.1.1, 4.1.1, 5.1.1, 6.2.1; Bureau of Statistics, 1987, 
Tables: F.14, F.17. No statistics of the mule population 
were recorded after 1970. 
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Cattle are still, perhaps, the most important animals in terms 
of cultural values. They are the medium for bridewealth 
transactions; they form an integral part of many rituals (e.g. 
use of black skinned beasts in funeral rites); and, as Ferguson 
(1990) has recently argued, they occupy a unique place in the 
imagination of Basotho men concerning the nature of rural society 
and rural livelihoods. They are a medium for economic 
transactions, be it for hire as draft power or, as is becoming 
more common, a source of income through sale at auctions to the 
national abbatoir. Furthermore, as Murray ( 1977) has argued with 
regard to the persistence of bridewealth, cattle are the medium 
through which rural residents can obtain a portion of migrant 
workers' wages, while also enabling the latter to invest in rural 
society prior to their retirement. 
The preponderance of sheep and goats reflects the importance 
of Lesotho as a wool and mohair producer for international 
markets. In addition, they are the common consumable and trade 
commodity. Sheep, in particular, are often slaughtered to provide 
food at social gatherings. They are bartered in exchange for 
services (e.g. payment of secondary school fees), and there is 
regular trade in sheep to local butcheries. They are also a 
medium for use in rituals. For instance, the liver of sheep is 
an important ingredient in some medicines prepared by healers 
(lingaka). Since angora goats were introduced in Lesotho at the 
turn of the century (Ashton, 1952:134; Phororo, 1979:100), pure 
white specimens have become central to some healing rituals. 
Horses and donkeys are vital means of transport in rural 
areas. The donkey has a humble status as a beast of burden, but 
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the horse has become a popular cultural and status symbol. The 
blanketed Basotho horseman is a much marketed image of Lesotho. 
Male social status is enhanced by ownership of a large imported 
horse, rather than the locally bred 'Basotho pony', and endorsed 
partly through popular interest in locally organised races. In 
Mokhotlong district, for example, informal race meetings are 
organised at various times of the year and at various localities. 
The horse is also a medium of exchange in bridewealth payments. 1 
Also, a boy's status as an adult is confirmed, after his 
initiation, by his maternal uncle who is formally required to 
give him a horse, a blanket and, in days gone by, a rifle. 2 
Although Basotho find much value in this diversity of 
livestock, it presumes flexible management strategies. The 
critical problem for Basotho owners is that the economic and 
ecological contexts for rearing livestock have outgrown the 
original logic of the transhumance system. That system emphasised 
adherence to known ecological limits in order to ensure the 
survival of livestock; the alpine grasslands were used during the 
warm summer months, and allowed to regenerate during winter and 
spring when livestock were grazed on the accumulated forage on 
the relatively warmer, lower sub-alpine grasslands in village 
environs. Not only is it difficult to rear animals in a country 
with climatic extremes, but the different survival capabilites 
of livestock species and breeds have required stock owners to 
develop different management techniques if their value is to be 
realised. 
The outcome has been re-assessment of known ecological limits, 
and subsequent modification of the transhumance system. During 
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the last 20 years stock owners have established 'winter' grazing 
posts in the intermediate valleys between villages and the summer 
grazing areas. These grazing posts are situated in the relatively 
warm sub-alpine valley grasslands and are usually no more than 
three or four hours walk from villages, thereby allowing rapid 
removal of livestock to the villages whenever the weather 
deteriorates. As a result, livestock movement patterns have been 
changed. In the past most livestock would be taken to the summer 
grazing areas in November, once ploughing had begun, and brought 
back to the villages once crops had been harvested during 
April/May. Only the rams and (goat) bucks would be kept in the 
villages, collectively under the care of an appointed villager, 
and allowed to cover the ewes and does upon their return in 
autumn. Now, stock owners must consider carefully the different 
capabilities of livestock to survive seasonal climatic and 
natural hazards in their efforts to re-define the ecological 
limits for livestock rearing. 
Most livestock are sent to the summer grazing areas during 
late December/early January. During April/early May the animals 
are usually brought down to the 'winter' grazing posts. Stock 
owners who have large herds occasionally leave hammels at 
'summer' grazing posts for the duration of winter in view of 
their ability to withstand cold, and if there are expectations 
that winter forage supplies will be inadequate in the winter 
grazing areas. Most stock owners keep ewes and does at the 
'winter' grazing posts for June and part of July, where they are 
covered by rams and bucks brought up from the villages. As the 
weather deteriorates, cattle and donkeys are brought back to the 
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villages, followed by ewes and does, and lastly by hammels and 
horses. Once the weather begins to improve in August, horses, 
ewes and hammels are returned to the 'winter' grazing posts, 
followed by cattle. As long as the weather continues to improve, 
stock owners will allow the ewes to bear their lambs at the 
'winter' grazing posts, and bring up donkeys and cattle that are 
not in daily use in the villages. Goats are generally kept in the 
villages until their owners are certain that there is little 
likelihood of inclement weather to which new born kids are very 
susceptible. This is the general pattern today but, between 
August and September, stock are moved back and forth between the 
villages and the 'winter' grazing posts according to changes in 
climate and in the availability of forage in village environs. 
Underlying these changes is a gradual division between the 
minority who are relatively wealthy stock owners and the majority 
who are relatively poor stock owners (this differentiation is 
discussed in detail later in the chapter) . The former often keep 
their sheep and goats permanently at grazing posts rather than 
in villages on the grounds that forage supplies in village 
environs are inadequate for their needs. It is the majority of 
poor stock owners who move their different animals regularly 
between village, and 'winter' and summer grazing posts because 
they can ill afford any stock losses. It is this majority who 
tend to rely on the chiefs to extend winter grazing periods and 
to ignore government stipulations, in opposition to the minority 
of wealthy stock owners who tend to support the government's 
interventions. The current state of play is that there is 
discernible opposition between chiefs and government officials, 
148 
with the authority of the former being upheld by the majority 
of villagers but challenged indirectly by a minority of wealthy 
stock owners. To understand these dynamics, the historical roots 
of the tensions between the different agents need to be 
outlined. 
Historical roots of current political tensions 
Colonial programmes emphasised livestock production over 
grassland management with a view to stimulating a market economy. 
During the first decade of this century, the colonial government 
sought to improve the quality of livestock in Lesotho by 
importing Angora bucks, Rambouillet rams and Arab stallions 
(Colonial Report, 1909:33; 1911:8; Phororo, 1979:73,100). Efforts 
to improve cattle breeds were curtailed by the East Coast fever 
epidemic which swept across South Africa between 1907 and 1910, 
and led to the prohibition of cattle imports into Lesotho 
(Colonial Report, 1911:8). The attempt to promote mutton 
production through the Rambouillet breed soon gave way to 
interest in wool production which had its origins in the 19th 
century (Ashton, 1952:134; Germond, 1967:469). 
By the late 1920s wool and mohair were the most important 
agricultural exports of the country (Murray, 1981:14), supported 
by various 
Catalonian 
means to promote 
Jack donkeys were 
a market economy in livestock. 
reportedly introduced in 1918 
(Ashton, 1952:112) as stud animals to produce mules capable of 
carrying heavy loads of wool over long distances to traders. 
According to informants, stock owners in eastern Lesotho used to 
travel via Namahali Pass in the north to traders in Witsieshoek, 
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and via Sani Pass to traders in Himeville. The first dip tank was 
constructed in 1905 as a forerunner of an intensive campaign 
begun during the 1920s to eradicate endemic sheep scab (Phororo, 
1979:92). By 1935 the parasite had been virtually eradicated from 
the national herd (Colonial Report, 1920:6; Phororo, op cit). The 
government introduced grassland management programmes during the 
1930s, but the emphasis still remained on livestock production. 
Projects included the first attempt to institute regular auctions 
of livestock (Mokitimi, 1988a:l), continued import of stud 
animals (Agric. Dept., 1938; 1939; 1940), a major ecological 
survey of the alpine grasslands (Staples and Hudson, 1938), 
introduction of rotational grazing and stocking rate controls 
(Agric Dept, op cit), and construction of shearing sheds 
(Mokitimi, 1988b:9). 
This emphasis continued in the 1940s and1950s. Market co-




and mohair in terms of 
of personnel, became 
Report, 1952: 33). A 
international standards, and 
priorities during the 1950s 
training scheme to develop 
veterinary services was started (op cit). A co-operative banking 
union for farmers was established in 1957 (Colonial Report 
1957:51). Stud animals continued to be imported, a scheme to 
promote breeding of Brown Swiss cattle was started, and two horse 
stud farms were established (Colonial Report, 1954:42; 1959:49). 
Not all of these schemes were successful. Livestock auctions 
collapsed in 1956 (Colonial Report, 1957:46). The market co-
operatives reportedly suffered from lack of capital, a shortage 
of government shearing sheds, and competition from traders 
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(Colonial Report, 1954:45). Wool and mohair buyers occasionally 
rejected the stated quality of the produce, which was supposed 
to be packed according to an internationally recognised classing 
system, because of the prevalence of cross-breed rams and bucks 
amongst people's herds (Colonial Report, 1958:51; 1959:49). 
Furthermore, the attempt to modify grassland management 
methods (e.g. rotational grazing, stocking rate regulations) does 
not appear to have been successful (Phororo, 1979: 153). The lack 
of success was due to their subordination to the effort to 
improve livestock production. For instance, rotational grazing 
schemes were linked to the dipping programme. The intention was 
that the dip tanks would form nuclei for demarcated grazing areas 
and that grazing patterns would be modified by controlling use 
of dip tanks (ibid) . This intention seems, however, to have been 
lost in the effort to demonstrate the advantages of dipping to 
improve survival rates, and in stock owners' recognition of the 
utility of dips to this end. Likewise, the logic of stocking rate 
controls, to impose externally assessed objective criteria, was 
contradicted by the emphasis on livestock production and by 
reliance on chiefs to implement the measures. On the one hand, 
the controls were somewhat contradictory in a context where 
Basotho were being encouraged to accumulate livestock. On the 
other hand, it was unrealistic to implement controls which were 
based on a different logic of conservation to that of the local 
land tenure system, and to expect the agents of this system, the 
chiefs, to subordinate the latter to the former. 
Moreover, the disposition of chiefs to uphold the local system 
had actually been endorsed by government rationalisation of the 
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chieftainship during the 1930s and 1940s, discussed in chapter 
3. Control over grazing had been the responsibility of the 
chiefs' courts. Trespass, damage to crops, and flouting of 
chiefs' edicts on grazing areas were subject to fines paid in 
livestock to the chiefs. Likewise, stray stock were held by the 
chief and, unless 
the rest would 
claimed, some would become his property while 
be sent to the relevant senior chief. 
Rationalisation of the chieftainship simply standardised the 
procedures in ways which endorsed this aspect of chiefs' 
authority, even though the chieftainship as a whole was 
subordinated to the authority of colonial government officials 
and institutions. Al though chiefs' judicial authority was 
restricted, chiefs were given the responsibility to ensure 
systematic branding of stock and to record ownership through 
issue of livestock transfer certificates. Stock pounds were 
introduced and became a means for formal distinction between 
chiefs and headmen. Operation of stock pounds, and appointment 
of pound managers, were restricted to 
there are still some gazetted headmen 
gazetted chiefs. However, 
who manage pounds on the 
basis of the local status of their predecesors as chiefs. In 
addition, following the establishment of a National Treasury in 
1946, a standard rate of fines was introduced and chiefs were 
responsible for the collection of monies and their remission to 
the Treasury. 
The colonial government's interventions up to the 1930s, and 
subsequent contradictions in its livestock programmes, indicate 
some reasons why livestock production took precedence over 
grassland management in the development of Lesotho's livestock 
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economy. These factors alone, however, do not explain why and how 
chiefs' authority in relation to their subjects was upheld, and 
actually reinforced as a result of their subjects' enthusiastic, 
though qualified, acceptance of the imperative to increase 
livestock production and to establish a market economy in 
livestock. To argue that economic incentives provide the answer, 
on the basis of the decline in the population's general capacity 
to sustain itself from farming, would not be very convincing, 
particularly in view of the discussion in chapters 4 and 5 which 
has highlighted how intrusion of the market economy in rural 
areas has eroded aspects of chiefs' authority with regard to 
settlement and arable farming. A full explanation has to consider 
why this was not the case with regard to livestock rearing. And 
this question leads to consideration of the specific ecological 
dynamics that the colonial programmes stimulated. 
It is reasonable to deduce, in view of the lack of necessary 
data (e.g.stock densities) for that time, that the consistent and 
relatively successful effort to improve livestock production 
would have generated greater investment in the welfare of 
livestock. Although there is no evidence to suggest overall 
improvement in survival rates, even through to the present day, 
investment in the welfare of livestock would have increased the 
number of animals in villages during the summer (e.g. prized 
horses, stud animals and milch cows and calves). Furthermore, the 
growing economic importance of sheep and goats would have 
generated concern to ensure optimal survival of offspring. This 
would have stimulated, as is evident in the current form of the 
livestock transhumance system, retention of ewes, lambs, does and 
153 
kids in villages for as long as possible following their delivery 
in early spring, in order to prevent mortalities due to cold 
weather and to increase their size and strength before removal 
to the summer grazing areas (mortalities due to cold weather 
during summer rains and to predation by jackals and eagles have 
always been hazards for young livestock). Accordingly, there 
would have been more intensive use of grazing land in village 
environs during the spring. In turn, on the basis of 
probability, more livestock would have survived the summer 
months, such that more stock would have made use of winter 
grazing in village environs, even if mortalities and consumption 
of livestock during the harsh winters continued to curtail gross 
survival rates. 
In other words, improvements in livestock production would 
have altered the seasonal and intra-seasonal concentrations of 
animals in specific localities which, in turn, would have had an 
effect on forage availability. For instance, one indication of 
this process is given in the oral record from stock owners in 
Mokhotlong district. There were, reportedly, few if any angora 
goats in the district prior to the 1940s. Since then, however, 
angora goats have become common components of individuals' herds. 
Many stock owners try to build up a flock of goats to take 
advantage of the occasional high prices for mohair. Goat herds 
are usually smaller than sheep herds for, despite the economic 
inc en ti ve to produce mohair, stock owners acknowledge the greater 
difficulty of rearing goats compared to sheep. In view of these 
variables, the ecological condition of the grassland would have 
been affected by the presence of goats in the district for the 
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last 50 years, by their particular foraging patterns, and by 
their contribution to increased density of livestock in villages 
during winter and spring. 
According to the oral record, moreover, the demand for mules 
decreased with the increase in the number of wool sheds thoughout 
the country, because there was less need for pack animals to 
transport wool and mohair over long distances to traders. 
Instead, demand for donkeys increased, to carry commodities and 
loads like maize to mills within localities, as more shops and 
services were established to meet rural residents' dependence on 
migrant wage incomes. As a result, there are few mules today in 
the country. Indeed, the government no longer compiles statistics 
on the mule population. Many people own donkeys, however, and 
assuming that the figures in Table 1 provide an imperfect but 
approximate indication of trends, there has been a marked 
increase in the donkey population. 3 Again, the demographic 
changes in the mule and donkey populations would have affected 
the condition of grassland and the management strategies of their 
owners. Mules would have been used mainly at specific times of 
the year but, as hardy animals, they would probably have been 
kept most of the time on the alpine grasslands. In contrast, the 
utility of donkeys to meet everday needs would have led to 
greater concentration of donkeys in villages throughout the year. 
Furthermore, since Basotho recognised that donkeys are less hardy 
than horses and mules, their owners would have been disposed to 
return donkeys from the summer grazing areas to the villages as 
soon as winter threatened. 
If we accept this analysis of the ecological dynamics which 
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underlay the colonial interventions, then we have a reasonable 
explanation of why the authority of chiefs in livestock 
management was endorsed, indirectly, by the government emphasis 
on livestock production and, directly, by the standardisation of 
livestock controls in village environs. As Basotho diversified 
their livestock holdings to take advantage of market 
opportunities, the need for greater control over livestock and 
use of communal resources would have been felt. Chiefs, as the 
legitimate authority over management of these resources, would 
have remained central to the management of livestock. 
More significantly, by endorsing the authority of chiefs with 
regard to control over livestock in villages, the colonial 
interventions gave chiefs responsibility over the critical nexus 
of economic and ecological changes wrought by the transformation 
of the livestock economy. The village was the critical nexus 
because it was the weakest link in the matrix of social, economic 
and bio-physical conditions that supported investment in a 
variety of livestock. On the one hand, given the harsh climate, 
it was the place in which animals had to be concentrated in order 
to ensure survival and regeneration of herds. On the other hand, 
the entire edifice of the stock owners' and officials' interests 
in promoting livestock production would have crumbled if there 
had not been adequate definition of authority to manage livestock 
in village environs. In the absence of effective intervention by 
colonial officials in grassland management, and on the basis of 
the colonial government's endorsement of chiefs' authority over 
the management of livestock in villages, the chiefs were the 
obvious authority to which people would have turned. Having 
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established these historical antecedents, we are closer to 
understanding not only current tensions in rural society in 
Lesotho, but also why the chieftainship is still upheld by the 
rural populace as a legitimate form of political authority. 
Current tensions over livestock and grassland management 
We can now turn to the underlying tension in the 'community' 
between chief and subject, which is manifest in the friction 
between the relatively wealthy and poor stock owners. The overt 
cause is the current form of government interventions in the 
livestock economy. Government policy is to concentrate livestock 
production in the mountain region, with an emphasis on grassland 
management, and arable farming in the lowlands. 'Range Management 
Areas' (RMAs) have been created throughout the mountain region 
and, in 1990, the area above the 2750masl contour in eastern 
Lesotho was proclaimed a 'Managed Resource Area' (MRA). Tension 
has become apparent in a number of ways. For example, there has 
been opposition to the RMAs since they were introduced in the 
late 1980s, and the form and the manner in which they were 
established is being continually modified in the light of 
experience. In a different vein, a plan to impose a grazing tax 
in 1989 was shelved in the face of popular opposition. There has 
yet to be opposition to the MRA but, as I discuss shortly, it is 
likely to generate opposition. At present it exists only in name 
and is still subject to government consideration of its role 
within the broader policy. 
The RMAs owe their name and existence to a United States 
Agency for International Development ( USAID) programme which 
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began during the early 1980s. A 'Range Management Division' was 
created, with USAID funding, within the Ministry of Agriculture, 
and it is staffed by Basotho and American personnel. The RMAs 
have been designed, as one USAID ecologist stated, on the basis 
of livestock and 'range' management programmes in native American 
reservations (A.Dobb, personal communication; Quinlan, 1993c). 4 
Each RMA includes alpine grazing areas and villages. Each RMA 
is the basis for grassland and livestock management programmes 
that are restricted to the residents who live within the 
circumscribed area. The RMAs were demarcated initially on the 
basis of topographical divisions in the landscape. This rationale 
met with opposition from those stock owners who found themselves 
excluded from grazing areas which they used to use. In response, 
the Range Management Division now attempts to incorporate locally 
acknowledged boundaries between areas even though these are 
loosely defined. There is a propensity for residents of one 
locality to use adjacent grazing areas as a matter of expediency. 
Moreover, stock owners tend to maintain the same transhumance 
route between village and grazing post year after year. It is 
this propensity which government officials now take into account 
in the design of RMAs, though it remains subordinate to the 
underlying logic of the policy for territorial division of the 
grassland. 
Government officials (e.g. American-trained, Basotho 
ecologists) manage the RMAs, supported by American staff. These 
officials establish Wool and Mohair Growers' Associations within 
each RMA, which are the basis for 'community' participation in 
management (Artz, 1994). The aim is that these associations will 
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take over the management of their respective RMAs. In addition, 
the government intends the Village Development Cammi ttees to play 
a broader supervisory role in the management of grasslands 
(Lesotho National Livestock Task Force, 1990). In the meantime 
the Associations are the medium through which stock owners are 
educated about livestock and grassland management techniques. 
Members of the associations are elected to management committees 
which carry out business such as collection of membership fees, 
arranging for hire of stud animals and general management of 
members' interests in producing and marketing mohair and wool. 
Through these arrangements, rotational grazing and breed 
improvement schemes have been established in the RMAs. Each RMA 
is divided up into grazing areas, and stock owners are required 
to move their stock to the different areas according to 
prescriptions laid down by government officials, and to keep 
stock within defined carrying capacity levels in each area. 
Three features of the RMA programme lie at the root of 
tensions in the villages. These are the rotational grazing 
schemes, the management structure, and the territorial logic of 
RMAs. First, the rotational grazing schemes promote 
differentiation between the minority who are weal thy stock owners 
and the majority who are relatively poor stock owners. Secondly, 
the management structure also promotes this differentiation, as 
well as substitution of the authority of chiefs by government 
officials and, indirectly, by wealthy stock owners. Thirdly, the 
territorial logic of RMAs imposes criteria for resource 
management which take little account of the history and evolution 
of local management practices. 
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Before elaborating this argument, it is necessary to outline 
the dynamics of wealth differentiation in livestock. Most rural 
Basotho own some livestock but few own large herds. It should be 
born in mind that statistical data on the characteristics of 
livestock ownership for the country as a whole are inadequate, 
as was noted earlier. The government's current policy to 
concentrate livestock production in the mountain region is 
undoubtedly generating changes in the general pattern, but as 
yet statistical illustration is impossible. Nonetheless, the few 
studies which have been conducted in the mountain region 
indicate general characteristics of livestock ownership and 
provide a basis for the following discussion. Table 2 presents 
the findings of three surveys conducted in the mountain region 
and a fourth, broader survey of the whole region. Although the 
surveys are of different magnitude and probably vary 
considerably in sampling technique, the findings do indicate the 
propensity for livestock ownership as well as intimating 
differentiation of stock holdings amongst stock owners. 
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Table 2: Percentages of households owning livestock in four 
sample surveys of the mountain region 
Area: Thaba Sehlaba- Tlokoeng Sanqe- Mountain 
Tseka -thebe -bethu zone 




Cattle 54 64 61 52 82 
Sheep 37 42 45 59 55 
Goats 29 30 32 35 44 
Horses 60 41 45 41 57 
Donkeys 32 38 42 6 28 
Mules 2 1 
Sources: (a) Jensen (1976:3), sample survey in Thaba Tseka 
Mountain Development Project. 
(b) Lawry (1986, Appendix 1:2), sample survey in 
Sehlabathebe Range Management Area. 
(c) Quinlan, random sample survey of eight villages 
in Tlokoeng Ward, Mokhotlong district, May 1988, 
for Agrar- und Hydrotechnik (1988). 
(d) Quinlan, random sample survey in one village in 
the Sanqebethu river valley, Mokhotlong district, 
September 1988. 
(e) Gattinara (n.d:157-158), nationwide survey which 
included village surveys in the environs of Thaba 
Tseka, Sehlabathebe and Mokhotlong. 
Although many Basotho own livestock, my own surveys indicate 
that few own many animals, as is indicated in Tables 3 and 4 on 
below. These Tables indicate the general pattern of stock 
ownership, but there is substantial differentiation of livestock 
holdings amongst stock owners as is indicated in Tables 3 and 
4. 
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Table 3: Percentages of households which owned sheep and goats 
according to herd size 
Survey 1: May 1988 Survey 2: September 1988 
% of households which % of households which 
own herds of: own herds of: 
Herd size Sheep Goats Sheep Goats 
1 - 10 32 40 40 17 
11 - 20 19.5 40 10 66 
21 - 30 19.5 10 20 
31 40 5 
41 - 50 7 7 
51 - 100 7 3 10 17 
101 - 150 10 20 
100 100 100 100 
Table 4: Percentage of households which owned Cattle, Horses 









16 - 20 
21 - 30 
31 - 50 
Survey 1: May 1988 
% of households which 
own herds of: 
Cattle Horses Donkeys 
16 60 51 
21 19 28 
9 5 15 
12 9 3 






Sources for Tables 3 and 4: 
Survey 2: September 1988 
% of households which 
own herds of: 
Cattle Horses Donkeys 





Village surveys conducted in Mokhotlong district during 
1988. Survey 1 was conducted during May 1988, by myself and 
a team of local field workers for Agrar- und HydroTechnik, 
andit covered eight villages in Tlokoeng Ward. The original 
sample included 100 households out of a total of 347. 
Adequate data for the purpose of these Tables were obtained 
from 95 households. Survey 2 was carried out by myself in 
one village in the Sangebethu river valley during 
September 1988. The sample consisted of 17 households out 
of a total of 47 in the village. 
one of the problems with discussing livestock ownership and 
differentiation of livestock holdings in Lesotho is the rapidity 
with which herd sizes and composition can change. On the one 
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hand, in theoretical terms, a herd of mature female animals can 
reproduce its own number and 50% of its own kind in the first 
year, assuming that all conceive and that half those born are 
males. Thereafter, the herd will reproduce slightly less than 50% 
of its number, assuming that it takes two years for young female 
animals to achieve maturity and that half of the new born animals 
each year are males. Accordingly, the size of a herd can increase 
rapidly. On the other hand, herd size and composition can change 
rapidly from year to year and intra-seasonally, through the 
influence of a multitude of variables such as changing genetic 
cycles and variation in animal fertility; theft; climatic 
conditions; individual knowledge, and use, of veterinary 
medicines; herders' skills; and stock owners' management 
decisions. In other words, one cannot reasonably discuss data on 
livestock ownership in terms of averages. To own livestock in 
Lesotho is to be both agent and subject of almost continual and 
marked variation in size of herds (Dobb, 1985:242-245; Lawry, 
1986:7-37). Most households own some livestock but there is no 
certainty that these households will always have livestock and 
that the size of herds will increase over time. For instance, my 
research indicated that approximately 70% of households in 
Mokhotlong district owned some livestock during 1988. However, 
in a survey of one village in Sanqebethu valley, 3 of the 17 
households in the sample reported loss of all their animals 
during the severe snowstorms of October 1987. 
A central problem with the RMA programme is that it does not 
take into account these rapid fluctuations in livestock holdings 
and the distribution of animals amongst villagers. Instead, it 
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exacerbates differentiation between the relatively poor, and the 
relatively wealthy, stock owners. The RMA programme supports the 
commercial interests of the latter. Rotational grazing is 
necessary, as people know, for anyone who owns a large number of 
animals. The wealthier stock owners, therefore, support the 
rotational grazing schemes which ensure that their herds have 
regular access to adequate forage. For the majority, however, the 
costs of participating in these schemes can often outweigh the 
benefits. These stock owners often do not regard rotational 
grazing within a grazing area as a necessary strategy, because 
they see that the grassland in the environs of their grazing 
posts provides adequate forage for their relatively few animals. 
Furthermore, following a rotational system means that they must 
build several grazing posts instead of staying at one post in one 
grazing area. Moreover, the costs of herding are indirectly 
increased. By using one grazing post year after year, "".11e 
livestock learn to stay in the vicinity and, thus, require less 
daily monitoring. For instance, the herds of sheep and goats 
learn to follow a set daily grazing route, such that the herders 
need only send out the animals in the morning and check the 
numbers upon their return in the evening. 
Furthermore, 'community' is built up between the herders and 
stock owners in one locality such that support is freely given 
when needed. For instance, if a stock owner cannot afford to hire 
a herder, he may be able to share the grazing post of a friend 
whose herder will look after the additional stock. Alternatively, 
if a stock owner has to rely on a young son to herd because of 
short term inability to find a teenager or a man, he can usually 
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rely on herders in neighbouring posts to help the son. However, 
once the stock owner participates in the rotational grazing 
schemes, he incurs the problems and costs of finding experienced 
herders to keep the animals safe while on the move and a close 
watch on the herds when they arrive in a new area. 
Finally, the market orientation of the services offered by the 
wool and mohair growers associations favours economies of scale, 
which in turn favour the stock owner who owns many animals. Such 
a stock owner obviously earns more from sale of wool and mohair 
than his poorer counterpart and is, therefore, in a better 
position to pay fees in addition to other costs such as hire of 
herders, building of additional grazing posts and purchase of 
veterinary medicines. Moreover, the unit cost for hire of stud 
animals such as rams and bucks is obviously less for the person 
who owns many ewes and does than for the one who owns a few. 
Furthermore, by having a diversity of livestock, the former is 
in a better position than the latter to offset market 
fluctuations, such as annual changes in market prices for wool 
and mohair, by occasional sale of other livestock such as horses 
and cattle. 
The management structure of RMAs is equally problematic in 
terms of the intention to diminish the authority of chiefs. 
First, the authority to assess the condition of grassland is 
placed in the hands of government officials. Secondly, the 
criteria used for assessment are determined by foreign scientists 
with an emphasis on preservation of natural resources. Thirdly, 
the wool and mohair growers associations are being groomed to 
implement the scientific agenda which will serve as a basis of 
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government authority to counter that of chiefs. Fourthly, the 
associations are being groomed to implement an economic agenda 
of emphasising market production of livestock. Once these 
agendas have been inculcated, it is apparent that the 
associations will continue to be dependent on external expertise 
in the form of scientific knowledge and marketing infrastucture, 
thereby extending government authority into the villages. 
There is nothing unusual about the structure of the RMA 
programme, for it reflects a functionalist logic that marks the 
culture of government interventions in Lesotho. Like the 
intervention to establish 'Development Committees', discussed in 
chapter 4, it poses a threat to the authority of chiefs by 
implantation of alternative structures. However, unlike the 
colonial livestock programmes, it ignores the concrete and 
abstract loci of chiefs' authority, thereby creating conditions 
for polarisation between chiefs supported by the majority of 
rural residents on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
government supported by a minority of wealthy stock owners. The 
programme ignores the political reality that livestock and 
grassland management begins and ends in the villages which are 
the nexus of chiefs' authority. It also ignores the way in which 
Basotho have accommodated changing economic and ecological 
circumstances in relation to the heritage of communal land tenure 
of which chiefs are an integral part. 
The annual cycle of livestock transhumance begins in spring 
with collective consideration of the state of grassland in 
village environs. The question of when to restrict use of this 
grassland depends on consul tat ion with the chief, not only 
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because the resource falls within the territorial boundaries of 
the chief's authority, but also because it is categorised as a 
communal resource, access to which is a basis of chiefs' 
authority. Furthermore, control of livestock in the villages is 
vested in the chief as a result of government interventions 
during the colonial era. In short, the critical decisions on 
livestock and grassland management are made in the villages 
through collective consultation, and in a far more holistic 
manner than is contemplated in government policies. 
The narrow perspective of the RMA programme begins with the 
use of the word 'range'. 'Range' and 'range management' do not 
exist in any meaningful sense amongst rural Basotho, even when 
translated as Ntlafatso ea Makhulo - 'Development of grazing 
land' as the RMA programme describes itself in Sesotho. 
Although Basotho readily recognise the general intent to improve 
the quality of grazing land and to prevent grassland degradation, 
few would accept such an objective perspective on resource 
preservation. On the one hand, the official description is often 
modified in discussion as 'Ntlafatso ea Phuliso', meaning 
'development of grassland which is used as grazing land, and 
which is administered by District chiefs', in recognition of the 
primary focus on grazing post areas which are under the nominal 
jurisdiction of these chiefs. On the other hand, the intent to 
control grassland degradation is identified and located in its 
appropriate cultural category. The word leboella, signifiying 
restriction on the use of a particular communal resource 
according to varying collective demand, is also used frequently 
by stock owners to describe the RMA programme. The reference 
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point in the latter case is the overt emphasis of the programme 
on the principle of rotational grazing, and its implication for 
restriction on use of grassland as grazing land at certain times 
of the year. 
The irony is twofold. First, the Basotho response has somehow 
led to appropriation of indigenous terminology to fit the logic 
of the RMA programme. Government officials, notably foreign 
personnel, often use the word maboella, the plural form of 
leboella, to mean specifically grazing land and to signify the 
need to preserve it by implementing some restrictions on its use. 
However, maboella formally refers to communal resources in 
general, and hence, to occasional restriction on the use and re-
definition of possible uses according to collective needs. In 
this confusing transliteration, the officials ignore the fact 
that grazing land is but one category of grassland amongst many. 
They also ignore the fact that chiefs authorise re-
categorisation of the grassland, within their areas of 
jurisidiction, for a variety of uses according to the variable 
requirements of their subjects, and with regard to the bio-
physical characteristics of the different species of grasses. 
Secondly, the association of RMAs with restrictions is somewhat 
unfortunate because the implication for many stock owners is that 
the programme will somehow deny them access to grazing land. Such 
unintended consequences are not unusual amongst Lesotho 
development projects (Ferguson, 1990). For instance, there is an 
arable project, the Lesotho Agricultural Project for Irrigation 
Systems, which is advertised as LAPIS. Unfortunately, when 
perceived in Sesotho, LAPIS suggests the verb Lapisa, meaning to 
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cause hunger. 
Although the imposition of the word 'range' and subsequent 
semantic confusion reflect a conflict of interest, its use to 
demarcate territories establishes conditions for conflict. In 
effect, the RMA programme superimposes a territorial basis of 
authority for the government in opposition to those of chiefs. 
The boundaries of RMAs often overlap the territories of two or 
more chiefs as well as those of the permanent alpine grazing 
areas that are under the authority of district chiefs. This 
problem has been recognised by the Range Management Di vision 
which, as noted earlier, now attempts to draw RMA boundaries to 
coincide approximately with locally acknowledged boundaries. 
However, such boundaries are not defined only topographically. 
The stock owner's propensity to keep to fixed transhumance routes 
between village and specified summer grazing areas and, in many 
cases, to establish a grazing post near to the post of his chief, 
indicate that the 'boundaries' are those of social networks. 
Accordingly, the 'boundaries' are not fixed, for they change in 
concert with life changes of members of the networks. 
For instance, a stock owner may inherit a grazing post and use 
it as did his father and grandfather before him, but there is no 
certainty that he will use it all his life or that his sons will 
continue to use it. If a stock owner's livestock holdings 
diminish at any time, or if he has problems securing the services 
of a herder, he may incorporate his herd into that of another 
kinsman or friend who has a post in a different locality. 
Alternately, if he is successful in rearing livestock he may 
choose to build his own grazing post, and the choice of location 
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will depend on which set of social relationships he feels are 
appropriate to use. 
In other words, demarcation of RMAs ignores the ways in which 
the precepts of human use and need are culturally expressed. 
Livestock and grassland management begins not only in the 
village, but also in the particular social networks that create 
the village. As we saw in chapters 3 and 4, those networks are 
built on a patriarchal imagination of family and social order, 
of which the chief is the personification. By ignoring these 
cultural premises and practices, the RMA programme fails to 
locate the social roots of grassland degradation which it is 
nominally intended to resolve. These roots lie in the relative 
lack of authority of chiefs over use of the mountain grasslands 
beyond their areas of jurisdiction. This lack of authority is the 
outcome of an historical process set in motion by settlement 
patterns, on the one hand, and, on the other, by colonial 
demarcation of chiefs' areas of jurisdiction. I discussed this 
process in chapter 3 to illustrate the way it entrenched chiefs' 
authority in relation to their subjects by confirming their 
control over access to, and use of, land in general. In view of 
the discussion in chapters 4 and 5, however, it is necessary to 
recognise that this process also laid the basis for subsequent 
differentiation of chiefs' authority with regard to land. 
Following the creation of Basutoland, Basotho began to occupy 
the mountainous interior of the country. At the time, according 
to chief Nkuebe Molapo, who lives in the foothills of the Maluti 
mountains near Butha Buthe, the vacant valleys of the foothill 
region were often used as summer grazing areas. A chief and his 
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stock-owning subjects would generally keep all their animals in 
a valley, where some men would live in grazing posts and act as 
herders. 5 As a chief's following increased and as the lowland 
villages grew, the grazing posts were used as settlement nuclei 
for people demanding land. As a result, these valleys were 
settled and grazing posts were moved to the higher, and as yet 
unsettled, valleys. Thus there was a gradual expansion of 
settlement from the lowlands up to the lower lying river valleys 
of the mountain region, preceded by establishment of grazing 
posts. 
A political consequence of this demographic process was 
distinction between authority over summer grazing areas and over 
villages. The summer grazing posts were initially like satellites 
around villages, marking the social boundaries of chiefs' 
authority over particular subjects and the land on which they 
depended. With the emphasis on gaining access to arable land, and 
the importance of this need as a basis of chiefs' authority over 
their subjects, settlement generally, and villages in particular, 
became the reference points for demarcation of different chiefs' 
authority. That orientation in the definition of political 
authority was endorsed, as we saw in Chapter 3, by colonial 
government interventions which used chiefs and villages to 
demarcate territorial boundaries to chiefs' authority. 
The outcome was that the unsettled valleys were excluded from 
the territories of chiefs and headmen, and were nominally under 
the authority of the paramount chief. Following the creation of 
districts, the unsettled grazing areas within each district 
became nominally the responsibility of each district chief, as 
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the representative of the paramount chief. Yet, given the 
political emphasis on settlement and subject, there was no reason 
to consider the grazing areas which were simply functional 
locations for keeping livestock, and which were only ever 
occupied temporarily. As a result, there has never been any 
systematic attempt by chiefs to exert authority over these areas. 
Instead, stock owners simply approached the district chief for 
permission to build a grazing post in the area of their choice, 
and such permission was unlikely ever to be refused. 
One can go further in analysis of this process to suggest that 
the exclusion of the grazing areas was consistent with cultural 
norms that were evolving in this political context, and in the 
broader economic context of using arable farming as a basis for 
survival and as a means to exploit the South African market for 
agricultural commodities. The grazing areas were effectively 
beyond society, in the sense of not being the nexus of political 
and economic activity, and hence not properly within the domain 
of chief's authority. The remote valleys were locations for 
mephato, lodges for initiation of boys into adulthood. Given that 
boys undergoing this ritual were (and still are) regarded as 
being in a liminal stage of life, and not subject to norms of 
family and village life, the remote valleys where the lodges were 
located would have been implicitly regarded, by such definition, 
as beyond society. Moreover, myths and legends of these areas as 
the domain of wild animals would have supported popular 
imagination of these areas as dangerous places to be occupied 
only by men capable of protecting their lives and livestock. 
Furthermore, a prohibition on women working at grazing posts 
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emphasised the separation of these areas from the norms and 
routines of village life. Finally, the separation of these areas 
from society is reflected in herders' tales. For example, 
discussions of livestock theft from grazing posts often include 
anecdotes of how thieves in the 'old days' were as likely to be 
shot by stock owners as to be delivered to the police. 
In view of the above, stock owners have been free to build 
grazing posts wherever they wanted in these valleys. The 
propensity for the stock owners and the chief of one locality to 
colonise particular valleys attests to the nature of this 
freedom. The choice of a site depends more on social 
relationships within a locality than on the formal authority of 
the district chief, and that of past and present government 
officials who have intervened in livestock and grassland 
management practices. Given the locus of chiefs' authority in the 
villages, there has been no reason for chiefs to transform this 
propensity into a separate and formal basis of authority. 
Instead, stock owners who built grazing posts near to those of 
their village neighbours and\or near to the chief's post simply 
reinforced the social networks of the village and, at the same 
time, the cultural bases of chiefs' authority. Coupled with 
intensive promotion of livestock production throughout this 
century, this 'freedom' has led indirectly to the current 
tensions in the community between chief and stock owner. 
First, stock owners have been drawn into adopting a 
utilitarian perspective on the alpine grasslands because, until 
recently, neither chiefs nor government officials have imposed 
strict controls over their use. Instead, promotion of livestock 
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production endorsed this perspective. The diversification and 
subsequent differentiation in value of livestock in the context 
of poverty required flexibility in livestock management. Stock 
owners needed 'freedom' to use the grasslands extensively in 
order to link the different survival capabilities of different 
breeds with their own limited financial capacity to transcend 
ecological constraints through, for example, purchase of modern 
veterinary medicines and cultivation of fodder crops. 
Secondly, although grazing posts inevitably became an 
important feature of more and more stock owners' livestock 
management strategies, the economic and politic al context of 
livestock management has limited the authority of chiefs over use 
of the alpine grasslands. On the one hand, the district chiefs 
acquired only nominal authority over these areas. Although they 
could, conceivably, restrict the number of posts built in a 
locality, they had no authority to restrict the number of animals 
at the posts. If denied permission to build a post, a stock owner 
could simply share the post of a friend or kinsman. On the other 
hand, control over livestock numbers on grazing land has been the 
responsibility of subordinate chiefs but, through territorial 
demarcation of their authority, the grazing post areas were 
placed beyond their jurisdiction. 
This process by which the boundaries of chiefs' authority were 
territorially defined, and by which stock owners' rights of 
access to, and use of, the grassland were entrenched, served 
Basotho interests in livestock for much of this century. In 
short, it enabled the colonially-induced imperative for 
accumulation of livestock to be grafted onto indigenous precepts 
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of human use and need without apparent contradiction. However, 
the contradictions have slowly become apparent. Grassland 
degradation has become evident and is exacerbated by use of 
'winter' grazing posts. 
Any attempt to illustrate this general ecological process is 
necessarily crude, owing to the lack of empirical data on the 
ecology of the mountain region. Written historical sources which 
include observations of the natural environment are few and far 
between (e.g. War Office, 1910; Ambrose & Brutsch, 1991). There 
is also a paucity of scientific research on bio-physical 
conditions in the region. The first ecological survey of the 
mountain region was conducted in the 1930s (Staples & Hudson, 
1938), and some botanical surveys have been conducted since then 
(e.g Jacot Guillarmod, 1962; Killick, 1978), but intensive 
research began again only in the the 1980s with the establishment 
of the Range Management Division. The RMA programme and the 
recent Drakensberg/Maluti Catchment Conservation Programme 
(D/MCCP) (Bainbridge et al, 1991) have improved ecological 
knowledge of grazing post areas in the region, but much of the 
data are inadequate. 6 The following analysis is based on research 
that I conducted in several valleys in eastern Lesotho (see Map 
2, page ix). 
First, the evidence suggests there has been a proliferation 
of grazing posts during this century, as is indicated in Table 
5. The rapid increase in post numbers during the last 20 years 
is perhaps indicative of the delayed but cumulative effects of 
settlement expansion and the colonial livestock production 
programmes in the mountain region. The valleys in question lie 
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close to the Drakensburg/Maluti escarpment, that is, at the 
territorial limits of Lesotho. It is, therefore, likely that 
these valleys would have been the last areas for establishment 
of grazing posts. Mokhotlong district as a whole, moreover, 
seems to be one of the last to benefit from infrastructural 
developments in support of a market economy in livestock. The 
district was created only in the early 1940s. A passable road 
from the lowlands in the north to Sani pass was built only in 
the 1960s. Furthermore, integration of the district into the 
market economy was restricted for political reasons after 
Lesotho became an independent country. According to oral 
reports, popular support for the BCP in Mokhotlong district led 
to politic al restriction on development of infrastructure by the 
BNP government for much of the 1970s and early 1980s. 7 
Table 5: Number of Grazing Posts in use during summer months in 
five valleys near the Maluti\Drakensburg escarpment 
1925-1992 
circa 
Year: 1925 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1988 1991 1992 
Valley: 
Langala- 2 2 3 4 7 7 14 15 14 
-balele 
Jareteng 2 3 5 6 14 12 20 22 26 
Merareng 1 3 4 4 4 12 13 10 
Sanqebethu 1 1 1 1 2 3 9 9 9 
(section) 
Khohlo li ? ? ? ? ? 
Ntja 
Source: Interviews with herders and stock owners, 1988, 1991, 
1992. 
NB: Khohlo li Ntja is now regarded as a 'winter' grazing area, 
but one cannot discount the possibility that it was once a 
'summer' grazing area prior to establishement of villages 
in lower, neighbouring valleys. In July 1992, there were 
nine 'winter' grazing posts in regular use in this valley. 
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Secondly, there are clear indications that use of grazing 
posts is not restricted to their owners. Not only do the majority 
of stock owners use grazing posts, but many share posts. Table 
6 and 7 illustrate these trends from two different perspectives. 
Table 6 represents results of two village surveys that I 
conducted while Table 7 gives the combined results of my seasonal 
surveys conducted in five grazing post areas. 
Table 6: Ownership and use of grazing posts 
Letseng 
village sample 
Category No of Stock % 
owners 
Own and use GP 5 
Do not own GP\ 
use GP of: Agnate 3 
Friend 1 
Own GP\no use of GP 1 
Do not own GP\no use 






















Source: Letseng is the village in the Sanqebethu valley in 
which I conducted a survey during September 1988 at 17 of 
the 47 households. The Tlokoeng ward sample consists of 
100 households, in eight villages, surveyed by me and a 
team of local field workers for Agrar- und HydroTechnik 
during May 1988. Adequate data for the purposes of this 
Table were obtained from 95 households. 
These results indicate that 79% of stock owners in Tlokoeng 
ward and 82% in Letseng use grazing posts. 8 Furthermore, the 
majority rely on access to posts of other stock owners. While 
these results suggest intensive use of grazing post areas, they 
also suggest that a sizeable number of stock owners keep 
livestock permanently in villages, supporting stock owners' 
contentions about shortages of forage on village grasslands. The 
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struggle to find adequate grazing and the increasing use of 
grazing post areas throughout the year are indicated in Table 7. 
Table 7: Number and ownershig of herds at grazing gosts in 
five valleys during 1988 
No and ownership of herds in relation to 
Grazing post owners 
Post Agnate Friend Hired Total 
owner herder 
Valley Season* 
Langala- Late summer 11 3 5 3 
-balele Winter 1 1 
Early summer 7 4 2 2 
Jareteng Late summer 20 10 10 7 
Winter 6 1 
Early summer 11 3 3 3 
Sanqebethu Late summer 4 1 1 
(section) Winter 4 
Early summer 6 1 
Merareng Late summer 11 4 3 
Winter 4 1 
Early summer 7 1 2 
Khohlo li Late summer ? ? ? ? 
Ntja Winter 7 2 
Early Summer 7 1 1 1 
* Late summer survey: mid April-early May 1988. 
Winter survey: first week of September 1988. 
Early summer survey: second week of November 1988. 

















Although the first four areas listed are generally regarded 
as 'summer' grazing areas as opposed to the fifth area, Khohlo 
li Ntja, the seasonal division is not clear cut. The grazing 
post in Langalabalele valley which is used during winter, is 
owned by a stock owner who, with his son, has more than 600 
sheep, and feels impelled to keep hammels at the 'summer' post 
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during winter as a means to offset the problems of finding 
adequate winter forage for them and his other animals. The same 
reason governs the use of other posts in the Jareteng valley 
during the winter. Two of the four posts in use during winter 
in Merareng valley are designated 'winter' posts by the owners 
while the other two are used all year round. Two of the posts 
in the section of the Sanqebethu valley are designated 'winter' 
posts by their owners who have 'summer' posts further up the 
valley. 
Thirdly, as would be expected with intensive use of grazing 
posts, there is marked though varying concentration of livestock 
in different grazing areas, as is illustrated in Tables 8 and 9. 
Table 8 provides data drawn from surveys conducted in 1988 and 
1992 whereas Table 9 provides data for the years 1988 and 1991. 
There are two reasons for this discrepancy. The first is that I 
was unable to obtain adequate 'summer' data for the year 1991 
because of inclement weather during a field trip which severely 
restricted research. The other reason is that I was unable to 
conduct any field research after the summer of 1992, and thus I 
have only 'winter' data up the year of 1991. 
Table 8: Livestock numbers and stock density in grazing post 
areas during the summer months of 1988 and 1992 
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Valley: Langalabalele Jareteng Merareng Khohlo li Ntja 
Area (ha): 1321 2306 2387 556 
Year: 1988 1992 1988 1992 1988 1992 1988 1992 
Stock No: 
Sheep 1037 1393 2530 3040 1401 1053 
Goats 879 1225 1419 1286 903 449 
Cattle 198 226 291 284 132 107 
Horses 49 68 91 132 56 17 
Donkeys 21 50 27 34 16 18 
Total AUS 586 777 1100 1202 614 407 
Stocking 
rate(AUs/ha) .44 .58 .47 .52 .25 .17 
Table 9: Livestock numbers and stock density in grazing post 
areas during the winter months of 1988 and 1991 
Valley: Langalabalele Jareteng Merareng Khohlo li Ntja 
Area (ha): 1321 2306 2387 556 
Year: 1988 1991 1988 1991 1988 1991 1988 1991 
Stock No: 
Sheep 133 ? 770 441 691 707 1053 1300 
Goats ? 66 28 23 153 210 49 
Horses ? 6 10 9 9 10 19 
Total AUS 27 ? 171 101 149 178 260 283 
Stocking 
rate 
(AUs/ha) .02 ? .07 .04 .06 .07 .46 . 51 
Notes for Tables 8 and 9: 
a) AU Conversion: Sheep, Goats= 0.2 AU; Donkeys= 0.5 AU; 
Horses= 0.7 AU; Cattle= 0.8 AU (Environmental Resources 
Limited, 1990). 
b) Only sheep, goats and horses were in these areas during 
the survey periods, September 1988 and July 1991. 
c) There are no 'winter' figures for Langalabalele valley in 
1991, but only one post was used during that season and 
only sheep were kept there. The resident herders stated 
that 200 - 250 sheep were usually kept at this post in the 
winter months, but the number would vary between 100 and 
300, depending on the management decisions of the owner 
and his son. 
With regard to Tables 8 and 9, it must be stressed that 
livestock statistics need to be treated with caution in view of 
intra-seasonal livestock movements between areas and the rapidity 
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of change in livestock holdings. For instance, when I surveyed 
the valleys in late March/early April 1992, several stock owners 
had already removed sheep born in the previous spring from the 
herds, and taken them back to the villages. Although I have 
included these animals in the statistics, their absence at the 
time of the research highlights the potential for error in such 
research. In a different vein, the 'summer' data from Merareng, 
illustrate the changes in the transhumance system. Between 1988 
and 1992, stock owners were beginning to regard the lower section 
of the valley as a 'winter' grazing area, and the upper section 
as a 'summer' grazing area. As a result, some of the posts in the 
lower section were not in use during the summer of 1992, whereas 
they had been 'summer' posts in 1988. 
Furthermore, statistical description of variations in 
concentration of livestock in a locality, in order to illustrate 
an ecological function, is a problematic exercise. In seeking to 
illustrate contradictions that have developed in the livestock 
economy, grassland degradation is a 






in the first 
is problematic, however, because it requires, 
instance, statistical description of livestock 
densities in a locality. And such description is extremely 
difficult because a multitude of variables need to be taken into 
account. This problem is obscured in Tables 8 and 9. They 
describe stock density on the basis of 'AUs' - Animal Units -
which correlate the different foraging capacity of different 
animal species on the basis of differences in body weight. The 
formula used here is a particular one which is now being used 
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frequently in Lesotho by natural scientists. 'AUs' are used here 
to show, albeit imperfectly, the seasonal variation in stock 
densities within summer grazing areas as well as between them and 
winter grazing areas, and to indicate, albeit crudely, two 
problems - grassland degradation and 'overstocking' - that have 
developed in the livestock economy. 
I have spelt out the fallibility of this exercise in view of 
my broader critique of the RMA programme. While I do not deny the 
legitimacy of conservationists concerns about grassland 
degradation and 'overstocking', the scientific rationale behind 
the RMA programme is suspect. This is indicated in the fact that 
the formula for 'AUs', which is used by government officials to 
assess 'carrying capacity' of the land as a basis for 
conservation and livestock management procedures, continues to 
change. The formula in common use today by natural scientists, 
and used in Tables 8 and 9, is not the formula used in the 1980 
Range Management and Grazing Control Regulations (Legal 
Notice,1980b), or the modified formula that appears in the 1986 
amendment of these regulations (Legal Notice, 1986). The 
implication is that government officials and scientists involved 
in conservation and 'development' in Lesotho are struggling, as 
much as Basotho stock owners, to understand the ecological 
dynamics of the livestock economy. Accordingly, the situation 
highlights subliminal contradictions in the livestock economy 
that are emerging as a result of the current interactions 
between stock owners and conservation agencies. I draw out these 
contradictions in the discussion below. 
A major ecological consequence of increasing use of grazing 
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posts, and of increasing stock densities in grazing areas, is 
degradation of the grassland. 9 Intensive grazing of grassland, 
fostered by animals following the same grazing route daily, 
creates bare patches of soil which allowed invasion of karroid 
shrubs (e.g. Chrysoma ciliata, Pentzia cooperi, Gymnopentzia 
bifurcata) (Morris et al, 1989). These shrubs, which are 
unpalatable to livestock, now carpet most grazing post areas, 
thereby increasing the pressure on remaining palatable grasses. 
Having accumulated livestock on a wide scale, Basotho stock 
owners are now victims of a situation that has been created by 
themselves and others. 
In particular, recourse to 'winter' grazing posts in answer 
to the lack of winter grazing in village environs is 
exacerbating grassland degradation. These cattleposts are 
located in sub-alpine valleys which are often narrow tributary 
valleys that are relatively warm and dry. While these conditions 
foster use of these valleys during winter, they also stimulate 
accelerated soil erosion when the grassland subject to 
trampling by livestock. Rainfall in the sub-alpine belt is less 
than on the alpine grasslands near to the Maluti\Drakensberg 
escarpment (Killick, 1978) and, given the relatively warm 
temperature regime at this altitude, the soils can be very dry 
at critical points during the year (Wieland, 1982). Use of these 
grasslands during the comparatively dry winter months, coupled 
with extended use over long periods (May - December) and the 
comparatively high concentrations of livestock (as is indicated 
in the figures for Khohlo li Ntja valley in Table 8), is 
contributing to marked degradation of these grasslands. 
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These problems are causes for dispute in villages because two 
different options are being impressed upon stock owners. On the 
one hand, there is an attempt, stimulated by government 
intervention, to develop an alternative system (RMAs and the MRA) 
which emphasises functional integration of livestock and 
grassland management, and seeks to sideline chiefs. On the other 
hand, there is an attempt, amongst the rural populace, to 
maintain the existing system of livestock management which 
implies, indirectly, extension of chiefs' authority to grazing 
post areas. These options and their implications are not so 
clearly defined in reality because they are part of a social 
process which is still in its infancy. Although most Basotho 
stock owners recognise grassland degradation as a problem, there 
is as yet little consensus on how to resolve it. Stock owners 
assess government initiated programmes in relation to the 
established system. Accordingly, while the implication of these 
programmes to 
possibility of 
sideline chiefs is becoming apparent, the 
extending chiefs' authority has yet to be 
acknowledged overtly. The contrast is being drawn to the surface 
only as use of 'winter' grazing posts becomes the norm. 
Many 'winter' posts are now being built within ward and sub-
ward chiefs' areas of jurisdiction, thereby bringing into 
question the relative authority of district and subordinate 
chiefs. The former are authorised to allow construction of 
grazing posts, but exercise of that authority within the 
territories of subordinate chiefs has never been contemplated. 
Subordinate chiefs have no authority over construction of grazing 
posts, which inevitably undermines their authority to control 
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winter grazing within their territories. Therefore, support for 
the government programmes would mean not only overt rejection of 
chiefs' authority over grazing management in general, but also 
a challenge to chiefs' authority with regard to use of communal 
resources within their territories. In contrast, support for 
subordinate chiefs to manage 
areas of jurisdiction would 
'winter' grazing posts in their 
mean acknowledgment of chiefs' 
authority to control communal resources in their territories, 
endorsement of the village as the basis of control over livestock 
and grassland management, and ultimately, relinquishment of stock 
owners' entrenched rights to use grazing post environs as they 
wish. In a different vein, the practice whereby stock owners 
build 'winter' grazing posts in the summer grazing areas 
contradicts the purpose and boundaries of the MRA which are 
designed primarily to control use of these areas during the 
summer. 
Conclusion: Community of chief and subject 
Rural residents have had to modify livestock management 
strategies to accommodate market-oriented livestock production. 
They have now to consider further modifications as the dangers 
of grassland degradation become apparent. Yet the modifications 
involve far more than preservation of grassland. They involve re-
definition of the content and boundaries of the rural political 
order. Ironically, the government's interventions are stimulating 
a contest over the boundaries of chiefs' authority in ways that 
are likely to exacerbate conflict between the government and the 
rural population. Simply put, the government is seeking to drive 
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a wedge into the community of interest amongst chiefs and stock 
owners, but it does not take into account the strength of that 
'community'. It is a 'community' grounded in the village, not 
only on the basis of pre-colonial cultural heritage, but also on 
its affirmation by colonial rule. This is also a community 
of interest that is affirmed inadvertently by local level 
usurption of the government's strategy with regard to ward and 
village 'development' in the sense that the VDCs and WDCs have 
been transformed to suit the existing social order, as we saw 
in chapter 4. Moreover,it is a community grounded in a context 
of material poverty in which collective and mutual support, in 
defence of threats to material security, is endorsed by the 
emphasis of the land tenure system on communal access to 
resources for the collective good. 
In view of the above, the apparent erosion of chiefs' 
authority in relation to people's need for arable land must be 
qualified. The chiefs remain central to villager's rural 
livelihoods because people still rely on them to maintain their 
interests in livestock. As arable farming becomes less and less 
significant as a source of sustenance, livestock become more than 
ever a critical component of rural livelihoods. Currently, there 
is evident 'community' between chiefs and stock owners with 
regard to sustaining collective rights of access to, and control 
over, grazing land. However, there are also evident tensions in 
this 'community' as a result of recent government interventions. 
On the one hand, there is a possibility of conflict between 
chiefs and the majority who are relatively poor stock owners on 
the one side, and the government and the minority who are 
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relatively wealthy stock owners on the other. On the other hand, 
recent changes in the transhumance system indicate a struggle 
over the way grassland resources are categorised, which involves 
the subliminal issue of retention of communal right of access to 
grazing land and, therefore, a struggle over the appropriate form 
of authority to manage these resources. 
Popular support for the chieftainship is likely to continue 
in this context for two reasons. First, the village is the nexus 
of any attempt to control use of grazing land, and this dynamic 
has yet to be fully recognised by the government. Secondly, the 
development of 'winter' grazing posts within and along the 
territorial boundaries of chiefs' areas of jursidiction is 
similar to the period in the past when grazing posts were like 
satellites around settlements. In other words, the separation of 
grazing areas from chiefs' areas of jurisdiction is breaking 
down. As government interventions intrude on their authority over 
land within these areas, chiefs will inevitably be drawn to 
defend that authority generally, and their subjects' efforts to 
secure winter forage for their animals in particular. The evident 
political problem is that such re-invention of 'tradition' is 
likely to reinforce government scepticism of the chieftainship, 
and popular disdain of chiefs amongst the rural population. 
Nonetheless, even if individual chiefs become the subject of 
disdain as impediments to the interests of the relatively weal thy 
stock owners and to government concerns, or even as ineffectual 
defenders of the interests of the majority of poorer stock 
owners, the chieftainship will be the faultline for disputes. 
Therefore, the chieftainship will remain a critical factor in the 
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strategies of people to maintain their cultural and economic 
interests in livestock and, more generally, in rural livelihoods. 
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CHAPTER 7 
POLITICAL CULTURE IN LESOTHO 
The national context of chiefs' authority 
The previous chapters have outlined the multiplicity of forces 
which have shaped the chieftainship. Here, I draw them together 
in order to conclude the study. I have argued that the process 
by which political authority in rural Lesotho is continually 
being re-defined, is a longstanding contest over the appropriate 
political order for a society which has become marginalised in 
the regional political economic system. I have characterised this 
process as a struggle over, and for, the chieftainship, thereby 
indicating that the chieftainship is a faultline in the contest 
between rural residents, chiefs, the government and other 
external agencies about what the appropriate political order 
should be. 
By describing the chieftainship as a faultline, I am 
suggesting that it marks the many conflicts and means by which 
Basotho have created and sustained society in rural Lesotho. The 
contest within Lesotho society is, on one level, over the scope 
of chiefs' authority to govern use of natural resources, in an 
historical context of political and technological interventions 
which have regularly changed the options for use of these 
resources. On another level, the contest is over how to 
accommodate these changes with established social practices. 
There can be no permanent solution, for the interventions are 
continuous, and the authority of chiefs that is evoked in social 
practices is always changing as a result of efforts to 
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accommodate these interventions. Consequently, both the 
boundaries of chiefs' authority and the extent to which the 
chieftainship represents the rural social order are continually 
in question. However, in questioning the form of authority, and 
in seeking to create and maintain an appropriate social order, 
Basotho define their world and their collective place in it. 
Accordingly, I argue that popular concern to construct a 
collective identity which expresses the people's heritage and 
contemporary existence lies behind the manifest disputes about 
chiefs. 
This argument is based on the discussion in the previous 
chapters. In chapters 2 and 3, the discussion on the relationship 
between chiefs and the government highlighted a process of 
gradual localisation of chiefs' authority by which chiefs became 
identified with particular localities, and authorised to manage 
the affairs of people residing within their territorial areas of 
jurisdiction. This process continues with the re-drawing of the 
boundaries of chiefs' authority over management of settlement and 
use of land, as I discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
The first point I take up here is that this localisation of 
chiefs'authority suggests entrenchment of the chieftainship as 
personification of rural family structure and village society, 
such that the chieftainship remains the basis of collective 
identity. It is a process which readily confirms an 'outsider's' 
view, and a familiar one for anthropologists, that the 
chieftainship is a manifestation of an ascriptive, 'tribal', 
collective identity. I say that it confirms this view because a 
'snap shot' analysis at virtually any point in the history of the 
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country would show not only that the chieftainship personified 
a society built upon co-resident kin groupings and communal 
distribution of natural resources within localities, but also 
that the 'outsider's' view was part of the consciousness of the 
people in view of colonial interventions. 
One cannot deny that the 'outsider's' view captures elements 
of this consciousness, particularly the differentiation of groups 
in ethnic terms, and the building blocks of Basotho collective 
identity such as use of the principle of agnatic descent to 
describe group membership. One can, however, easily cast aside 
this view's characterisation of that consciousness and collective 
identity in terms such as tribe, which implies a fixed collective 
identity and, by extension, that the chieftainship is also a 
fixed social institution which alone governs the minds and 
actions of its subjects. Not only does the process of 
localisation of chiefs' authority reveal that collective identity 
was fashioned, and continued to be re-fashioned, through the 
interaction of Basotho with external agents in specific political 
and economic circumstances, but also that the form and content 
of the chieftainship was re-constructed as these circumstances 
changed, and as people's need for, and categorisation of, natural 
resources were re-defined. Furthermore, acknowledgement of the 
complexity of this process, which I have examined in terms of the 
relationship between chiefs and the government, between chiefs, 
and between chiefs and subjects, not only precludes acceptance 
of the 'outsider's characterisation, but also raises the more 
pertinent issue of evident fragmentation of collective identity. 
This fragmentation is the second point I take up here. 
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Chapters 4, 5 and 6 drew out the relationship between chief and 
subject, indicating that the chieftainship constitutes the 
terrain where rural residents and the government contest 
different strategies to realise people's need for land. This 
contest highlights the challenge to the chieftainship to 
represent collective interests in land. This challenge involves 
the question of fragmentation of collective identity in the face 
of economic differentiation amongst the populace (e.g. wealthy 
and poor stock owners) and the different collective conceptions 
of the rural economy; the government and aid organisations see 
potential for intensive market production of agricultural 
commodities, notably livestock, while the majority of the rural 
populace recognise that market production and the sustainability 
of agriculture depends on access to migrant wage incomes. There 
are, therefore, indications of an historical process in which the 
chieftainship has been central to construction of a national 
identity as Basotho, but also indications of its fragmentation. 
The construction and fragmentation of collective identity is 
the general process of political culture which I explore in this 
chapter. The argument I wish to put forward is as follows. On the 
one hand, there is a popular perception within and beyond Lesotho 
of correspondence between the state and national identity in the 
past; this is based on a history that can be read to have 
produced the Basotho nation, with an homogenous population and 
a common language, and a state which, by retaining the 
chieftainship, upheld inclusive and indigenous concepts of 
government and economic practice. On the other hand, there are 
strong indications of divergence between identification with 
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Lesotho and the ability of the state to meet the needs of the 
people. Dependence on jobs and commodities in South Africa is an 
acknowledged, integral part of the population's existence. 
However, this has been at the cost of treatment as outsiders and 
subjection to the inequities of apartheid. Although that 
treatment has helped delineate a boundary of identity as Basotho, 
the people have depended on South Africa for the material means 
to sustain rural homes in Lesotho, and by extension, their 
political and cultural heritage. 
In this chapter, I ask why there is this apparent lack of 
correspondence between state and nation in Lesotho. I begin by 
outlining recent state interventions in Lesotho to show that it 
is attempting to impose its authority on the populace, but that 
this has created considerable political tension in the country. 
Then I examine why the state has to make such an effort, to show 
that it is wrestling with an historical process which has led to 
a rupture between state and nation. In conclusion, I examine the 
threat to popular support of the chieftainship that results from 
people's increasing political and economic reliance on South 
Africa, the constraints on arable farming, and the political 
interventions by many agencies into the livestock economy. 
State interventions: the indications of crisis 
Chapters 4 and 5 outlined a number of political and economic 
changes in Lesotho with regard to settlement and arable farming, 
notably the Land Act of 1979 and the integration of 'Development 
Committees' into the rural social order. In chapter 6 I examined 
the marked interventions by the state into the livestock economy 
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since the 1980s. Thus far, however, I have only alluded to 
broader developments such as the implementation of the Lesotho 
Highlands Water Project in the mid 1980s, and the military coup 
in 1986, which need to be drawn into the picture now. Seen 
independently of each other, these changes illustrate a familiar 
pattern of efforts by poor countries to develop their economies. 
Seen in relation to each other, they indicate a sudden spate of 
state interventions in the lives of the predominantly rural 
population. 
Lesotho has received substantial foreign aid since it gained 
independence in 1966, and particularly in the last decade 
(Ferguson, 1990). This assistance has been underwritten by 
considerable political interest. Apart from the longstanding 
presence of the embassies and aid organisations of the USA and 
of western European countries, the early 1980s witnessed 
establishment of a Russian embassy, amidst sparring between 
Taiwan and China which led to increased business investment by 
Taiwanese firms and establishment of an embassy by China. The 
1986 military coup dislodged the Basotho National Party 
government which had governed since Lesotho gained independence 
in 1966. An economic blockade of the country by South Africa 
prior to the coup, and the speedy recognition of the new 
government by the American and British governments, suggest 
collusion to create a new basis for donor agencies' interactions 
with Lesotho. The coup was followed by the forced abdication of 
the king two years later, his expulsion from the country, and the 
government's appointment of his son in his place. The military 
government's proclaimed intent to re-establish civil rule was 
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eventually honoured in March 1993, when general elections were 
held for the first time since 1970. The Basotho Congress Party, 
which orignated in, and which has long espoused, Pan Africanist 
Congress ideology of the 1950s, won every constituency (Leeman, 
1985; Southall, 1994). 
The 1980s also witnessed substantial economic intervention in 
the rural areas. The most notable development has been the 
Lesotho Highlands Water Project, which is designed to provide 
water and electricty for South Africa. Although plans had been 
drawn up in the early 1980s, they were implemented only after the 
1986 coup. As I mentioned in chapter 4, the scheme involves a 
large number of multi-national consortiums and extensive 
subsidiary work. Indirectly linked to this scheme are the 
government's efforts to re-structure the agricultural economy, 
particularly its plan to concentrate arable farming in the 
lowlands and livestock production in the mountain region. 
In addition, the RMA programme coincided with South African 
government detente with Lesotho which began in the early 1980s. 
In spite of ruptures such as the South African Defence Force raid 
on African National Congress refugees in Maseru in 1982, common 
ground was reached on agricultural questions. A result was the 
D/MCCP research programme to devise a conservation policy for the 
mountain region, with the primary aim to minimise soil erosion 
in the alpine valleys in the interest of preventing silting of 
the proposed LHWP dam resevoirs (Bainbridge et al, 1991). These 
plans tie in with official efforts to stimulate 'community 
participation' in the restructuring of the rural economy through 
use of grazing associations and the VDCs (Artz, 1994; Lesotho 
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National Livestock Task Force, 1990). 
What is remarkable about these developments is their rnagni tude 
and concentration in such a short period of time. Why was there 
this sudden impetus and what is the purpose? I suggest that these 
developments indicate a crisis for the state in two respects. 
First, they indicate that the state is being driven by changes 
in South Africa's international relations. Secondly, they 
indicate a struggle within the state over how to accommodate 
these changes. 
On the one hand, the economic interventions are a progression 
of government and donor policies of the 1970s. The policies stern 
from a calculated decision by Leabua Jonathan's BNP government 
to cut formal ties with South Africa, and to proclaim an 
anti-apartheid stance, which led to large scale international aid 
for the state (Hirschman, 1979). The state gained international 
legi tirnacy. Popular support within the country, however, was 
tenuous in the face of widescale patronage which restricted 
access to jobs that arose out of aid funding to BNP supporters, 
and restricted diffusion of aid services throughout the country. 
Seen in this light, the recent interventions reflect not only 
Lesotho's acceptance of its dependence on external support as a 
means to survive. They also indicate consolidation of that 
experience by both the state and aid agencies, and demands by the 
latter for more arnbi tious and larger initiatives. In other words, 
there has been a subtle change in Lesotho's relationship with 
donors. Donors will provide support, but they have effectively 
demanded that Lesotho acknowledge the need to align itself 
economically with South Africa. Consequently, Lesotho has had to 
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modify its stance towards South Africa. 
Furthermore, acquiescence to these demands is endorsed by the 
changing political and economic relationships between the donor 
countries and South Africa. Today, the possibility of extensive 
aid in the future is threatened by the political transformation 
of South Africa and the re-establishment of formal ties between 
the latter and many other countries. The Russian embassy in 
Maseru has closed, for example, and there is no longer an 
ambassador resident at the USA embassy. Lesotho's Gross National 
Product, which is based largely on migrant wage remittances from 
South Africa, is under threat in the face of reduction in 
recruitment of Basotho workers by South Africa's mining houses, 
coupled with massive retrenchments that followed the 1987 miners' 
strike. 
On the other hand, the changes in the relationship between 
Lesotho and its donors require the state to re-constitute its 
relationship with its citizens, if it is to exploit the potential 
of its water, woll and mohair resources. 1 In order to fulfill 
these demands, the state must exercise control over the populace 
not only through patronage, but also through direct intervention 
into local methods of exploitation of natural resources. 
If the military coup signalled donors' impatience with the BNP 
government's failure to recognise the implications of the new 
dispensation, the recent general elections highlight the 
additional demand for legitimation of the state's interventions 
in the rural areas. This is a speculative point, but Lesotho's 
existence on terms dictated by more powerful states seems 
transparent. The clothing of this new dispensation is rather like 
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the tailoring of the Emperor's new clothes; this is the problem 
which the state faces with regard to its relationship with its 
citizens. 
Although the state is legitimately represented in the form of 
the BCP, the magnitiude of recent economic interventions in the 
rural areas suggest that the general elections were engineered 
by international agencies, rather than being the result of 
political pressure by Basotho citizens and commitment of the 
previous military government to re-establish parliamentary rule. 
Although the state is attempting to create an economic basis on 
which it might survive with less external support in the future, 
it is faced with a rural society which binds people more to chief 
and locality than to the government, and livelihoods which link 
people more to South African towns than to Maseru. Al though 
nationalist sentiment was expresed in the elections, propagated 
by the BCP's Pan Africanist ideology, the grounds for drawing 
political boundaries in these terms is being swept away by South 
Africa's politic al transformation. Therefore, popular support for 
the BCP reflects perhaps, more a yearning for concordance between 
the state and national identity than commitment to the party's 
socialist ideology and support for the interventions over which 
the government presides (Quinlan, 1994). 
This does not mean that the BCP is unlikely to retain a 
country to govern. The events of the last decade indicate the 
opposite. The problem facing the BCP government is that it has 
inherited a situation in which it has little chance of re-
constituting the state in the image desired by itself or by the 
populace. The reasons for this lie not only in its inevitable 
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subordination to the demands of powerful donors and South Africa. 
They also lie in the way these demands exacerbate the disjunction 
between the state and national identity. This is putting the 
case too bluntly, but what is at stake is the BCP's difficulty 
of finding in nationalist sentiments the means to cultivate 
popular support for the state. And this difficulty stems not only 
from current circumstances, but also from the history of the 
country and the cultural heritage of the people, as I discuss 
below. 
The state and national identity 
Lesotho's tenuous existence, which has been re-emphasised 
recently in Eldridge's (1993) historical study, underlies the 
current crisis of legitimacy facing the state. Lesotho has 
existed as a separate geo-political entity for little more than 
150 years. It arose out of Moshoeshoe's efforts to secure the 
survival of his Mokoteli chiefdom amidst the depredations of the 
lifagane, and to maintain a place for African people on the 
highveld in the face of colonial incursion. Following many wars 
against colonial forces, Moshoeshoe and his followers eventually 
acquiesced to the geo-political framework demanded by Britain and 
the emergent Afrikaner republics. 'Basutoland' was gradually 
circumscribed as a territory. 
Lesotho came into being as a colonial state, but its existence 
has always been in question. As a result of colonial policies to 
integrate the people into the economy of South Africa, political 
incorporation was regularly considered as early as the time of 
union, and continued to reverbrate until the 1960s when Basotho 
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sought political independence form Britain (Spence, 1968; Murray, 
1981:1-26). Although Lesotho tocks its place within the global 
framework of nation states in 1966, its economy was almost 
totally dependent on external sources before then, and remains 
so today. As I have noted in earlier chapters, people continue 
to make considerable investments in arable farming, but like 
their forbears, they rely on migrant labour wage incomes to 
sustain rural livelihoods. Even the livestock economy, which 
generates sizeable incomes for individuals and for the country 
through the export of wool and mohair, is not self sustaining, 
but depends on regular importation of animals from South Africa 
(Quinlan, 1990a). 
This dependence is central to the iconography of Lesotho. It 
has been the focus of most studies of the country for the last 
thirty years (e.g. Eldridge, 1993; Murray, 1981; Spence, 1968; 
Wallman, 1969). Much political capital has been made out of it, 
as the strategy of the BNP government demonstrated. The events 
of the last decade indicate that it has been formally 
incorporated into donor and government planning of Lesotho's 
future. What is of interest here is the intimation of a dichotomy 
between the state and the rural populace in the terms by which 
they identify the nation. 
In the first instance, the state has constructed Lesotho's 
political identity on the basis of this dependency. The rural 
populace clearly cannot afford to delineate their collective 
identity so bluntly, however, for they have to contend with life 
at the interface between ideals about maintaining a rural home 
and the reality of dependence on jobs in South Africa. Secondly, 
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the state could not draw such boundaries if this dependency was 
not woven into the social and cultural fabric of society in 
Lesotho. This suggests that the state and the rural populace 
differ in the way they define a national identity. The state 
appears to have focused on the history which produced Lesotho as 
a subordinate but distinct gee-political entity, while the rural 
populace has focused on the history which forced people to share 
life at the margins of regional society. This dichotomy provides 
a clue to understanding why the BCP government is unlikely to 
find the means to cultivate popular support for the state in 
nationalist sentiments of its citizens. The government has to 
contend with a population which has constructed a national 
identity which is based more on a struggle to maintain homes in 
Lesotho than on the existence of Lesotho as a politically 
indepenedent state. The question which follows is, how has this 
dichotomy evolved. 
I suggest, as I discussed in chapters 2 and 3, that the seeds 
were sown in the 19th century when Moshoeshoe created a model of 
authority based on the notion of patrilineal descent, and 
expressed in the form of a hierarchy of chiefs. This model was 
the antithesis of colonial concepts of statehood. It was based 
on a conception of society as a network of familial bonds, of 
which the relationship between chief and subject was a 
representation, rather than on territorial demarcations of 
society and separation of political office from social 
relationships. The dichotomy was exacerbated by the interaction 
between colonial officials and Moshoeshoe's heirs. This 
interaction first allowed the latter to elaborate the model, 
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entrenching the chieftainship as the institution of the state, 
but then led to subordination of the institution to colonial 
concepts of statehood. In other words, the chieftainship was the 
central institution of the state until the early 20th century and 
it is still the core of rural government. This indicates that it 
has been the object of a wide range of ideas about political 
authority, and that it has been subject to modifications and re-
positioning within the state. 
The critical issue is that the chieftainship has been the 
nexus of political contests throughout the history of Lesotho. 
The contest has been, and still is, about the appropriate social 
order for the prevailing circumstances. This means that it is a 
struggle over the principles which are given coherency and form 
in the chieftainship, and which have been challenged in the 
course of Lesotho's genesis, growth as a colonial state, and 
existence as an independent state. On the one hand, the continued 
existence of the chieftainship has ensured that the principles 
which underlie its constitution have been retained. On the other 
hand, when the state attempts to impose its authority, using 
ideas of political order inherited from the colonial regime and 
borrowed from the international context of modern nation-states, 
it confronts the chieftainship not as a seemingly archaic 
obstacle, though that is often the reified sentiment of 
government officials, but a heritage of ideas which the rural 
populace have used and re-interpreted in different ways to define 
their place in the world. There are, therefore, historical 
factors which the state cannot ignore, but which it has yet to 
acknowledge. 
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The 'Basotho nation' evolved from the incorporation of many 
Sotho and Nguni speaking refugees into the Mokoteli chiefdom 
under Moshoeshoe (Ambrose and Brutsch, 1991:85,99,107; Lagden, 
1909:41-44). The political identity of the polity as Basotho was, 
however, as much a product of interaction between Moshoeshoe and 
colonial settlers as it was a result of interaction between 
himself and other chiefdoms. 
With regard to the interaction between chiefdoms, group 
identities were not so definitive during the early 19th century. 
Groups identified themselves in relation to their leader, the 
chief. This was a necessity in view of the tumult during the 
early 19th century which had witnessed the dispersal and re-
constitution of groups as a result of the lifagane, the expansion 
of the Zulu polity and passage of Mzilikazi's 'Matabele' across 
the highveld (Lye & Murray, 1980:30-39, 45-50; Murray, 1992:13). 
Origins were not lost, however, and this is reflected in the way 
the people distinguished groups and acknowledged affinity through 
use of clan names and totems. Oral records which traced male 
ancestors back to a single legendary ancestor, like branches of 
a tree to a trunk, provided a formal representation of human 
society as a process of fission marked by male progeni ture. 
Chiefs were the contemporary, individual markers of this process. 
Through reference to them, people could explain the existence of 
different groups as products of fission over the generations 
amongst the male descendants of the legendary ancestor. Reference 
to the genealogical heritage of chiefs also provided a formal 
means to determine the 'closeness' of one group with another. 
Those groups whose chiefs shared a common ancestor were, in 
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principle, part of a broader imaginary group. This broader 
affiliation was summarised in the use of totemic categorisations 
which correlated the familial model of society with known and 
imagined clan affiliations. 
The indigenous conception of history and of society has little 
meaning, however, if divorced from the political circumstances 
of the 19th century. Distinctions made between different 
chiefdoms did not necessarily signify a distinct political 
identity and political independence. Indeed, Moshoeshoe paid 
tribute during the 1820s to more powerful chiefdoms such as the 
Ngwane and the Zulu and, at one stage, even acknowledged himself 
to be a vassal of Shaka (Thompson, 1975:44-52). As Moshoeshoe 
secured some freedom for independent action, he forged alliances 
with other chiefdoms such as those of Moroka and Moorosi which 
were identified by the totems of their leaders, Barolong and 
BaPhuthing respectively (Murray, 1992). Although Moorosi 
generally retained an independent status, Moshoeshoe came to 
regard Moroka as a subordinate chief of a following within his 
sphere of control (Thompson, 1975:126-132; Murray, 1992:15). In 
contrast, Moshoeshoe's totem, Bakoena, was superceded rapidly by 
the epithet Basotho but became a basis for distinction of status 
within the polity. It marked Moshoeshoe's propensity to appoint 
agnates as subordinate chiefs, and the eventual dominance of 
these agnates vis a vis other non-related chiefs in the hierarchy 
(Thompson, 1975:176-180). 
The point in question is that the circumstances of the early 
19th century brought many different groups into contact, and also 
caused fragmentation and re-constitution of groups from amongst 
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refugees. As the fortunes of chiefdoms changed, so did their 
political identity and the terminology used to express it. These 
changes raise questions about what constructs of authority were 
being used and how they were being re-fashioned in a context 
where the chiefdoms were being directly and indirectly affected 
by colonial intrusion. These questions were put forward in 
chapter 2, in the light of the Comaroffs' recent study (1991) of 
Tswana history. Pre-colonial arrangements were clearly being 
contested, but leaders like Moshoeshoe were attempting to re-
construct them in order to re-establish a stable society. 
However, they faced a novel situation of new political and 
economic opportunities and constraints and, in particular, of 
different ideas on possible combinations of authority constructs 
as a result of colonial interventions and local re-
interpretations. Our focus here is not on the change between the 
old and the new patterns of politic al discourse, but on how 
established constructs of authority were re-fashioned in the 
Basotho polity during this period. 
The striking theme in this history is the paternalistic 
character of political relationships within and between 
chiefdoms. The point is significant, for it is indicative of how 
Moshoeshoe tried to build a following on the same basis as other 
leaders through use of the pre-colonial, patrilineal model of 
authority. In short, to be a Mosotho was to acknowledge 
Moshoeshoe as the patriarch of a society structured in familial 
terms. However, this model was not a particularly cohesive 
mechanism. It was a premise for construction of a collective 
identity because it conveyed a very different sense of society 
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to that of the colonial settlers with whom the Africans were 
locked in conflict. The model served Moshoeshoe by demarcating 
a political boundary between his followers and colonial settlers 
rather than containing inherent features which determined a 
particular corporate identity for his followers. 
As a pre-colonial construct, the model was not designed to 
promote political groupings on a large scale. Once people were 
congregated together, there was little that Moshoeshoe could do 
to prevent subordinate chiefs from leading their followings 
independently, as I discussed in chapter 2. The reason for this 
is that each chief was patriarch to his own followers, and, 
accordingly, committed to extending his own authority rather than 
subordinating it to other chiefs. This was a dynamic which, as 
I discussed in chapter 4, was still very evident in the case of 
the Batlokoa chiefship during this century, but which was less 
controllable during the 19th century ( Thompson, 197 5: 257-258, 
283). However, in the context of external threats, the model's 
ideological emphasis on familial bonds was a means to unite 
people to face those threats, as was illustrated in Mopeli 
Mokhachane's incorporation into Moshoeshoe's polity during the 
wars against the colonial forces. 
The model served Moshoeshoe in the face of colonial intrusion 
and the particular threat of denial of access to land, but had 
it not been for that development Moshoeshoe might not have been 
able to maintain his supremacy vis a vis his subordinates. Even 
then, as I noted in chapter 2, his authority was not absolute, 
as the secession of his son, Molapo, from the polity in 1869 
demonstrated. Despite such tribulations, use of this model and 
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its acknowledgement by the colonial forces ensured that it was 
kept alive for subsequent use in organising a government for 
Basutoland, and in constructing a national identity for its 
inhabitants. 
A critical factor in this history was the translation of 
Moshoeshoe's model by colonial settlers into their terms, for it 
had the subtle effect of differentiating the status of the Sotho 
chiefdoms with respect to each other and to the settlers. 
Moshoeshoe's success in building up a large following, and in 
combining both diplomacy and military resistance against colonial 
forces, secured him status as 'majestic', a 'stately' ruler with 
'absolute' authority over a distinct 'Basutoo'/'Basuto'/'Basutu' 
'tribe', and commensurate recognition as the ruler of 
'Basutoland' (Orpen, 1979:10-12; Thompson, 1975:59,64,80,81,122, 
123). Other chiefs fared less well, salvaging what they could 
from the turmoil; one example is Mopeli Mokhachane, who was 
tempted away from the Basotho polity by the offer of a 'reserve' 
in Witsiehoek, where he used the Bakoena totem to distinguish his 
group from others, and to be accepted as a 'tribe' by colonial 
officials (Quinlan, 1986:33-34). After Basutoland became a 
colonial state in 1870, Moshoeshoe's model was elaborated under 
novel political conditions. Again, the elaboration of this model 
was as much a response to colonial intrusion as a product of 
indigenous heritage. In particular, the territorial 
circumscription of the Basotho polity, and the colonial support 
given to Moshoeshoe's heirs to follow in his footsteps, enabled 
these chiefs to achieve a concordance between state and national 
identity. 
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Creation of concordance between the state and national identity 
Moshoeshoe's heirs implemented his model in relative freedom 
during the late 19th century. The minimal colonial presence in 
the territory, coupled with Imperial protection, provided them 
with a secure domain, free of competition from other chiefdoms, 
in which to establish a structure of authority. However, as I 
discussed in chapters 2 and 3, use of this principle did not lead 
to a well defined hierarchy of chiefs. On the one hand, the 
principle affirmed the lineage structure of authority and 
formally safeguarded the claim of Moshoeshoe's sons to superior 
status. On the other hand, it also justified every chief, and 
each succeeding generation of chiefs, to act like lineage 
founders. Given that the younger brothers of the paramount chief 
had become chiefs, so too other chiefs could appoint not only 
their eldest son as heirs but also other sons to subordinate 
positions of authority. As a result, the hierarchy burgeoned as 
more and more chiefs were appointed. Furthermore, as the case of 
Mosuoe Sekonyela demonstrated, there was a propensity for chiefs 
in later generations to counter the dissipative effect of this 
increase, and to re-affirm their own authority, by placing their 
junior sons as superiors over previously placed chiefs. 
Furthermore, the construction of the chieftainship involved 
the application of contradictory criteria, as both chiefs and 
colonial officials contested the form and content of the 
institution. It would be, therefore, simplistic to assert that 
the construction of the chieftainship, and its suffusion 
throughout a finite area, determined a national identity which 
coincided with the territorial boundaries of Basutoland. Such a 
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perspective simply tallies with the 'outsiders' view of the 
chieftainship which I discussed in chapter 2. It implies that 
Basotho saw Basutoland through the eyes of the colonial 
authorities, and proceeded to construct the chieftainship on this 
basis. Given that Moshoeshoe's political model did not recognise 
territory as a criterion of political authority and collective 
identity, one must acknowledge that the profusion of chiefs and 
subsequent suffusion of the institution throughout the country 
did not determine a national identity, but expressed a deeper 
struggle by Basotho to define their world. Put differently, 
Moshoeshoe's heirs asked not only how to occupy Basutoland, but 
also how to re-draw 'Basutoland', the colonial and territorially 
defined political space, so that it accorded with familiar 
concepts of political space. 
Moshoeshoe's model provided an answer to the first question. 
As the population and demand for land on which to survive 
increased, Moshoeshoe's heirs appointed subordinate chiefs and 
despatched them, with subjects, to establish new settlements in 
the interior of the country. However, it was in answering the 
second question that concordance between the state and national 
identity was engineered. The application of Moshoeshoe's model 
within Basutoland established the character of the state. As 
Moshoeshoe 's heirs placed chiefs to fill up the territorial 
space, they also changed the relationship between chiefs, and 
between them and their subjects. In the past, Moshoeshoe 's 
chieftainship had been a loose combination of leaders with their 
own followings and of some of his agnates, all of whom were 
struggling to defend African highveld residents' access to land 
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and their usufructory use of it. Once contained within 
Basutoland, the paramount chief was the authority over a defined 
area, and subordinates were dependent on his patronage to become 
leaders of settlements and to manage usufructory use of land. 
Similarily, chiefs no longer retained their status as leaders 
primarily through their capabilities to command a popular 
following. People were dependent on chiefs to gain access to 
land through expression of allegiance to particular chiefs and, 
through them, to the paramount chief. Basutoland, the colonial 
construct, was being redefined by patronage on a large scale, to 
the extent that the state was the chieftainship. 
The construction of the state in this manner also created the 
framework for a national identity. People's access to land 
through chiefs was reciprocated by chief's dependence on people 
for their own sustenance, as we saw in the careers of Mosuoe 
Sekonyela and Seeiso in chapter 3. On the one hand, the 
opportunities to extract services and products in a usufructory 
system come from use of the land rather than directly from 
control over its allocation. On the other hand, agricultural 
livelihoods were the mainstay of the territory's inhabitants, but 
not a means to great wealth in the face of regular environmental 
hazards and a broader socio-economic process of decline in the 
capacity of agriculture to support the population. Accordingly, 
in a general context of relative poverty and economic 
uncertainty, to be a chief was a means to economic security. The 
'placing system' was, therefore, as much as consequence of this 
context as it was a logical feature of Moshoeshoe's model. The 
quest for economic security encouraged junior sons of chiefs to 
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seek appointment as chiefs. The placing of agnates over 
previously placed subordinate chiefs was a means to re-affirm the 
nexus of patronage around the incumbent chief. The subsequent 
proliferation of chiefs not only consolidated the centrality of 
the chieftainship as the institution of the state, but also 
ensured that every citizen was bound intimately to it. 
Al though the hegemony of the state does not necessarily 
generate a concordant national identity, it did in this case 
because the chieftainship reflected its subjects' conception of 
social order. As I outlined earlier, society was understood in 
familial terms and described on the basis of belief in male 
progeniture. This conception of society was carried through into 
life in Basutoland because there was never a sharp rupture in 
the existence of the Basotho polity. As a result, the 
chieftainship was an accentuated expression of the type of 
society which Moshoeshoe had sought to build, which his subjects 
had endorsed, and which had been retained in popular imagination 
through resistance to colonial incursion onto the highveld. 
Foundations for a national identity were laid in the early 
days of expansion into the interior of the country, by the 
establishment of new settlements consisting of groups led by 
leaders appointed by the paramount chief and his brothers. As we 
saw in chapter 3, the placing of Lelingoana, his struggles to 
command allegiance from settlers, and Rafolatsane's subsequent 
placement, helped to define not only the external boundaries of 
Lesotho vis a vis neighbouring states, but also superimposed a 
political framework with which settlers could identify. 
Territorial boundaries were not of primary concern. They were 
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obviously a consideration, but in the placing of these chiefs, 
the emphasis was clearly on clarifying boundaries in terms of 
personal affiliation to chiefs. The subsequent expression of 
affiliation in familial terms, such as in the names of villages 
and placing of sons as chiefs of new settlements, affirmed chiefs 
as representations of the social relationships which constituted 
family and society. In other words, the status of a chief was 
relative, reflecting social relationships which overtly expressed 
a patriarchal ideology of authority and identity. The placing 
system led to a profusion of chiefs which bordered on the absurd, 
but it was not a contradictory process. Not only did it ensure 
replication of familiar concepts of society, but it also promoted 
uniformity of political practice. 
The critical point here is that a national identity was built 
upon the creation of local identities. In each locality, chiefs 
were patriarchs to their subjects. Through the placing of agnates 
as subordinates, a locality acquired a distinctive political 
identity, as in the case of Tlokoeng. The relationship between 
chief and subject in a locality reflected the familial conception 
of society, simply giving political expression in the form of 
patronage to the patriarchal ethos of social relationships 
between people. The chieftainship as a whole evolved out of those 
relationships, with the placing system being both the means to 
create the framework and the ideological endorsement of those 
relationships. In short, to be a Mosotho was to align oneself 
with a chief and through him, to acknowledge an affinity with 
other individuals as members of a unique social and political 
order. 
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I draw attention to the creation of local identities because 
it lies at the root of the present day crisis of legitimacy of 
the state. This is not to say that the creation of local 
identities in the early days of Lesotho's existence created rigid 
internal political boundaries between state and locality, and 
that the state has now inherited longstanding and deep divisions 
in the society. I suggest that for as long as the chieftainship 
was the state, albeit buttressed by imperial Britain, the 
boundary between the state and locality was perceptible but not 
substantial. Only as the chieftainship lost its predominance and 
became an institution within the state, was the boundary 
sharpened. And only as this occurred, did this boundary become 
politically significant in terms of creating division between the 
state and its subjects. In other words, the delineation of the 
boundary took time. The process originated, as we have seen, at 
the beginning of this century, but became politic ally significant 
only in the 1940s. Furthermore, the delineation of the boundary 
involved a re-positioning of the chieftainship and consequent 
change in the dynamics of collective identity. In particular, the 
chieftainship became an expression of a national identity which 
did not depend on the existence of Lesotho as a state, but which 
reflected the realities of people's existence on the margins of 
regional society. 
Disassembling the state and national identity 
The potential for creation of local identities was not a 
pressing threat to the state in the late 19th century, though the 
danger was perceived, as is intimated in the local explanation 
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of Lelingoana's and Rafolatsane's placing in eastern Lesotho, 
discussed in chapter 3. However, that perception could have been 
only a momentary fear, reflecting consciousness of the earlier 
19th-century struggles between chiefdoms, and the weakness of 
Moshoeshoe's model in retaining the allegiance of chiefs. In the 
context of containment within Basutoland and acknowledgement of 
colonial authority in support of Moshoeshoe's heirs, the threat 
of clan and totem affiliations being fault lines for 
fragmentation of the Basotho polity was a temporary possibility. 
The era of the chiefdom had passed, and with it, the political 
and economic conditions that had given credence to their 
individual identities. 
The threat to Moshoeshoe's heirs lay in the appropriation of 
these identities by colonial authorities as part of their 
strategy to divide the people and to restrict Africans access to 
land. At the time, the colonial authorities' attempts to lure 
Molapo away from the Basotho polity would still have been fresh 
in people's memories. Likewise, Mopeli Mokhachane's departure to 
Witiseshoek, as leader of the newly designated 'Bakoena tribe', 
was testimony to the potential for collusion between desperate 
leaders and the colonial authorities, at the expense of efforts 
by Moshoeshoe's heirs to defend the integrity of the Basotho 
polity. However, the underlying cause of this threat, namely the 
need to gain access to land, was dispelled within Basutoland by 
the availibility of land in the interior for settlement and 
cultivation. 
This did not mean that local identities in these terms simply 
disappeared. They receded, as politically significant sources of 
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internal tensions, into the cultural consciousness of the people, 
and found expression in everyday life as markers of different 
social practices amongst the inhabitants. For example, the 
different origins and heritage of the Batlokoa in relation to 
other Basotho were reflected in different bridewealth payment 
practices, and in the association of particular clan identities 
with particular villages in the Tlokoeng area (Ashton, 1952: 200). 
Local identity expressed in these terms, however, was subsidiary 
to its expression in relation to the economic realities of rural 
life and the influence of the colonial authorities. I am 
referring here to the emergence of political and economic 
conditions which promoted stronger attachment to locality than 
to Basutoland, and to particular chiefs 
chieftainship. Central to this process 
as opposed to the 
were the colonial 
authorities who sought to align the chieftainship with their 
concepts of administration. In particular, the imposition of 
territory as a criterion of authority had the effect, in time, 




subjects in each locality at the expense of distancing 
from the chieftainship as a whole. Initially, however, 
colonial intervention did not challenge people's 
identification with the chieftainship because it was subordinate 
to, and in service of, the efforts of Moshoeshoe's heirs to 
occupy Basutoland. 
The intervention consisted initially of demarcation of large 
districts, which, as I outlined in chapters 2 and 3, were nominal 
rather than substantive, and helped to consolidate the new 
chieftainship by delineating the hierarchy and by specifying the 
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status of chiefs relative to each other. Moreover, one must 
remember that the chiefs' control over the administration of 
affairs within the country was greater than that of colonial 
officials in the late 19th century, for the latters' 
administrative structure had yet to be developed. The situation 
changed when the colonial authorities began to replicate the 
territorial precept within districts, beginning with imposition 
of categories such as 'sub-chief' and following with the 
systematic restructuring of the chieftainship in the 1930s and 
'40s. The ranking was neither uniform nor consistent, but the 
result, in broad terms, was a territorially defined hierarchy; 
the paramount chief was the authority over the whole country, and 
above district, ward, and sub-ward chiefs and headmen. Coupled 
with the restrictions imposed on the administrative and judicial 
authority of chiefs, the chieftainship was gradually subordinated 
to fledgling institutions of a modern state, as understood by the 
colonial government. 
This subordination of the chieftainship marks the point at 
which the institution lost its capacity to reflect a national 
identity that was in concord with the state. The consequence was 
that the chieftainship itself represented the boundary between 
the state and locality. On the one hand, the chieftainship had 
become one institution within the colonial state, and chiefs were 
being pressured to become its agents. Demarcation of areas of 
jurisdiction eroded the indigenous notion of political authority 
as a representation of familial relationships. The restriction 
of chiefs' authority meant that the chieftainship no longer 
encompassed virtually every public facet of people's lives in the 
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rural areas. The specification of roles, duties and salaries for 
chiefs imposed a quasi-class barrier between chiefs and their 
subjects, distancing the chieftainship from its well spring, the 
people. On the other hand, however, the colonial interventions 
re-emphasised identification with locality and chief. Territorial 
demarcations of authority sharpened the boundary between locality 
and Basutoland as a whole. The restriction of chiefs' authority 
emphasised their role as local authorities in close contact with 
citizens, as opposed to the distanced position of colonial 
of ficals resident in district capitals. The specification of 
chiefs' roles and duties emphasised the authority of individual 
chiefs in the administration of a locality. 
What was really an attempt to combine two very different 
models of society required re-definition of the relationships 
between the chieftainship and the colonial government, between 
chiefs, and between them and their subjects. The chieftainship 
was, therefore, inevitably the fault line, and the rupture was 
expressed in bitter contests such as the episode of liretlo (the 
politically inspired 'medicine' murders, discussed in chapter 2), 
as chiefs struggled to accommodate the structural changes in 
culturally familiar ways. A notable illustration of the process 
is the contest involving Lelingoana, his heir, Mosuoe, the 
paramount chief and the colonial government. During this contest 
the Batlokoa heritage became an integral part of the political 
and legal discourse, as Mosuoe managed successfully to straddle 
the contradictions arising from the re-structuring of the 
chieftainship. On the one hand he acquired status as a senior 
chief in the 'new' chieftainship. On the other hand, he 
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consolidated his authority with regard to his own subjects by 
establishing very clear boundaries between his area of 
jurisdiction and those of other senior chiefs. His success in 
creating a solid, local basis of authority was expressed in 
ethnic terms. The area and its residents acquired a political 
identity as Batlokoa, a distinction which has since been 
entrenched in official descriptions of the chieftainship 
(Mazenod, 1984). 
The political process through which the chieftainship came to 
express local identities as much as a national identity was 
supported by changes in the people's livelihoods. The changes in 
question are the combination of agricultural activities and 
migrant employment in the late 19th century, their subsequent 
integration with established social practices, and the people's 
increasing reliance, during this century, on migrant work to 
sustain agricultural livelihoods. I suggest that these changes 
endorsed the close bond between chief and subject, but they also 
contributed to the re-definition of the relationship between 
people and the chieftainship as a whole, and of their affinity 
to Basutoland and the state. 
Following the circumscription of Basutoland in 1869, the 
turbulent political economy of southern Africa required Basotho 
to rely on farming and occasional wage employment as 
complementary means of survival. The development of markets in 
agricultural commodities, through expansion of the mining 
industry in South Africa, provided opportunities for Basotho to 
prosper on occasion as farmers. However, they were vulnerable to 
environmental hazards such as drought at least once a decade, and 
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the rinderpest epidemic in the 1890s. They were also vulnerable 
to political hazards such as efforts by South African farmers to 
establish tariff barriers against grain exports from Basutoland 
in the 1890s, and the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1902 which 
restricted trade (Murray, 1981:10-14). 
The hazards of farming were offset by reliance on occasional 
employment in South Africa (Murray, 1981:14-15). Although the 
historical evidence from the early 20th century suggests that per 
capita income from agriculture was steadily declining, farming 
was clearly still the primary economic interest of Basotho 
(Ashton, 1952:173-177; Eldridge, 1993:187-192). Coupled with the 
opportunities to use land as needed, according to the usufructory 
principles of land tenure, and with the dependence on chiefs to 
acquire land, this interest would have supported the expansion 
of the chieftainship and, in particular, the close bonds between 
chief and subject. As the capacity of agriculture to sustain the 
people declined and as migrant work became a necessity, the 
capacity of the chieftainship to encapsulate the economic 
activities of the people and their social and cultural heritage 
receded for several reasons. 
First, the constraints on farming, and the efforts of people 
to resolve them, focused people's attentions on the locality in 
which they were born and raised rather than on the territory as 
a whole. By the 1930s it had become necessary to defer rights 
of access to arable land which had been enshrined in the 
usufructory land tenure system, and ensured through expansion 
of the population into the interior. The general lack of land 
and the threat of landlessness were resolved by allowing people 
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to inherit fields from their parents, though inheritance was 
only legally sanctioned much later. The contribution of these 
developments to the localisation of collective identity is still 
evident, as we saw in the case study of Maliehe 's fields in 
chapter 5. Furthermore, as I discussed in chapter 6, the growth 
of the livestock economy entailed close co-operation between 
stock owners and chiefs within a locality, notably in villages, 
in order to sustain the accumulation of livestock. 
Secondly, the migrant labour system encouraged workers to 
invest in rural homes. With restrictions on settlement and 
employment in South Africa, Basotho workers were driven to invest 
in rural livelihoods, and to support parents, as a means of 
gaining social security in the long term (Murray, 1977; Murray, 
1979; Spiegel, 1979). Thirdly, the reliance on jobs in South 
Africa led to establishment of an ex-patriate population whose 
existence was closely bound to the regular flux of migrant 
workers. Many Basotho established homes in South Africa during 
the 1930s and 40s (Murray, 1981:15), and continue to do so, but 
they rarely gave up their de jure domiciles in Basutoland, 
particularly after the implementation of apartheid, in view of 
the difficulties of gaining rights to permanent residence in 
South Africa. 
In summary, the reference points for collective identity 
sharpened in the face of the changing economic conditions which 
governed the people's lives in and beyond Basutoland. The 
consolidation of ties with localities, through migrant workers' 
support of parents and dependants as a means of gaining access 
to arable land, supported the authority of chiefs vis a vis 
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their subjects. The transition was not a smooth one. The 
proliferation of chiefs, 
subjects in the context 
and the demands they exercised on 
of the latters' general economic 
hardships, became a source of tension throughout Basutoland and 
re-inforced the hand of the colonial government to intervene 
during the 1930s and 1940s. Nonetheless,the interventions also 
affirmed chiefs as local authorities. The colonial interventions 
were really the political corollary to the economic process 
which narrowed people's options for survival. As the authority 
of chiefs became focused on the locality in which they resided, 
so too their subjects were driven to invest in the political 
economy of the locality. 
Furthermore, the close links between rural residents, 
migrants and 'permanent' residents in South Africa can be seen 
to have contributed to creation of a national identity which 
transcended the boundaries of Basutoland. It was constructed in 
reference to the working environment, as in the case of Basotho 
shaft-sinkers on mines who acquired a reputation as the best 
workers for this job and constructed their identity as Basotho 
on this basis; and also in reference to the urban environment, 
as in the case of the street gangs which included the 
'Ma-Russians' whose membership consisted of Basotho men (Guy & 
Thabane, 1988; Coplan, 1992). In short, the political and 
economic history of Basotho incorporated a process in which 
national identity was disassembled from the state. 
The politic al consequences of this disassembling were apparent 
when Lesotho became an independent state in 1966. Popular support 
for independence reflected a long history of resistance to the 
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political and economic deprivations that the people had suffered. 
Nonetheless, this expression of Basotho nationalism could not 
hide for long the incapacity of the state to improve the lot of 
its citizens. Moreover, political independence itself could do 
little to change a population whose existence, and national 
identity was based on the bonds between chief and subject, and 
on links between rural home and urban South Africa, rather than 
on any substantive affinity with the state. In short, political 
independence brought into the open the fragmented political 
culture of Lesotho. Despite the gloss of common language and 
homogeneity of the population, Lesotho was divided into numerous 
political units which were tacitly expressed in the chiefs' 
territories with their own local hierarchies, and were sustained 
by their subjects' efforts to survive on the basis of whatever 
resources were available in the locality. 
Following the BNP's usurption of the state during the 1970 
elections, and Lebua Jonathan's volta face with regard to 
relations with South Africa, Weisfelder ( 1972) described the 
political situation in the following terms: 
' ... these all too real domestic divisions and conflicts must 
also be perceived as desperate expedients in a frantic, ad hoc, 
diplomatic game which is aimed at preserving the maximum 
residual options for the nation or at least for the chance to 
survive.' 
It would have been more correct to assert that the situation 
reflected the state's struggle to survive rather than a 
collective struggle by the nation, particularly in view of the 
BNP' s subsequent interventions which highlighted its ability only 
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to strengthen the barriers between the state and the people. 
Government interventions to impose its authority were di verse, 
ranging from implementation of aid schemes as a form of 
patronage, to politicisation of VDCs, to physical coercion by a 
paramilitary force and the police (Murray, 1981:6). The outcome 
was a deeply divided society, as the rural areas were riven by 
disputes along party political lines, the formation of vigilante 
groups, passive resistance by chiefs and villagers, and military 
resistance by likhukhuni (guerrillas) of the BCP 's 'Lesotho 
Liberation Army' (Leeman, 1985:40-110). For example, Mokhotlong 
district became a centre of BCP activity. Village militias 
(Maboto a Khotso) which were established by the BNP government 
rapidly deteriorated into vigilante groups, according to local 
informants. Furthermore, what was perhaps a longstanding 
perception of difference between lowland and highland existence 
was politicised; travel to the lowlands was, and still is, 
described as 'going to Lesotho' as often as 'going to the 
lowlands'. The interventions could not succeed in securing the 
hegemony of the state over the rural populace because they were 
like those of colonial settlers and governments in the past: 
intrusions which promised little in the way of significant 
improvements to people's lives but threatened the means that 
people had developed to survive, and which were being imposed on 
a population whose existence was simply not governed by the 
existence of Lesotho as an independent state. Instead, the 
interventions exacerbated the di visions between the state and its 
citizens. 
In view of the above, the interventions of the state after 
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1980 reflect an intensification of its efforts to establish a 
commanding presence in the rural areas. Again, the faultline is 
the chieftainship, because the state contends with the recently 
consolidated di visions between itself and its citizens. The 
general context is well defined. The interventions, notably the 
effort to re-structure the agricultural economy, confront a 
multiplicity of local political entities which have become 
sharply defined through localised efforts to derive some 
sustenance from agriculture. As the state attempts to challenge 
the authority of chiefs in this context, so people are driven to 
use the chieftainship as their basis for assessment and response 
to the interventions. The dynamics of this confrontation are, 
however, different to those in the past. 
on the one hand, the re-structuring of the agricultural 
economy promises considerable inflow of state resources into the 
rural areas. This promise raises expectations for the rural areas 
to be a basis of political patronage. Furthermore, it opens up 
the possibility for contestation over the distribution of the 
state's financial resources and subsequent differentiation of 
wealth amongst rural residents. Given the centrality of chiefs 
in management of natural resources, the chieftainship is again 
the focus of political attention. For example, there was 
vociferous debate in the National Assembly about the 
chieftainship, particularly the principal positions before the 
elections. recent general 
installation of a 
distinct political 
The debate included demands for 
Baputhing chiefship in southern Lesotho as a 
entity like the Batlokoa chiefship. Also, 
there was much debate over the occupation of all but three of 
224 
the principal positions by the descendants of Moshoeshoe. 2 
On the other hand, although such debate expresses perception 
of the chieftainship as both a barrier to state interventions and 
as a potentially significant 'gatekeeper' for distribution of the 
state's resources, it does not take into account the potential 
decline in the relevance of chiefs to their subjects. More and 
more people do not have arable land and are unlikely to gain 
access to it, particularly as land holders make use of the 1979 
Land Act to secure private property rights to their fields. 
Moreover, the RMA programme and the new conservation policy pose 
a possible threat to the majority of relatively poor stock owners 
who cannot participate in them on the terms demanded by the 
government and conservationists. Furthermore, the incipent class 
division in the rural areas is producing a relatively wealthy 
elite who are gaining the ability to sidestep the authority of 
chiefs, as is reflected in traders' and salaried officials' 
acquisition of residential and commercial sites discussed in 
chapter 4, and in the alignment of the richer stock owners with 
the government's livestock programmes discussed in chapter 6. 
There is, therefore, a possibility that chiefs will become less 
relevant as rural administrators to an increasing number of their 
subjects. In a different vein, rising levels of unemployment due 
to cut backs in migrant job opportunities in South Africa, 
coupled with the inability of chiefs to help people with access 
to land, are likely to increase popular disdain for chiefs. 
Nonetheless,the situation is complicated by state 
interventions into the livestock economy. The authority and 
relevance of chiefs is likely to be butressed in the face of 
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these interventions for several reasons. First, the interventions 
are a direct challenge to stock owners' grazing and livestock 
management practices which hinge on chiefs' legitimate control 
over use of communal resources. Secondly, the interventions 
ignore the nexus of investment in, and control of, livestock, 
namely the villages, and thus they leave aside a critic al 
position for politic al organisation and resistance under the 
aegis of chiefs. Thirdly, in the context of increasing 
unemployment and lack of access to arable land, livestock are a 
critical resource for rural residents, but without regular access 
to wage incomes, fewer people will have the capacity to build up 
and to maintain large herds. The question which remains is 
whether the state can incorporate this majority of people with 
few animals in programmes which are actually designed for people 
with large herds, and provide greater benefit to the weal thy 
rather than the poor stock owners. The lines of conflict have, 
therefore, been drawn between the state and the majority of the 
rural populace, and the chieftainship is at the interface. 
There is a strong possibility, however, that the state 
interventions into the livestock economy, coupled with 
privatisation of arable land, will exacerbate the class divisions 
that are emerging amongst the rural populace. In that case, even 
if the government succeeds in establishing its authority in the 
rural areas at the expense of the chieftainship, rural society 
will be fragmented yet again, but on different lines. There will 
be a small proportion of the population which continues to derive 
an existence from agriculture, and a larger proportion which will 
be driven towards permanent employment and residence in South 
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Africa. As the relevance of the chieftainship declines and as 
state interventions contribute to an exodus of people, the future 
of the state and the heritage which created a Basotho national 
identity will be in doubt. 
Conclusion 
Rural residents have perceived, and continue to voice, the 
complexity of political culture in Lesotho. This complexity is 
summarised in a question that is the basis of much political 
debate in the country. The question is, should Lesotho be 
incorporated into the 'new' South Africa? It is actually an old 
question, but its currency today stems from the political 
transformation of South Africa. Proponents point to the country's 
economic dependence upon South Africa, and the tenuous existence 
of Lesotho as a state since its birth in the 19th century, to 
suggest that citizens might be better of if they became part of 
the 'new' South Africa. Responses inevitably evoke nationalist 
pride, and the recounting of Lesotho's history of successful 
resistance, first against colonial settlers and,later, against 
incorporation into the Union and against apartheid. But 
proponents argue that the South African nemesis is crumbling, and 
ask what there is to resist. 
Consensus is rare, for the question is really a rhetorical 
summation of complex popular concerns: what is the future of 
Lesotho as a state, and hence, of its citizens? What does it 
means to be Basotho? What is the significance of Lesotho's 
particular history to contemporary political and economic 
circumstances? Moreover, the question presumes uncertainty about 
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the coherence of established social institutions and practices, 
such as the chieftainship, in the face of the multiplicity of 
forces that require re-assessment of rural livelihoods. 
Clearly it would be simplistic to suggest that the 
chieftainship remains the basis on which rural Basotho define 
their world and construct a national identity. While the 
chieftainship is still a particularly significant reference 
point, it is itself subject to re-assessment. Its longstanding 
political and economic significance to rural residents is a 
reason why there appears to be a dual structure of government, 
as I indicated in Figure 4 in chapter 4. However, to accept that 
perspective would be to reify the institution. It would imply 
that the chieftainship is a solid rampart behind which exists a 
coherent Sesotho culture, and from which Basotho resist 
interventions that threaten to change that culture. As I have 
sought to show, the chieftainship still expresses to a large 
extent the social relationships which constitute family and 
society in rural Lesotho. These relationships are changing, 
however, as people witness the transformation of the world around 
them and participate in its transformation, notably in the ways 
they categorise and use natural resources. Moreover, rural 
residents clearly do not simply resist interventions into the 
rural social order. It follows that the validity of using 
'resistance' as a basis for explanation of the continued 
existence and significance of the institution is suspect. 
The chieftainship has certainly been held up as an expression 
of the type of society Basotho have sought to construct in the 
face of external threats. The institution is, however, really a 
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manifestation of a deeper struggle by rural residents to be 
authors of the way they construct and change their world rather 
than passive subjects of others' interventions. It is, 
accordingly, appropriate to see the chieftainship as a faultline 
whose fissures and cracks mark the course of their efforts to 
define appropriate concepts of authority at different times in 
the history of the country. The result is that the chieftainship 
reveals particular, but continually changing, resolutions in a 




THE FUTURE OF THE CHIEFTAINSHIP 
In view of the circumstances described in the previous 
chapter, it is not surprising that people voice disdain about 
individual chiefs, but shy away from suggestions that the 
chieftainship should be dissolved. Chiefs are fallible, imperfect 
representatives of an institution which reflects a longstanding, 
but only partially successful, struggle by Basotho to shape their 
society on their terms, and embodies their collective 
understanding of society and its history. 
Chiefs are really the local government in rural Lesotho. It 
is government conceived in terms of the familial networks that 
constitute settlement, and sustained on the basis of collective 
identification with village and locality. These premises for 
government demarcate the world for chiefs to govern. In terms of 
their extent at any one time and their regeneration over time, 
these familiar networks identify the boundaries, albeit 
fluctuating ones, of the society to which chiefs are responsible. 
Identification with village and locality is a premise for use of 
the land, such that it guides definition of natural resources in 
terms of collective need. Chiefs are the pivot on which Basotho 
have defined and re-defined both the collective need for land and 
the social norms for categorisation and exploi tiation of its 
constituent resources. Their centrality in rural Lesotho as 
authorities who govern on the basis of direct interaction with 
subjects is, however, neither prescribed nor immutable. What it 
is to be a chief has clearly changed as political, economic and 
technological interventions have modified the conditions for 
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access to land and its use and, more generally, the form of rural 
society. 
In schematic terms, chiefs of the mid-19th century occupied 
a tenuous position in relation to their subjects compared to 
their position at the end of the century; moreover, today, their 
position is being re-assessed amidst considerable uncertainty 
about their future viability as a form of authority. As the the 
mid-19th century inhabitants of the highveld sought to re-
establish society in the image of pre-colonial groupings, chiefs 
depended upon their subjects to grant them the authority to 
govern the group's affairs so that individuals could use land. 
Land in that context was the source of sustenance, and access to 
it was seen as an inalienable condition of existence prior to the 
right of chiefs to manage its allocation and use. By the end of 
the 19th century, however, chiefs had usurped this right through 
collusion with, and subjection to, colonial rule. As a result, 
their subjects were dependent on their patronage in order to 
sustain values which were evolving into rights of usufruct to 
land. Today, patronage is as entrenched, as a principle of social 
order, as are rights of usufruct. But chiefs are again dependent 
on their subjects to grant them authority to be patrons, in the 
face of their rapidly decreasing capacity to control use of land, 
and of the development of alternative and necessary means of 
survival. 
The reasons for the discrepancy between popular disdain for 
chiefs and support of the chieftainship lie in this history. 
Chiefs are caught in the middle of contesting efforts by 
different agencies to define the nature and exercise of 
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authority. Popular critic ism of chiefs is inevitable because they 
are the subjects in which different agencies have attempted to 
encapsulate diverse, and often contradictory, criteria of 
authority. Yet, as a body in the form of the chieftainship, they 
represent the social order which rural Basotho have struggled to 
create amidst the many interventions by external agencies. 
Continual re-definition of the centrality of chiefs in the 
imagination and practical affairs of rural residents is marked 
by the numerous interventions to specify and, necessarily (as 
the form of society changed), to re-define the markers which 
identify the particular characteristics of 'chief', the position 
of chiefs in society, and the boundaries of their authority. 
These interventions indicate institutional transformation. The 
process in question is the construction of authority rather than 
its subsidiary, namely the encapsulation of authority in the 
category 'chief'. The former process is not immediately evident 
because it lies in the shadows of the latter, which is the 
domain in which modifications engineered by different agencies 
described. In other words, modifications draw are presented and 
attention to the continued existence of this form of authority 
change in how authority is being re-constructed 
by chiefs. 
rather than to 
and represented 
The remaining question is whether or not this is a process of 
fundamental change as I argued in chapter 2 . The point is 
debatable, given that it depends on the level at which analysis 
addresses the dynamics of change. If analysis emphasises the 
interventions of colonial and post-colonial agencies, the 
implication is that fundamental change was prevented by those 
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agencies' imposition of rigid constraints upon the exercise of 
authority in rural Lesotho by the resident population. If the 
emphasis is on this population, the implication is that these 
constraints dictated only particular directions for change, which 
this population continues to modify and to fashion in terms of 
their collective understanding of society and history. If 
analysis acknowledges both sets of agencies, then it must 
recognise an underlying dynamic; the evolution of the 
chieftainship along a generally predictable course, but subject 
to particular constructions of authority which are unique, and 
which can change that general course. 
This qualified support of my argument in chapter 2 rests upon 
a neo-marxist approach to the topic, informed by questions that 
postmodernist discourse has raised with regard to both 
description and theoretical explanation. While this study has 
retained a focus on materialist explanation, it has also been a 
reflexive exercise. The outcome is an explanation of the 
chieftainship in Lesotho as a modern institution, in the sense 
that it is not a decaying phenomenon carried over from the past, 
but that it was fashioned, and continues to be re-fashioned, in 
relation to the changing circumstances of rural Basotho's lives. 
The chieftainship is a systematic representation of the rural 
populace's struggle to exercise some authority over how politic al 
and economic developments, and ecological consequences, beyond 
their immediate control were, and continue to be, integrated into 
rural society. 
In developing this argument I have highlighted the importance 
of taking into account ecological processes in terms of how 
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'nature' is defined in society, and how bio-physical phenomena 
dictate certain premises upon which definitions are built. This 
approach has been useful to address the underlying dynamics of 
institutional and environmental change. I have used this aspect 
of the study to develop a critique of current interventions by 
the state and para-statal agencies, in terms of how their efforts 
to define objectively the relationship of people to the land 
cannot improve understanding of ecology, let alone fulfil 
aspirations for sustainable development, because they do not 
recognise the fact that this relationship is continually changing 
in form and content. 
The interventions of colonial and post-colonial agencies 
highlight a striving to impose objective criteria of authority. 
This quest for uniformity hid, as it still does, a political 
imperative to sideline the chiefs in favour of the 'objectively' 
constructed institutions of the modern state. In the context of 
evident changes to society within and beyond Lesotho, this quest 
has led to reification of the chieftainship and to its assessment 
as an archaic form of authority. Such reification and assessment 
are premature because, as we have seen, chiefs cannot be so 
easily prised out of society, and from the imagination of its 
subjects. 
The interventions of these agencies established, and continue 
to re-affirm, a political basis, in the form of modern state 
institutions, for gradual dissolution of the chieftainship. Yet 
it is an ineffectual basis in view of its economic constitution. 
However much officials may rail against chiefs, their work and 
the work of supporting donor agencies is focused on the 
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agricultural economy of the country. That attention has 
inevitably brought these agents into a domain in which the rural 
residents have undeniably as much, if not more, appreciation of 
the ecological, economic and political constraints and 
opportunities. Furthermore, it is a domain suffused with a long 
history of diverse reactions, including resistance, 
accommodation, and support, by rural Basotho to the various 
interventions of external agencies. Chiefs have been central 
figures in this history, in the sense that they have been the 
focus of attention of all other agencies with regard to 
questions of how to sustain agricultural activities. The outcome 
is that the numerous interventions of different agents have 
actually embedded the the chieftainship as an institution of 
authority deep into the fabric of rural society. 
The chieftainship is not, however, simply a legacy of 
Lesotho's particular history, and rural Basotho do not shy away 
from suggestions of its dissolution simply because the 
institution is a longstanding cultural edifice. It is the 
embodiment of rural residents' longstanding struggle to authorise 
local aspirations to shape rural society. The rural population 
has supported the chieftainship, but as economic and political 
circumstances have changed, it has also re-defined the 
relationship between chief and subject. This re-definition 
continues in particular ways as the rural populace addresses new 
developments, such as changes in the livestock economy wrought 





reinforcement of local political 
that is fostered by the potential 
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conflict emanating from the establishment of RMAs, and from 
local re-assessment of the scope of chiefs' authority with 
regard to grazing posts built along, and within, their areas of 
jurisdiction. The political consequences of that course are not 
evident, however, in view of the uncertainty about the scope of 
agriculture to play a meaningful role in people's lives in the 
future. 
The existence of the chieftainship and the way it increasingly 
reflects local political identities are due as much to the 
interventions of the national government and donor agencies as 
to the actions of the rural populace. As long as these agencies 
and the national government remain, in effect, as external 
agencies seeking to intervene in rural Lesotho, the future of 
the chieftainship seems secure, and dependant primarily on the 
commitment of the rural populace to rural residence. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTERS 
Chapter 1 
(1) The D/MCCP was a South African government-funded project to 
help devise a conservation policy for the mountain region 
of Lesotho. This project is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 6. 
Chapter 2 
( 1) The undated document is attributed to Jones since it is 
written in the style of his work (personal communication: 
E.Eldridge, Department of History, Michigan University). 
This document is an analysis of the events which led to the 
'medicine murders' that followed the rationalisation of the 
chieftainship in the 1930s and '40s. This document was 
probably written for colonial officials, given that it is 
marked 'secret'. The doubt about authorship stems from the 
unacknowledged inclusion of this material in Ashton's 
monograph and, likewise, incl us ion of data on political 
organisation which appears to be derived from Ashton's 
field research (see Ashton, 1952:185-221) in the undated 
document. These authors probably collaborated to some 
extent in view of the presence of Jones' documents in 
Ashton's field notes and other documents, housed in the 
University of Cape Town archives. 
Chapter 3 
( 1) These villages along the Mokhotlong river valley still 
exist, and are still distinguished as 'Bathepu' villages by 
other residents in the area. There are some old residents 
in these villages who continue to speak a language which is 
different from Sesotho. I have not been able to ascertain 
whether these settlements actually preceeded Lelingoana's 
and Rafolatsane's arrival. 
(2) Oral tradition records that Joel led a troop of warriors to 
fight Lelingoana but stopped at a place now known as 
Khalong ea Lithunya (Pass of Guns) and returned home 
without engaging in battle. During the night that he and 
his men rested at this place, Joel reportedly had a 
nightmare in which he dreamt of being killed by Lelingoana. 
Upon waking, he decided not to pursue Lelingoana but, he 
gave the place its name because he was startled by the 
sight of his men's rifles. 
(3) It is possible that the paramount chief, Griffith, did hope 
that Rafolatsane and Lelingoana would break Seeiso, in view 
of his efforts to have Bereng proclaimed as his appointed 
heir (Ashton, 1952:196-197; Hamnett, 1975:40). 




( 1) The figures were drawn from the 1986 census record, and 
were obtained from the Bureau of Statistics prior to its 
publication. 
( 2) 
( 3 ) 
The Land Committee in Mapholaneng had met on only four 
occasions in 198 6, and seven times during 198 7. At the 
beginning of 1988 chief Reselisi tsoe demanded that his 
committee meet regularly, once a week. Between January and 
March 1988, the committee processed 11 applications for 
residential sites ( 3 of which were also to be used as 
business premises), and three for commercial sites, and it 
ratified the di vision of fields amongst the heirs of a 
deceased landholder. 
Spie Batignolle's interests were also served. The project 
was viewed as a 'loss leader' product by the professional 
staff. It was carried out at a time when lucrative 
contracts were in the offing for the Lesotho Highlands 
water Project, a multi-billion rand scheme to build five 
large dams in the interior of Lesotho and a tunnel to feed 
water into South Africa's Vaal river system. Amidst intense 
competition amongst a number of international consortiums, 
the Tlokoeng project gave Spie Batignolle an opportunity to 
lobby for these contracts from within the country. Indeed, 
the presence of the company's director of operations for 
central and southern Africa on the Tlokoeng site, as 'site 
engineer' in addition to the real site engineer, could 
hardly be justified except as a means to establish close 
contact with government departments and ministers. 
Chapter 5 
(1) This is an estimate based on information provided by stock 
owners and herders on stock losses between October 1987 and 
April 1988 (Quinlan, 1990a:76-77). 
Chapter 6 
( 1) A horse is often given in brideweal th payments and is 
categorised as Molisana, meaning 'the herder' of the other 
animals. A horse is not included in bridewealth payments of 
those who claim a Batlokoa heritage. 
(2) The maternal uncle also fulfils ritual obligations to his 
nephew before,and during, the latter's initiation (Ashton, 
1952:47-48). 
( 3) The current ban on importation of donkeys into Lesotho 
gives an indication of current official concern about the 
numbers of donkeys in the country and their ecological 
effects. I have not been able to find out the specific 
reasons for the ban. 
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Chapter 6/ ... 
( 4) The RMA programme demarcates territorial boundaries in 
Lesotho, borrowing from experience of clearly defined 
reservations in the USA, within which extension workers 
developed livestock and grassland management programmes. 
Information from: A.Dobb, Arizona Ranch Management, Box 
2792, Globe, Arizona. 
(5) Chief Nkuebe Molapo also stated that some men were fully 
occupied as herders and, as a result, the grazing posts 
became homes to them and their wives and children. This 
suggests that grazing posts were not so clearly 
distinguished from villages as they are today. 
(6) There has been no countrywide census of grazing posts, and 
official surveys of posts in RMAs are questionable. During 
the course of the D/CMMP, for example, a Range Management 
Di vision census of grazing posts in the Mokhotlong RMA 
'found' over 400 grazing posts. However, my own research 
and that of an ecologist on the programme in six valleys 
within the RMA indicated that many of the recorded posts 
did not exist or were ruins. 
(7) Mokhotlong town has long been regarded as a "Robben Island" 
by civil servants posted to work in the district 
administration, in view of its isolation from the rest of 
the country. The tendency of civil servants to stay only 
for the minimum two years required is often seen amongst 
rural residents as a reason why little infra-structural 
development occurs. 
( 8) Dobb ( 1985: 136) notes that 78% of stock owners in his 
village survey used grazing posts. 
( 9) There is a lack of adequate comparative data, but some 
exploratory research in summer grazing areas near to 
Mapholaneng (at the head of the Matsoku valley) revealed 
severe degradation of the grassland, and acknowledgement by 
stock owners that this area was unlikely to be useable in 
the near future. 
Chapter 7 
( 1) The potential of tourism is a subsidiary consideration. 
Tourism was initially propagated through building of hotels 
and casinos in Maseru, but it is now being aligned with 
conservation programmes (Crush & Wellings, 1987; Quinlan, 
1990b). 
(2) Personal communication: T.Petlane, Institute of Southern 
African Studies, National University of Lesotho. Advocacy 
for a Baphuthing chiefship was openly voiced earlier, in 
1988, by some senior civil servants who proclaimed a 
Baphuthing heritage (personal communication: S.Gill, 
Lesotho Evangelical Church Museum and Archives, Morija). 
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